ICPR

TRANSLATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS

General Editor
Sibajiban Bhattacharyya

Gadādhara's Theory of Objectivity

Viṣayatāvāda

PART TWO

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CONTAINING THE TEXT OF

GADĀDHARA'S *Viṣayatāvāda*

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION,

EXPLANATORY NOTES AND

A GENERAL INTRODUCTION

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

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PREFACE

This work contains an English translation of *Viṣayatāvāda* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācāryya, the last great Navya-Nyāya philosopher who flourished in the late seventeenth century. His style, being fully developed, is complicated, using the latest technique of Navya-Nyāya. Because of the very complicated conceptual structure of Navya-Nyāya thinking, no work of Gadādhara has so far been translated in any Indian or European language. There is, however, a long tradition of translation of Navya-Nyāya texts, in English, French, German—the languages which I read—and perhaps in other European languages. Saileswar Sen, Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Kuppuswami Sastri, Bimal Krishna Matilal, J.N. Mohanty, Goekoop, Karl Potter and others in English; A. Foucher and Kamaleswar Bhattacharyya in French; Erich Frauwallner and his school in German have developed a technical language[1] in which Navya-Nyāya texts can be translated. Although this technical language of translation is not intelligible to general readers without adequate understanding of the Navya-Nyāya concepts, still with explanations and introductory essays explaining the Navya-Nyāya concepts and techniques of expressions, a sort of intelligibility might be achieved. It is this hope which has prompted me to undertake the present translation, although with what success it is for scholars to judge.

In translating and explaining the text I have derived the greatest help from Pandit Madhusūdana Nyāyācārya whose sudden death on August 26, 1985, deprived me of help in the final stages of writing this book. My general understanding of Navya-Nyāya concepts, as expressed in the *Part One* of this book, is due entirely to him, although he is in no way responsible for my errors. Pandit Viśvabandhu Tarkatīrtha was kind enough to explain a number of pages of difficult text with his characteristic insight and clarity. I only hope that I have been able to

1. For details see Karl H. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. I, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980.

incorporate his explanations fully and correctly; without his help the work would have been far worse than it is.

My thanks are due to Professor Heramba Nath Chatterjee, formerly Principal, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, who provided me with all facilities for consulting books and manuscripts in the College Library, for editing the text. I have followed the text of *Viṣayatāvāda* edited by Dhuṇḍirāja Śāstrī (Chowkhamba, 1940), (cited by me as A); correcting it by the following two manuscripts in the Government Sanskrit College Library:

Subject Nyāya

(1) Cat No. 388, script Bengali, incomplete, 10 pages (cited as B).
(2) Cat No. 2625, script Bengali, incomplete, 8 pages (cited as C).

The text incorporated in *Vāda-Vāridhi* edited by Dhuṇḍirāja (Chowkhamba, 1933) is exactly the same as A. Two other earlier editions (6617 and 6619 in Karl H. Potter's *Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, 1983) were not available to me.

I must thank the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, for full financial support for preparation of the manuscript.

Calcutta University
September, 1985

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

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Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācāryya's *Viṣayatāvāda*, which was published in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 14 (1986), Numbers 2 and 3 (D. Reidel Publishing Company), is reproduced here with minor modifications, as Part Two, with the kind permission of Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal, the editor of the Journal.

PART TWO

विषयतावादः

(*Viṣayatāvāda*)

TEXT, TRANSLATION AND
EXPLANATION

VIṢAYATĀVĀDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Definition of Cognition

Text

बुद्धिर्नाम कश्चिदात्मविशेषगुणः ।

Translation: Cognition is a special quality of the self.

Explanation:

(1) *Terminology*: The Sanskrit *jñāna*, though philologically cognate with the English 'knowledge' through the Greek *gnosis*, is now-a-days translated as 'cognition'. We shall use this translation with the following remarks.

(i) *Jñāna* is used to denote not merely propositional acts like judging, believing, disbelieving, doubting, assuming, inferring, remembering, perceiving, introspecting, but also non-propositional states like sensing, etc. *Jñāna* is, therefore, identical with awareness (of facts, objects, sensory qualities, internal states).

(ii) *Jñāna* is always used in the episodic sense to denote an occurrence of an act, but never in the dispositional sense. The term *saṃskāra* is used for 'disposition' in general, physical as well as mental; in the context of cognition, *saṃskāra* is used to denote unconscious traces which, when stirred up or activated, produce conscious memory.

(2) *Theory*: Cognition is a special quality of the self. According to Navya-Nyāya every finite self has the following fourteen qualities:

(1) Number (*saṁkhyā*)
(2) Magnitude (*parimiti*)
(3) Separateness (*pṛthaktva*)
(4) Contact (*saṃyoga*)
(5) Disjoining (*vibhāga*)

These five qualities are what the self shares with material things. The remaining nine are *special* qualities in the sense that they belong only to finite selves:

(6) Cognition (*buddhi*)
(7) Pleasure (*sukha*)
(8) Pain (*duḥkha*)
(9) Will or desire (*icchā*)
(10) Aversion (*dveṣa*)
(11) Effort (*yatna*)
(12) Memory impression (*saṃskāra*)
(13) Merit (*dharma*)
(14) Demerit (*adharma*)

A special (perceptible) quality is a quality which makes the self an object of introspection. The self-substance, devoid of special qualities, cannot be cognized directly in introspection. In introspection the self is cognized invariably in the form 'I cognize something', 'I feel pain', 'I perform this action', etc. but never as mere 'I'.

The Navya-Nyāya theory of cognition as a special quality of the self has the following special feature. Cognition is the same as awareness, the other special qualities of the self are not conscious states. The next five (7-11) special qualities of the self—pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort—are necessarily cognized in introspective cognition which invariably succeeds them immediately. A cognition, however, *may* itself be cognized, if we so desire, in a higher order, secondary, cognition.

Cognition is one of the nine special qualities of the self. In defining it, it is necessary to state how it differs from the other special qualities of the self. It is usual to define cognition as that special quality of the self which is a cause of all behaviour,[1] and to interpret 'all behaviour' as verbal behaviour, i.e. use of language. The author of the *Padakṛtya,* however, interprets 'all behaviour' literally to include eating, walking, etc.[2] Here Gadā-

[1]Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarkasaṃgraha* with the commentaries of *Nyāyabodhinī, Nirukti, Padakṛtya, Dīpikārahasyā, Vākyārthabodhinī* and *Bhāṣāpariccheda,* p. 22.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 22.

dhara states the definition of cognition simply as a special quality of the self, without further specifying the speciality.

2. Ontological Status of Cognition

Text

तद्व्यवस्थितिः, घटमहं जानामीत्याकारकापामरसाधारणानुभवबलादेव ।

Translation: That cognition is a different kind of reality is established only by introspective cognition of all (including common) people of the form 'I know the jar'.

Explanation: Cognition conceived as a quality of the self-substance is, according to Navya-Nyāya, ontologically a distinct type of reality. The cognition of cognition as a distinct type of reality is by introspective cognition. It is only by this universal introspective evidence that cognition is recognised as a distinct ontological reality. To say that the *form* of this introspective cognition is 'I know the jar' is to say that the introspective cognition *is expressed by* the sentence 'I know the jar'. Cognition being an attribute or a quality (of the self) cannot have any *form* in the sense of physical shape. Hence the idiom 'the cognition of the form of . . .' means only the cognition which is expressed in the sentence '. . . .'.

3. Object and Objectivity

Text

सा च सविषयिका; उक्तधर्मिग्राहकप्रतीत्या घटादिविषयकत्वेनैव तदवगाहनात् ।*

Translation: That (cognition) is, again, always *of an object*, as the (secondary) introspective evidence, mentioned above, is always of a (primary) cognition having the jar etc. as its object.

Explanation: (i) Gadādhara here introduces the concept of *object of cognition* and the property *being an object of cognition*. That every cognition has an object is evidenced by the introspective awareness of the cognition. In introspection, a cognition is

*Typographical errors in A are corrected from B and C.

always cognized as having an object. The phrase 'having an object' means that it is the cognition which determines the objecthood resident in the object. In simple language, this means that the cognition and its objects are correlatives.

(ii) That every cognition has an object can be established by cognizing that cognition, i.e. by introspective evidence.

(iii) By 'object of cognition' is meant whatever is cognized—a thing, a quality, an action, a universal, etc. Thus 'object' does not stand for an isolated thing-like element. It means anything belonging to any category, provided it is cognized.

II. NATURE OF OBJECTIVITY : TRADITIONAL NAVYA-NYĀYA THEORY—REDUCTIONISM

4. OBJECTHOOD AS A RELATION

Text

घटादिनिष्ठं तद्विषयत्वञ्च तत्प्रतियोगिकः सम्बन्धविशेषः ।

Translation: The objecthood of *that* resident in the jar etc. is a particular relation with that as its successor (second term). (that=cognition)

Explanation: 'Cognition *of* an object' simply means that the cognition is related to the object by a special type of relation, the successor (second term) of which is the cognition and the predecessor (first term), the object. The relation is objecthood. The cognition is related to the object by objecthood.

Thus a cognition of a particular jar has the jar as its object. The objecthood of that cognition resides in the jar and that (cognition) is the successor of this objecthood.

4.1 OBJECTHOOD AS A SELF-LINKING RELATION

Text

स च प्रतियोगित्वादिवत् स्वरूपादनतिरिक्त एव; क्लृप्तेन स्वरूपेणैवोपपत्तौ अतिरिक्तकल्पनाया अनवकाशात् ।

Translation: That relation (which is objecthood) is indeed not

an additional entity other than the very nature (of its terms), just as counterpositiveness is the very nature of the entity which is the counterpositive. As it is necessary to postulate that everything has its own nature, there would be no scope for postulating an additional entity, if the problem (of the ontological status of objecthood) is solved by holding that objecthood is the very nature (of its terms).

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains the Navya-Nyāya theory of a self-relating relation. In ordinary relations we have two terms and a relation which is ontologically different from them. But in the case of self-relating relations, they are ontologically identical with the very nature of one or other or of both terms. Gadādhara gives the usual Navya-Nyāya argument that if in order to explain our cognition of a relation between two terms, we do not need to postulate an ontic real as the relation between the terms then it would be unjustified to postulate such an additional entity. If ontologically there is no separate entity serving as the relation between the two terms then how can we explain the cognition of a relational complex, i.e. of two terms as related by a relation? The Navya-Nyāya answer is that the very nature of one, or of the other, or of both terms, functions as the relation in cognition. The Naiyāyikas, specially of the older school, find it unreasonable to postulate a real *additional* relation between a cognition and its object to explain cognition *of* an object. The very nature of one of the terms here namely, the cognition, functions as the relation. It is the very nature of the cognition to be related to its object. It is necessary to postulate that everything including cognition must have its own nature. And if this nature can serve also as a (self-linking) relation, then it is wasteful to postulate an additional reality as the relation.

4.11 *Criticism*

Text

न च तादृशसम्बन्धस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपता विषयस्वरूपता वा स्वीक्रियते इत्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहादुभयस्यैव सम्बन्धता कल्प्या, इति तदपेक्षया लाघवात् सम्बन्धत्वेनातिरिक्तैकविषयताकल्पनमेवोचितमिति वाच्यम्;

(1) *Translation*: It cannot be determined whether the very nature of the cognition or of the object is the relation between the cognition and its object, hence the nature of the cognition and the nature of the object, both, have to be admitted as the relation; but then it would be simpler to postulate an additional relation as one objecthood.

Explanation: The Nyāya philosophers have argued that it is not necessary to postulate a third ontologically real relation to explain how cognition can be *of* an object, by holding that this real relation can be ontologically identical with the nature of one of the terms. Now the objection is, as there is no reason to prefer the nature of the cognition to the nature of the object as the relation between cognition and object, we shall have to hold that the natures of both the terms constitute the relation between cognition and object. But then it will be simpler to postulate one relation ontologically different from cognition and object.

4.111 *Reply*

Text

विषयताया विषयस्वरूपत्वे विषयेण समं तस्या आधाराधेयभावानुपपत्तेः,
ज्ञानस्वरूपाया एव तस्या उपगमात् । अभेदेऽपि आधाराधेयभावोपगमे
घटो ज्ञानविषयतावानितिवत् घटो घटवानित्यादिप्रतीत्यापत्तेः ।

(2) *Translation*: If objecthood were of the nature of the object, then objecthood could not be said to be *in* the object; hence objecthood must be identified with the nature of the cognition of the object. If (the relation of) identity also could explain the cognition of one *being in* the other, then as we have the cognition that the jar (is) objecthood-possessing, we would also have the cognition that the jar (is) jar-possessing.

Explanation: The objection is that there is no reason to choose either the nature of the object or the nature of the cognition as the real relation which is objecthood; hence both have to be accepted as the relation. Against this objection it is now argued that the objecthood as the relation between the object and its cognition has to be identified with the very nature of the cogni-

tion itself, not with the nature of the object. For we have the cognition that the jar possesses the objecthood of the cognition (of the jar) which shows that the objecthood *is in* the jar. Now if the objecthood of the jar were indentified with the very nature of the jar, i.e. with the *jar itself* then we would have such a cognition as the jar *is in* the jar as an explanation of the cognition that the objecthood *is in* the jar. Navya-Nyāya distinguishes between two fundamentally different types of relations: (i) Relations which produce the cognition that one term *is in* the other, and (ii) relations which do not produce such cognition. If objecthood were identified with the nature of the object, i.e. with the object itself, then objecthood and the object would have been identical. But this relation of identity between the object and objecthood cannot give rise to the cognition that the object has objecthood. Identity *is not* an occurrence-exacting relation; so we could not cognize that the jar possesses objecthood of the cognition of the jar.

4.112 *Objection to Reply and Its Reply*

Text

न च विषयतात्वावच्छिन्ननिरूपिताधिकरणतैव घटादावुपेयते न घटत्वावच्छिन्नाधिकरणता इति नातिप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्; तदवच्छिन्न-निरूपितत्वस्य तदाश्रयनिरूपितत्वविलक्षणस्य दुर्वचत्वात् ।

(3) *Translation*: It cannot be said that the jar possesses substratumness determined by what is limited by objecthood-ness and not substratumness limited by jarness and hence there is no over extension. For it is difficult to distinguish between being determined by what is *limited by* some property and being determined by the *locus of* that property.

Explanation: This is an attempted solution of the problem of objecthood being identified with both the cognition and the object. The official Navya-Nyāya position is that objecthood is identical with the cognition but cannot be identified with the object. Now a reply is here attempted to show that even if objecthood be identified with the object there would be no difficulty. The difficulty here is that like the cognition:

(i) The jar is objecthood-possessing,
which we have, we ought to get the impossible consequence,

(ii) The jar is jar-possessing
because of the following identity,

(iii) The objecthood (resident in the jar) = the jar.

The problem is how to distinguish between (i) and (ii), admitting (iii).

The solution lies in distinguishing between two substratum-nesses both of which reside in the jar. This may be explained by analysing (i) and (ii) to reveal more structure. Analysis of (i) proceeds as follows:

(1) The jar is objecthood-possessing.
(2) Objecthood is the superstratum and the jar is the substratum.
(3) Objecthood possesses superstratum-ness which determines the substratum-ness resident in the jar.
(4) Now if objecthood is again cognized under the mode of the higher order abstract, objecthoodness, then objecthood is limited by objecthoodness.

So (3) becomes

(5) The substratumness, determined by the superstratumness limited by objecthoodness, resides in the jar.
(ii) The jar is jar-possessing
becomes merely
(6) The substratumness determined by the superstratumness limited by jarness resides in the jar,
which is, of course, false.

Thus by distinguishing between the two substratum-ness-es resident in the jar one can successfully explain why (i) is true, while (ii) is false.

Reply: The whole explanation of the difference between (i) and (ii) rests on the crucial distinction between 'being determined by what is limited by' and 'being determined by what is a locus of'. But this all-important distinction cannot be explained any

further. 'Something as limited by objecthoodness' and 'something as a locus of objecthoodness' seem to differ only verbally in the absence of any further explanation.

Thus in the present example, (i) becomes

(7) that (superstratumness) which is limited by (i.e. cognized only under the mode of) objecthoodness, determines the substratumness resident in the jar,

whereas (ii) becomes

(8) that which is the locus of objecthoodness (i.e. jarness) determines the substratumness resident in the jar.

The difference

(7) and (8) cannot be further explained, and hence is not justified. So objecthood cannot be indentified with the object also, but has to be identified only with the cognition.

4.12 *An Alternative Solution*

Text

अस्तु वा विनिगमनाविरहादुभयमेव विषयत्वम्, तथापि तादृशोभयस्य क्लृप्तत्वात्, अतिरिक्तविषयतायास्तत्र ज्ञानादिसम्बन्धतायाश्च कल्पनाऽपेक्षया तदुभयस्य ज्ञानादिसम्बन्धत्वकल्पने गौरवानवकाश इति सिद्धान्तानुयायिनः।

Translation: Or, let both be objecthood in the absence of reason for preference, both being necessary. Still there is no scope for heaviness in holding that both constitute the relation of cognition, rather than postulating a different ontological entity of objecthood and, then its additional relation to cognition, etc.

Explanation: It was suggested by the opponent that it will be simpler to postulate one single ontological entity of objecthood instead of postulating that both the object and the cognition constitute objecthood. But Gadādhara points out that the position traditionally held by Navya-Nyāya philosophers is that even if both the object and the cognition be regarded as constituting objecthood still it would not be heavy. On the contrary, to

postulate an independent ontologically real entity as objecthood will be a heavier theory. For, in any case, the object and its cognition have to be admitted, whereas postulation of any other ontologically real entity is not necessary. Moreover, the postulation of such an entity will also raise the problem of relating it to cognition and also to the object. Thus the postulation of an independent, ontologically real, entity to explain objecthood will be a heavier theory.

III. THE THEORY OF THE LATER NAVYA-NYĀYA PHILOSOPHERS

5. Objecthood as an Independent Reality

Text

नव्यास्तु—विषयत्वं पदार्थान्तरमेव, न तु स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः ।

Translation: The later philosophers hold that objecthood is, indeed, a separate ontological reality, and not a special type of self-relating relation.

Explanation: After explaining the theory accepted by the traditional followers of Navya-Nyāya school, Gadādhara now explains the position of later thinkers who deviated from the traditional theory. This deviant theory is that objecthood as the relation between the object and its cognition cannot be ontologically identified with any or both the terms of the relation. The arguments for this deviant theory now follow.

IV. ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEW THEORY: OBJECTHOOD CANNOT BE COGNITION ITSELF

5.1 *First Argument*


Text

तथाहि—ज्ञानविषयताया ज्ञानात्मकत्वे ज्ञानाधिकरणकालस्यापि ज्ञानविषयत्वापत्तिः; कालनिष्ठतत्सम्बन्धस्यापि तत्स्वरूपानतिरिक्तत्वात् ।

Translation: Thus if objecthood of a cognition be indentified

with the cognition itself then even the time of the occurrence of the cognition, too, would (necessarily) become an object of cognition as the relation of cognition to the time of its occurrence is again identical with the nature of the cognition.

Explanation: The commonly accepted theory that the objecthood is the very nature of cognition is first examined. The argument of the later, deviant, Navya-Nyāya philosophers is based on the accepted Navya-Nyāya theory of self-relating relations. These philosophers point out that there are all sorts of situations where a cognition is related to ontologically different types of entities by self-linking relations. Now if objecthood be identified with the cognition itself, then all these different entities to which cognition is related by a self-linking relation would necessarily become objects of the cognition—an absurd consequence. The first case that is cited is the time in which a cognition occurs. Now the cognition is related to the time of its occurrence by a self-linking relation which is, again, the cognition itself. Now as the cognition of a jar is related to the jar, by itself, and also to the time of its occurrence by itself, and if objecthood be identified with the cognition, then the cognition of the jar would have also the time of its occurrence as its object.



where both R_1 and R_2 are the cognition itself. So $R_1 = R_2$, and if R_1 is objecthood, R_2, too, is objecthood, i.e. both the jar and the time of occurrence of the cognition become objects of the cognition of the jar.


5.2 *Second Argument*

Text

एवं स्वाभावेन समं प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिभावरूपज्ञानसम्बन्धस्यापि स्वस्वरूपानतिरिक्ततया घटादिज्ञानस्य घटादिविषयकत्ववत् स्वाभावविषयकत्वस्यापत्तिः ।

Translation: Thus also the relation of cognition with its own negation being counterpositive-locus-ness, is not ontologically different from the cognition itself; hence the cognition of the jar etc. would have its own absence as its object just like the jar etc.

Explanation: If the relation between a cognition and its object be ontologically identical with the cognition itself then the absence of the cognition would become the object of the cognition. For the cognition is related to its own absence by being its counterpositive, and this relation is again ontologically identical with itself.



where $R_1 = R_2$=the cognition (of the jar) itself. Hence the absence of the cognition of the jar would become the object of the cognition as much as the jar itself.

5.3 *Third Argument: An Attempted Solution and Its Untenability*

Text

कालादौ ज्ञानादिसम्बन्धस्यातिरिक्तत्वे च विनिगमनाविरहात् विषयनिष्ठतत्सम्बन्धस्याप्यतिरिक्तत्वसिद्धिर्निष्प्रत्यूहैव ।

Translation: If the relation of the cognition to time etc. be ontologically different from the cognition itself then the relation of

cognition to its object would be similarly ontologically different from the cognition itself.

Explanation: The later deviant Navya-Nyāya philosophers have shown that if the relation of cognition to its object be ontologically identical with the cognition itself then the time of the cognition as well as the absence of the cognition would necessarily become its object for the same reason. Now if to avoid this consequence the traditional Navya-Nyāya philosophers assert that the relation of cognition to time or to its absence is not ontologically identical with the cognition itself, then they would not have any reason to hold that the relation between the cognition and its object be ontologically identical with the cognition itself. The point here is that if it is denied that the cognition is related to the time of the cognition or to its own absence by a self-linking relation, then there will be no reason to hold that the cognition is related to its object by a self-linking relation.

5.4 *Fourth Argument*

Text

एवं विषयताया ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे घटपटावित्यादिसमूहालम्बनात्मकैकज्ञानीयघटपटादिरूपनानाविषयनिष्ठविषयतानामेकतया तादृशज्ञानानां घटत्वपटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नपटघटादिनिष्ठविषयताकतया भ्रमत्वापत्तिः; तदवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नतन्निष्ठविषयताशालिबुद्धेरेव भ्रमत्वात् ।

Translation: So also if objecthood be ontologically identical with the cognition itself, then in the conjunctive cognition 'both the jar and the piece of cloth' where one cognition has many objects there will be correspondingly many objecthoods all of which will however be the same, being ontologically identical with the cognition; hence the true cognition 'both the jar and the piece of cloth' would have to be regarded as false as the objecthood resident in the jar will be limited by the property clothness and the objecthood resident in the cloth will be limited by jarness. For a false cognition is one the objecthood of which resides in something and is limited by a property not resident in that something.

Explanation: A fourth objection against identifying objecthood (i.e. the relation of the cognition to its object) ontologically with the cognition itself, is that a cognition which is simultaneously of many objects, *has* to be regarded as false. This type of cognition is called congnition of a collection. In such a type of cognition there will be as many objecthoods as there are objects, for the cognition has to relate itself to all those objects individually. Thus in the conjunctive conjunction of both a jar and a piece of cloth the cognition will have to be related to both the objects separately by two relations, thus:




Fig. A

Now as both R_1 and R_2 are ontologically identical with the cognition itself they are identical with one another. This means that the objecthood resident in the jar (R_1) and the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth (R_2) being identical, the cognition can be interpreted as the cognition of the jar with the objecthood of a piece of cloth and of the piece of cloth with the objecthood of a jar. As R_1 and R_2 are identical ontologically it would make no difference if the cognition is interpreted thus:




Fig. B

But thus interpreted the cognition becomes false. In Fig. A, the objecthood resident in a jar is limited by jarness, a property which is resident in the jar. In other words, the object which is a jar is known as a jar, i.e. under the mode jarness; so also with the piece of cloth. But in Fig. B, as the objecthoods have been switched, the cognition has become false; for now the objecthood resident in the jar is limited by clothness, a property which is not resident in the jar. This means that in Fig. B the cognition of the thing which is the jar is as a piece of cloth and of the thing which is the piece of cloth as a jar. This cognition is false, for in it a jar has been cognized as a piece of cloth and a piece of cloth as a jar, although this false cognition is, like the true cognition, a cognition of both a jar and a piece of cloth.

5.5 *Fifth Argument*

Text

तादृशज्ञानानन्तरं घटत्वेन पटं जानामीत्याकारकानुव्यवसायापत्तिश्च;
घटत्वावच्छिन्नपटनिष्ठविषयताकज्ञानस्यैव तादृशानुव्यवसायवियषत्वात् ।

Translation: Immediately after such a cognition one ought to have a secondary (introspective) cognition of the form 'I am knowing a piece of cloth as a jar'; for only the cognition having the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth and limited by jarness is the object of such a secondary (introspective) cognition.

Explanation: A fifth objection against ontologically identifying objecthood with the cognition itself is based on an absurd consequence which this theory has for introspective cognition. The introspective cognition is a secondary cognition having a primary cognition of the object as its object. Now the introspective awareness of a conjunctive cognition like the cognition 'both a jar and a piece of cloth' will be not merely of the form 'I know both a jar and a piece of cloth' but of the form 'I know a piece of cloth as a jar and a jar as a piece of cloth'. According to Navya-Nyāya introspection is possible only of a qualified primary cognition which is of the form of *a* (is) *b*-possessing, where *a* is the qualificandum of the cognition and *b* is the qualifier. No indeterminate primary cognition can be an object of a secondary

(introspective) awareness. Now a conjunctive cognition is different from a qualified cognition of one object in this that in a cognition of one object, there is one qualificandum as well as one qualifier. But in a conjunctive cognition of two objects like the cognition 'both a jar and a piece of cloth' there are two qualificanda and two qualifiers thus:

(i) a jar (the thing) is the first qualificandum and jarness is its qualifier.
(ii) the piece of cloth (the thing) is the second qualificandum and clothness (the property—being a piece of cloth) is its qualifier.

Now in introspective awareness of such a cognition one has the cognition of the form, 'I cognize a jar under the mode of jarness and also a piece of cloth under the mode of clothness'. But if the two objecthoods are switched then one should have the introspective awareness of the form 'I cognize what is actually a piece of cloth as a jar etc.', which is absurd. This shows that the objecthood (of the primary cognition) resident in the jar cannot be identified with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth. But this means that objecthood, i.e. the relation of the cognition to its object cannot be identified with the cognition itself.

5.51 *Reply to the Fifth Objection*

Text

न च तादृशसमूहालम्बनीयघटपटादिनिष्ठविषयताया ऐक्येऽपि सा विषयता घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतात्वेन घट एव वर्तते, पटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतात्वेन पट एव वर्तते, अतो न तादृशधियो भ्रमत्वापत्तिः, तदवृत्तिर्यो धर्मस्तदवच्छिन्नविषयतात्वेन तद्वृत्तिर्या विषयता तत्प्रतियोगिन एव ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्। न वा तादृशसमूहालम्बनानन्तरमुक्तानुव्यवसायप्रसङ्गः, घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतात्वेन पटादिवृत्तिविषयताप्रतियोगिन एव ज्ञानस्य तद्विषयत्वादिति वाच्यम्।

Translation (Reply): Even though the objecthood resident in a jar and a piece of cloth of that conjunctive cognition be ontologically identified still the objecthood cognized under the mode of

(the property of) being objecthood limited by jarness resides only in the jar, and the objecthood cognized under the mode of (the property of) being objecthood limited by clothness resides only in the piece of cloth, hence a cognition of that type is not erroneous; for that cognition is erroneous which is the second term of objecthood (which is the relation of the cognition to its object) which resides in something and is cognized under the mode of (the property of) being objecthood limited by a property not resident in that thing. Nor is there any possibility of a secondary (introspective) cognition of that (erroneous) type immediately succeeding the conjunctive cognition. For that type of erroneous secondary cognition has, as its object, that primary conjunctive cognition which is the second term of the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, and cognized under the mode of being objecthood limited by jarness (not resident in the piece of cloth).

Explanation: This is an attempted reply to the above objection concerning conjunctive conjunction. The point made here is this. Even though objecthood resident in a jar is *ontologically* identical with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, still considered *as* objecthood, i.e. cognized under the mode of the second-order abstract property of objecthoodness the two objecthoods are different. The principle here is that even an object which is one ontologically may be known in different ways, i.e. may be different from the epistemological point of view. In the Navya-Nyāya technical language this epistemological point of view is expressed by the concept of the limiting property. The limiting property of objecthood is the way the object is cognized, is the mode of cognition of the object. In the present instance although there is ontologically one objecthood resident both in the jar and in the piece of cloth, still the objecthood resident in the jar, under the mode objecthoodness, i.e. being objecthood, limited by jarness, is different from the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, under the mode objecthoodness, limited by clothness. Thus we cannot switch these objecthoods as they are *cognized* in different ways even though they are ontologically identical.

The point is that we are talking here of cognitions, and cognitions are determined by what features of their objects get mani-

fested in them by the mode under which the object is cognized. Thus if we consider the cognition of the objecthoods by using a higher order abstract property, objecthoodness, which is the mode under which objecthood is cognized then we shall find that the objecthood resident in the jar being limited by jarness is epistemically different from the objecthood which is limited by clothness and is resident in the piece of cloth.

Thus there will be no absurdity in the secondary (introspective) awareness, too, of the primary conjunctive cognition. The objecthood resident in the jar cannot be introspectively cognized as belonging to the piece of cloth if we take into consideration the mode under which the objecthood resident in the jar is cognized.

5.511 *Refutation of the Reply*

Text

यतः घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतात्वेन पटादिवृत्तित्वं हि तद्रूपावच्छिन्न-निरूपितपटादिनिष्ठाधिकरणताकत्वम्, तादृशी चाधिकरणता यदि शुद्ध-विषयतात्वावच्छिन्ननिरूपिताधिकरणतातोऽनतिरिक्ता तदा तादृशज्ञा-नीयपटादिनिष्ठविषयतायामपि तादृशाधिकरणताकत्वमक्षतमेव, अति-रिक्ता चेत्, तर्हि किमपराद्धमतिरिक्तविषयतया इति ।

Translation: For, residence in the piece of cloth, cognized under the mode of being objecthood limited by jarness etc., is merely the property of having substratumness which is resident in the piece of cloth, and is determined by what is so limited. Now if such a substratumness be ontologically the same as the substratumness determined by what is limited by unqualified, pure objecthoodness, then, in the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth as cognized in the conjunctive cognition, the property of having the qualified substratumness remains as before. If they are different ontologically, then what harm is there if objecthood be regarded as an ontologically different entity?

Explanation: Here Gadādhara is refuting the above argument to distinguish between two objecthoods of a conjunctive cognition by having recourse to the second order limiting property,

objecthoodnesses which are the modes under which the objecthoods are cognized.

Gadādhara refutes this argument by analysing residence (in the piece of cloth) cognized under the mode of being the objecthood limited by jarness etc. and the objecthood being cognized simply under the mode of *objecthoodness*. The analysis can be represented as follows:

C_1 = Conjunctive cognition 'the jar and the piece of cloth':
(i) the objecthood of C_1 resident in the jar = the objecthood of C_1 resident in the piece of cloth.
(ii) the objecthood resident in the jar = the objecthood limited by jarness.
(iii) the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth = the objecthood limited by cloth-ness.
(iv) the objecthood limited by jarness = the objecthood limited by clothness [from (i), (ii) and (iii)].

Now (iv) simply states that *ontologically* the two objecthoods are the same.

The attempted reply is based on forming an abstract of the RHS of (ii) and (iii). These abstracts will then be *epistemic* modes thus:

(v) (λx) (x is the objecthood limited by jarness) or, in the language of Navya-Nyāya objecthoodness limited by jarness.

So also from (iii).

(vi) (λx) (x is objecthood limited by clothness) or objecthoodness limited by clothness.

Because (v) and (vi) are epistemic modes, these properties will be different even though (ii) and (iii) are not different ontologically as in (iv). So (v) will reside only in the jar, and (vi) will reside only in the piece of cloth and hence the cognition will be true. These properties, therefore, cannot be switched to turn C_1 false.

Criticism: This attempt to save the theory that objecthood is

identical with cognition does not succeed. For by switching (v) and (vi) we get (v) resident in the piece of cloth and (vi) resident in the jar. Now what is this residence in the piece of cloth? It is just.

(vii) (λx) (x resides in the piece of cloth),
where x is the superstratum and the piece of cloth is the substratum.

So (vii) really stands for the superstratumness which is the determiner of the substratumness resident in the piece of cloth. Thus :

(viii) Residence in the piece of cloth = being the determiner of the substratumness resident in the piece of cloth.

Hence:

(ix) The property *being a resident* (in the piece of cloth) cognized under the mode of objecthoodness limited by jarness is identical with

(x) the property of being the determiner of the substratumness which is resident in the piece of cloth and is determined by what is limited by objecthoodness limited by jarness.

But then the question is, whether (x) is the same as

(xi) the property of being the determiner of the substratumness which is resident in the piece of cloth and is determined by what is limited by objecthoodness pure and simple?

There are two possible answers.

(a) As a qualified entity is identical with that entity without the qualifier, so the substratumness determined by qualified objecthoodness (in (x)), and that determined by simple objecthoodness (in (xi)), is the same. But then the objecthoods can be switched and the true conjunctive cognition is rendered false. For even if the epistemic modes are different, their residence may be the same; hence, this residence of the modes may be, although the modes cannot be, switched.

(b) The second answer is that the residences are different ontologically, i.e. a qualified residence is ontologically different from

unqualified residence. But then what harm is there if objecthood is postulated as an ontologically different real entity?

V. OBJECTHOOD CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE OBJECT

6.1 *First Argument*

Text

विषयताया विषयस्वरूपत्वे च घटत्वप्रकारकप्रमानिरूपितायाः पट-त्वप्रकारकभ्रमनिरूपितायाश्च घटनिष्ठविषयताया ऐक्यप्रसङ्गेन घटत्व-प्रकारकप्रमाया अपि भ्रमत्वापत्तिः ।

Translation: If objecthood be ontologically identified with the object, then the two objecthoods resident in the jar which is the object of true cognition as jarness-possessing and is also the object of false cognition as clothness-possessing, being identified, the true cognition of jar would also become a false cognition of the jar.

Explanation: Gadādhara, explaining the position of deviant modern Navya-Nyāya philosophers, examines the position that objecthood is identified ontologically with the object. The first objection to this identification is based on the fact that one and the same object, say the jar, can be the object of a true cognition as well as of a false cognition. But if the objecthood of a cognition is identified with the object then the objecthood of the false cognition and the objecthood of the true cognition would become identical, thus making the true cognition false. A true cognition differs from a false cognition of the same object by virtue of different objecthoods determined by these cognitions. Thus the objecthood determined by a true cognition is different from objecthood determined by the false cognition, even though the true cognition and the false cognition have the same object. The possibility of thus distinguishing between true and false cognition would be ruled out if objecthood determined by a cognition be identified with the object of cognition.

6.2 *Second Argument*

Text

एवं घटवद् भूतलं, घटभूतलसंयोगा इति ज्ञानयोरविशेषप्रसङ्गश्च; विषयाणां तदात्मकविषयतानाञ्चाविलक्षणत्वात् ।

Translation: So also the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' and the cognition of 'jar, ground and contact (relation)' cannot be distinguished, the objects as also the objecthoods being indistinguishable.

Explanation: This is a second argument against identification of objecthood with object. According to Navya-Nyāya there is a fundamental difference between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition, by virtue of their objecthoods. Now if objecthood be identified with the object then no difference can be made between these two types of cognition. For the qualified cognition, 'jar-possessing is the ground', has three objects—the jar, the ground, and the relation of contact between them expressed by the suffix '-possessing'. The conjunctive cognition, 'jar, ground and contact' also has the same objects. If objecthood and object of cognitions be identified then these two types of cognition which have the same objects cannot be differentiated.

6.21 *Reply and its Refutation*

Text

न च प्रथमज्ञाने सम्बन्धविधया भासमानस्य संयोगस्य सम्बन्धोऽपि अधिको भासते, न तु समूहालम्बनरूपे चरमज्ञाने, इत्यत एवोभयोर्वैलक्षण्यमित्युपाध्यायमतं सम्यक्; संयोगादिप्रतियोगिकसम्बन्धमादायापि समूहालम्बनसम्भवात् ।

Translation (Reply): In the first cognition the contact is cognized as a relation; and hence *its* relation, too, becomes cognized; but in the second cognition the relation of the contact, is not cognized. Thus this theory of Upādhyāya is adequate to distinguish between the two types of cognitions.

Refutation: It is possible to have conjunctive cognition with the relation of the relation as one of its objects.

Explanation: An attempt may be made to distinguish between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition on this theory by accepting the interpretation of Yajñapati Upādhyāya. In a qualified cognition 'Jar-possessing is the ground' the ground is the qualificandum, the jar is the qualifier and the relation, contact, is the qualification. Now Upādhyāya holds that to know a relation as a relation between two objects it is necessary to know which object is the *first term of the relation* and which the *second term of the relation*. But to know this is to know the relation of the relation with its two terms. According to Upādhyāya, in a qualified cognition we not merely know the qualificandum, the qualifier and the relation between them, but also the relation of the relation to the qualificandum and the qualifier. Thus there are five objective factors in the relational complex which is cognized as the object of the qualified cognition. In the case of conjunctive knowledge however of the form, 'the ground, the jar, and contact' there are only three items of the objective complex cognized in such a cognition. Thus a qualified cognition and the conjunctive cognition will be distinguished by the number of items cognized in the objective complex.

But Gadādhara says that this line of argument does not really help; for it is possible to have a conjunctive cognition not merely of the form, 'the jar, the ground and contact' but also of the form 'the jar, the ground, contact, being the first term (of the contact), and, being the second term (of the contact)'.

6.22 *Another Reply*


Text

न च संयोगसंसर्गकविशिष्टबुद्धौ संयोगः स्वरूपत एव भासते न तु संयोगत्वेन, सखण्डपदार्थस्यापि सम्बन्धविधया स्वरूपतो। भानाभ्युपगमात्, उक्तसमूहालम्बने च संयोगत्वेन संयोगो भासते इति संयोगत्वरूपाधिक-विषयभानाभानाभ्यामेव तयोर्विशेष इति वाच्यम्;

Translation (Reply): In a qualified cognition where contact is the qualifying relation, contact is cognized in and through itself, not

under the mode of contactness. For even an analysable entity may be admitted to be cognized as a relation in and through itself. But in the conjunctive knowledge mentioned above, contact is cognized under the mode of contactness, (as contact is not cognized as a relation). Thus a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition are distinguished from each other by considering whether contactness has been manifest in the cognition or not.

Explanation: Another attempt is made to distinguish a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition on this theory. According to Navya-Nyāya only one relation, inherence, has been admitted as an independent ontological entity, but all other relations have been assimilated into other non-relational categories. Yet in a cognitive situation an entity which is ontologically not a relation may yet serve as a relation in that cognition. This is because what entity is functioning as a relation in a certain cognition is determined by the relation of the cognition to that entity. This may be explained by the following diagram:



One cognition, C_1, is related by three different relations, R_1, R_2, R_3 to three elements in the objective complex. That element in the objective complex functions as a relation to which the cognition is related by R_3, whether the element is ontologically a relation or not does not matter. Thus the Navya-Nyāya theory is that an entity which is ontologically not a relation (i.e. not inherence), may yet be the first term of R_3 in the cognition. Now what is the peculiarity of R_3, such that to be the first term of it is to be cognized as a relation in the cognition? According to

Navya-Nyāya philosophers, the peculiarity of R_3 is this that *its* first *term* is never cognized under a *mode*, although anything other a universal or an unanlysable property cannot be so cognized as a qualifier or a qualificandum. In all other cases, the qualificandum and the qualifier are, as a rule, cognized under a mode; whereas anything cognized as a relation is never cognized under a mode whatever may be its ontological status. This feature of the different elements of the objective complex may be taken to be the defining mark of a relation. A relation is not an ontologically different type of entity; it is that which is cognized under no mode in a determinate, i.e. qualified cognition. Thus one entity may function as a relation in a certain cognition, but may not function as a relation in another cognition, by simply being cognized under a mode.

Now, in the qualified cognition 'jar-possessing (is) (the) ground', contact between the ground and the jar functions as a relation, because it is not cognized under the mode of contact-ness. But in the conjunctive cognition '(the) jar, (the) ground, and contact', contact, being a qualificandum, just like the jar and the ground, is cognized under the mode, contact-ness. Thus whether contact-ness has been manifested in the cognition or not, will determine whether the cognition is conjunctive or qualified.

6.221 *Refutation*

Text

एवमपि घटवद् भूतलं संयोगश्च घटभूतलसंयोगा इति ज्ञानयोर्विशेषानिर्वा-
हात् ।

Translation: Even then the two cognitions, 'jar-possessing is the ground and contact' and 'the jar, the ground and contact' cannot be distinguished.

Explanation: But this way of distinguishing between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition does not succeed for the following reason. Let us take two types of conjunctive cognition —one in which a conjunct is itself an object of a qualified cognition, and the other where the conjuncts are separate items.

Example of the first type of conjunctive cognition:

(C_3) jar-possessing is the ground and contact.

Now in this cognition, the first conjunct being an object of qualified cognition contact is not manifested under a mode; but then as the contact is again the second conjunct, it has to be cognized under a mode. Thus in this cognition we have the jar, the ground and contact all three cognized under their respective modes.

Example of the second type of conjunctive cognition:

(C_4) the jar, the ground and contact.

In this conjunctive cognition, again, all the three items, the jar, the ground and contact are cognized under their respective modes. Thus we cannot say that a conjunctive cognition and a qualified cognition differ by the fact that in qualified cognition the relation is not cognized under a mode. For undoubtedly C_3 and C_4 are different cognitions, yet not merely the object cognized but also the modes of their cognition are the same in two cases.

6.23 *Another Reply*

Text

घटवद् भूतलमिति ज्ञानस्य घटप्रकारकत्वमेव घटविशेष्यकोक्तसमूहालम्ब-नाद् विशेष इति चेत् ?

Translation: If it is said that in the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' the jar is the qualifier and in the conjunctive cognition the jar is the qualificandum and hence they are different, then the reply is this:

6.231 *Refutation of the Reply*

Text

घटप्रकारकत्वं हि घटनिष्ठप्रकारताप्रतियोगित्वम्, घटविशेष्यकत्वञ्च घटनिष्ठविशेष्यताप्रतियोगित्वम्, तत्र च ज्ञानीयप्रकारताविशेष्यते यदि प्रकारविशेष्याभ्यामनतिरिक्ते तदा उक्तविशिष्टबुद्धेरपि घटविशेष्यकत्वम्,

उक्तसमूहालम्बनस्यापि घटप्रकारकत्वं दुर्वारमेव; घटात्मकयोस्तन्निष्ठ-प्रकारताविशेष्यतयोर्भवन्मतेऽभिन्नत्वात् । यदि च ते अतिरिक्ते तदा सिद्धं नः समीहितम्; प्रकारताविशेष्यतयोर्विषयतात्मकत्वात् ।


Translation: Having the jar as the qualifier is simply being the successor (the second term) of (the relation of) qualifier-ness resident in the jar; similarly having the jar as a qualificandum is simply being the successor (the second term) of the (the relation of) qualificandumness resident in the jar. Now if qualifierness and qualificandumness relative to the cognition be ontologically non-different from the qualifier and the qualificandum then even the qualified cognition will have the property of having the jar as the qualificandum and the above mentioned conjunctive cognition, too, will have the property of having the jar as the qualifier. For in your view, qualifierness and qualificandumness resident in the jar are identical with each other, both being identical with the jar itself. If, however, they are ontologically different then our position is conceded to, qualifierness and qualificandumness being identical with objecthood.

Explanation: 6.23—6.231—Qualified cognition refers to an objective structure of the form aRb where *a* is the qualificandum, *b* the qualifier and *R* the qualification of the cognition. In the qualified cognition of the form 'jar-possessing is the ground', the ground is the qualificandum, jar the qualifier and contact is the qualifying relation. In the conjunctive cognition of 'the jar, the ground and contact' the jar is the qualificandum, like the ground and contact. Thus this conjunctive cognition has three qualificanda and three corresponding qualifiers, namely, jar-ness, ground-ness and contact-ness. Thus the qualified cognition of the form 'jar-possessing is the ground' and conjunctive cognition of the form 'the jar, the ground and the contact' can be distinguished from each other by the fact that while in the qualified cognition jar is the qualifier, in the second cognition the jar is the qualificandum.

But this way of distinguishing between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition is not justified because of the following reason. What is it for a cognition to have the jar as a qualifier? It is merely to be the second term of the relation,


qualifierness resident in the jar. To have the jar as the qualificandum a cognition has to be the second term of the relation, qualificandum-ness, resident in the jar. This may be explained by the following two diagrams:

Cognition having jar as the qualifier



where R_2 is the qulifierness resident in the jar (the first term), of which relation the cognition is the second term.

Cognition having the jar as qualificandum



where R_1 is the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar (the first term) of which relation the cognition is the second term.

Now the question is : What is qualifierness, or qualificandum-ness ontologically? If they are self-linking relations, then in the first case, qualifierness is ontologically identical with the jar; so also is qualificandumness in the second case. Thus even in the first case, the cognition will have the jar as its qualificandum and in the secondcase it will have the jar as the qualifier. Hence the two cognitions cannot be distinguished by holding that the jar is the

qualifier in the first case, and the qualificandum in the second case. If, however, qualifierness and qualificandumness be regarded as ontological entities, different from the jar and different from each other, then, as qualifierness and qualificandumness are two forms of objecthood, objecthood becomes ontologically a different type of reality.

6.24 *Another Reply*

Text

यत्तु भासमानवैशिष्टचप्रतियोगित्वं प्रकारत्वं तादृशवैशिष्टचानुयोगित्वं च विशेष्यत्वं न विषयतारूपमिति

Translation: The theory that the qualifierness is being the second term of the relation manifested in the cognition and qualificandumness of a cognition is being the first term of such a relation and hence not identical with objecthood is untenable.


6.241 *Refutation of the Reply*

Text

तदसत्; उक्तसमूहालम्बनस्यापि घटप्रतियोगिकवैशिष्टचविषयकतया घटप्रकारकत्वापत्तेः, संयोगादिरूपव्यधिकरणसम्बन्धेन द्रव्यत्वादिभ्रमस्य द्रव्यत्वादिप्रकारकत्वानुपपत्तेः, भूतले घट इत्यादिज्ञानस्य भूतलाद्यनुयोगिकसंयोगादिविषयकतया भूतलादिविशेष्यकत्वापत्तेः, गुणादौ संयोगादिसम्बन्धेन घटादिभ्रमस्य गुणादिविशेष्यकत्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

Translation: For even the above mentioned conjunctive cognition has the jar as the qualifier, for as the jar is the second term of a relation which is the object of cognition. Secondly, in the erroneous cognition of substance-ness residing in something by the relation of contact which is an incompatible relation, substance-ness cannot be explained as the qualifier of the erroneous cognition. Thirdly, in the cognition 'the jar is on the ground' the relation manifested in the cognition is contact, with the ground as the first term, and hence the cognition would have the ground as the qualificandum. Fourthly, the erroneous cognition of a jar in a quality by the relation of contact cannot have the quality as its qualificandum.

Explanation: 6.24—6.241—So far various attempts have been made to define the qualificandum and the qualifier of a cognition by relating them to the cognition by different relations. But now an attempt is made to define them without a direct relation to the cognition. This new theory may be explained by the following diagram:




Here the cognition is directly related to a relation which must be evident in a qualified cognition. That which is in fact, but not cognized as, the first term of this relation which has become evident in the cognition by being directly related to it, is the qualificandum; and that which is in fact, but not cognized as, the second term of this relation is the qualifier.

The difficulties of this theory stem from the fact that neither the qualificandum nor the qualifier of a cognition is directly related to the cognition and is not therefore manifested as such in the cognition. They are not objects of the cognition but are factually related to the relation which is manifest in the cognition.

The *first* objection is to show that the jar could become the qualifier of the conjunctive cognition 'the jar, the ground and contact' as the jar is the second term of the relation contact of which the first term is the ground. The point here is that the contact which is cognized is a relation the first term of which is the ground and the second term is the jar, although it is a fact that they are not cognized as such. Factually, contact is a relation between the ground and the jar but when contact is cognized in the conjunctive cognition, it is not cognized as holding between the ground and the jar. The theory under consideration holds that if factually certain things are the first and second terms of a

relation which alone is cognized, then the terms of this relation become the qualificandum and the qualifier *of the cognition.*

The *second* objection to this theory is that in an erroneous cognition where the relation cognized does not as a matter of fact hold between the terms which however have been cognized wrongly as the terms of the relation, they cannot be regarded as the qualificandum and the qualifier of the cognition. The following diagram will make the point clear.



Now there cannot be ontologically a relation of contact between a substance and substance-ness; hence when such a relation is erroneously cognized as holding between a substance and substance-ness, they cannot be regarded as the qualificandum and the qualifier of the cognition as they are not factually the first and the second term of the relation cognized, even though erroneously.

Thirdly we can cognize a relational complex in two ways: (i) we may cognize the first term of the relation as the qualificandum and the second term as the qualifier of the cognition. (ii) Or we may cognize the first term of the relation as the qualifier and the second term of the relation as the qualificandum. Thus we may cognize the relational complex of a jar on the ground either as (i) the ground is jar-possessing or as, (ii) the jar is on the ground. In (i) the jar is the qualifier, in (ii) it is the qualificandum. Yet in both the cases, factually the jar remains the second term of the relation of contact. Thus this theory which defines the qualifier of a cognition not by its relation to the cognition, but by a factual property of being the second term of the relation which alone becomes manifest in the cognition, fails to explain cases like (ii) where the jar has become the qualifier.

Fourthly, the theory cannot explain the case of an erroneous cognition of a jar being in contact with a quality when actually a jar cannot be so related to a quality. The quality cannot be qualificandum of the erroneous cognition as actually it cannot be the first term of the relation of contact.

6.25 *Another Reply*

Text

अथ वास्तवतादृशवैशिष्टचप्रतियोगित्वानुयोगित्वे न प्रकारताविशेष्यत्वे येनोक्तदोषाणामवसरः स्यात्, अपि तु वैशिष्टचप्रतियोगितया तदनुयोगितया च भासमानत्वमेव प्रकारत्वं विशष्यत्वञ्च—इति चेत्? न;

Translation: Now, then, the factual second term and first term of a relation manifested are not the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition but only when they are manifested as the second or as the first term of the cognized relation, they become the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition.

6.251 *Refutation of the Reply*

Text

प्रतियोगितयेत्यादौ तृतीयार्थस्य दुर्वचत्वात्, भासमानत्वस्य ज्ञानविषयतात्मकतया प्रकारताविशेष्यतयोर्विषयतात्वसिद्धेश्च ।

Translation: But this attempt at salvaging the theory also fails. For it is very difficult to explain the meaning of 'as' in 'manifested as'. Moreover to be manifest in a cognition is to be an object of that cognition; hence qualifierness and qualificandumness become forms of objecthood.

Explanation: 6.25—6.251—The above difficulties of this theory may be avoided if instead of defining the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition as what are actually the second and first term of the relation which is manifested in the cognition, they are defined as those objects which become manifested, in the cognition, as the second and the first terms of the manifested relation.

But this attempt to save this theory is not successful. For it is

not clear what is to be meant by 'as' in 'manifested as'. Secondly, to be *manifested* as the first and second term of the manifested relation is simply to be the objects of the cognition. Thus being the qualifier or the qualificandum of a cognition is simply being an object of the cognition. Thus qualifierness and qualificandumness become forms of objecthood.

VI. OBJECTHOOD IDENTIFIED WITH BOTH COGNITION AND OBJECT

7. Argument for the Theory

Text

यत्तु विषयत्वं न केवलज्ञानस्वरूपं नापि केवलविषयस्वरूपमपि तु ज्ञानविषयोभयस्वरूपम्, अतो न प्रागुक्तदोषाणामवसरः, तथाहि घटपटावित्यादिसमूहालम्बनीयघटादिनिष्ठतज्ज्ञानघटाद्युभयात्मकघटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतायाः पटादिनिष्ठतज्ज्ञानपटाद्युभयात्मकपटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतानात्मकतया न तादृशज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वापत्तिः, न वोपदर्शितविशिष्टधीसमूहालम्बनयोरविशेषप्रसङ्गः; तादृशसमूहालम्बनस्य तथाविधविशिष्टबुद्धिनिरूपिततज्ज्ञानघटोभयात्मकप्रकारताऽनिरूपकत्वेन विषयतावैलक्षण्यस्य सत्त्वात् इति––

Translation: The theory that objecthood is not merely ontologically identical with the cognition, not also with the object itself, but is of the nature of both the cognition and the object, avoids the above mentioned objections. For the objecthood (of the conjunctive cognition 'the jar and the piece of cloth') resident in the jar, and ontologically identical with both the jar and its cognition, and limited by jar-ness is not identical with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, and identical with both the piece of cloth and its cognition, and limited by cloth-ness; hence this conjunctive cognition cannot be possibly interpreted as false. Nor is there any possibility of non-distinction between above mentioned qualified cognition and the conjunctive cognition; for, there is a difference in the objecthood of the two cognitions, as the conjunctive cognition of that type does not have the qualifierness, which is determined by the qualifier cognition

of the above mentioned type, and which is ontologically identical with both the jar and its cognition.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains another attempt to avoid postulating objecthood as a separate ontological entity. The theory is to identify objecthood ontologically not merely with either the object or the cognition but with both. This theory of objecthood may be symbolically represented as:

T objecthood is ontologically indential with both the cognition itself and the object itself
TS (λx) (λy) (x is the cognition of the object y).

The two other theories previously discussed identified objecthood of a cognition either with the cognition itself or with the object itself. These theories may be represented symbolically thus:

A objecthood is ontologically identical with the cognition itself:
AS (λx) (x is the cognition of (object) y)
B objecthood is ontologically identical with the object itself:
BS (λy) (x is the cognition of (object) y).

Although AS and BS denote relational property resident in only one of the two, cognition and its object, still these properties are regarded as relations, although *ontologically* they are identical with one or the other of the two terms. As we have already discussed in detail both these theories, we now turn to an examination of T.

It is claimed on behalf of T that it avoids the defects of the earlier two theories A and B. First of all a true conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth cannot be rendered false by switching the objecthood resident in the jar with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth. Thus it is impossible to cognize erroneously a jar as a piece of cloth and a piece of cloth as a jar. The reason for this impossibility of thus interpreting a true conjunctive cognition as false is that the objecthood of the conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth, which is resident in the jar is ontologically identical with the jar and

its cognition and limited by jar-ness, such an objecthood being not the same as the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, and ontologically identical with both the piece of cloth and its cognition. Hence the one objecthood cannot be replaced by the other. As objecthood resident in the jar cannot be interpreted to be resident in the piece of cloth, the possibility of interpreting a true conjunctive cognition as false is excluded.

The other objection that a qualified cognition cannot be distinguished from the corresponding conjunctive cognition is also answered. For the two objecthoods are different: the objecthood of a conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth does not have the qualifier-ness which is determined by the qualified cognition and is ontologically identical with the jar and its cognition. To cognize 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' is to have the qualifierness resident in the jar (the jar is the qualifier in this cognition), determined by this qualified cognition, and ontologically identified with both the jar itself and its cognition itself. The objecthood resident in the jar, in the conjunctive cognition 'a jar and a piece of cloth', is determined by the conjunctive conjunction not by the qualified cognition (the jar here is the object of this conjunctive cognition, and not of the qualified cognition) and cannot be ontologically identified with the jar and *its qualified* cognition. Thus the two objecthoods resident in the jar cognized in two different ways, are different; *hence* the two cognitions are also different.

7.1 *Criticism of the Argument*

Text:

तदप्यसत्; घटपटावित्येतादृशसमूहालम्बनात्मकज्ञानस्य तज्ज्ञानपटोभयात्मकपटत्वावच्छिन्नपटनिष्ठविषयताकत्वेन घटत्वावच्छिन्नघटनिष्ठतज्ज्ञानघटोभयात्मकविषयताकत्वेन च घटनिष्ठा या पटत्वावच्छिन्ना तज्ज्ञानरूपा विषयता तन्निरूपकत्वेन भ्रमत्वापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात् ।

Translation: That theory, too, is untenable. The objecthood of the conjunctive cognition 'both a jar and a piece of cloth', (i) is resident in the jar, (ii) is limited by clothness and (iii) is ontologically identified with the cognition of the jar as cognized under the two

modes (a) the property of having the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth and is limited by clothness and ontologically identical with the piece of cloth and its cognition; (b) the property of having objecthood resident in the jar and which is limited by jar-ness and its cognition. This objecthood being determined by the conjunctive cognition, the charge that a true conjunctive cognition is rendered false is difficult to avoid.

Explanation: The theory of objecthood that it is ontologically identical with both the object and its cognition is not an improvement upon inadequate theories examined earlier (theories A and B). It has been argued that the objecthood resident in the jar if ontologically identified with the jar and its cognition cannot be switched with the objectivity resident in the piece of cloth. But this contention is untenable for the following reason.

Let us examine the objecthood resident in the jar. It is identical with the jar and its cognition. Now the question is what is the nature of this cognition of the jar? The jar is the object of this cognition and therefore the objecthood resident in the jar is ontologically identical with the cognition of the jar. But it is possible to have, on the theory under consideration, an objecthood resident in the jar but is limited by clothness. If the objecthood resident in the jar is limited by clothness then the jar becomes the object of cognition as a piece of cloth thus the conjunctive cognition becomes erroneous. Now we have to explain how the objecthood resident in the jar can yet be limited by clothness—the objecthood which is identical also with the cognition of the jar. The explanation is as follows:

The conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth determines two objecthoods—(i) one objecthood which (a) is resident in the jar, (b) is limited by jarness and (c) is ontologically identical with the jar and *the conjunctive cognition*; (ii) another objecthood, (d) which is resident in the piece of cloth, (e) is limited by clothness and (f) is ontologically identical with the piece of cloth and *the conjunctive cognition.* The conjunctive cognition cognized as thus determining both these objecthoods can be said to determine also the objecthood which is resident in the jar (a), but which is limited by clothness (e), and is ontologically identical with the conjunctive conjunction. Here the switching occurs

between the limiting *properties* of objecthoods and *hence*, of objecthoods, but there is no direct switching of objecthoods which are ontologically different.

This is because one and the same conjunctive cognition determines objectivities having features:

F. ((*a*). (*b*). (*c*)). ((*d*). (*e*). (*f*).)

which can be regrouped as

F* ((*a*). (*e*). (*c*)). ((*d*). (*b*). (*f*).)

because conjunction is both associative and commutative. But F* renders the conjunctive cognition false, as determining the objecthoods resident in one thing and being limited by properties resident not in *that* thing but in the other thing.

7.11 *Objection to the Criticism*

Text

अथ तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नविषयतात्वं तज्ज्ञानतत्तद्विषययोर्व्यासज्यवृत्ति उपेयते, एवञ्च तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नविषयतात्वेन तद्धर्मानधिकरणवृत्तिर्या विषयता तत्प्रतियोगित्वमेव भ्रमत्वम्, उपदर्शितसमूहालम्बने च पट-त्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतात्वस्य तज्ज्ञानपटाद्युभयपर्याप्ततया तेन रूपेण तदुभयात्मकविषयता न घटादिवृत्तिः; घटादेस्तद्रूपाश्रयपटाद्यात्मकवि-षयत्वासम्बन्धित्वात्, स्वाश्रययावद्व्यक्तिसम्बन्धिन एव व्यासज्यवृत्ति-धर्मपुरस्कारेण तदाश्रयवत्त्वात्, इति न तस्य भ्रमत्वापत्तिः इति चेत् ?

Translation: Objection: Now the property of being objecthood, (objecthoodness) limited by the property of that, acquires *vyāsa-jya-vṛtti* of both that object and a cognition of that object. Hence an erroneous cognition is a cognition of that objecthood which resides in a substratum which is not of that property and which is cognized under the mode of being objecthood limited by that property. In the example, of the conjunctive cognition cited above, the property of being the objecthood limited by cloth-ness etc., being located in both the piece of cloth and its cognition, cannot, cognized as such, reside in the jar, the jar being un-related to the objecthood which is the locus of object-hoodness having the *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property. Such an objecthood-

ness cognized as possessing the *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property will have as its loci all and only its substrata. Hence the true conjunctive cognition cannot possibly be interpreted on this definition of objecthood as a false cognition.

Explanation: Now another method is used to support the definition of objecthood as being ontologically identical with both the cognition and its object. If objecthood is defined in this way then objecthood-ness will reside in both the cognition and the object but not in each separately. Objecthoodness thus conceived becomes a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property which, like bothness, can reside only in both but not in each object separately. Navya-Nyāya philosophers postulate a new type of relation by which a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property resides only in both; this new relation is the *paryāpti* relation. Thus *paryāpti* relation is the relation by which a property resides in two or many objects without residing in each. This type of property which becomes the second term of a *paryāpti* relation is a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property; and conversely a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property can reside in both or many without residing in each only by *paryāpti* relation.

Objecthood being identified with both the cognition and the object objecthoodness becomes a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property which resides by *paryāpti* relation in both the cognition and the object but not in them separately. Thus a true conjunctive cognition cannot be given an interpretation which renders the cognition false by switching the objecthood resident in the jar with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth. Objecthood now identified with the nature of both the cognition and the object, objecthood-ness thus becoming a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property, can reside only in both a cognition and its object. As the jar is not an object in which objecthood which resides in the piece of cloth can reside,—such an objecthoodness resides in all and only those objects which are ontologically identical with objecthood—there is no possibility of interpreting the true conjunctive cognition as false.

7.111 *Reply to Objection*

Text

पटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविषयतात्वं स्वरूपादतिरिक्तं न वा? आद्ये किम-

पराद्धं तद्रूपावच्छिन्नातिरिक्तविषयतया? अन्त्ये च तस्य व्यासज्यवृत्ति-
त्वानुपपत्तिः; तत्तत्स्वरूपस्य प्रत्यकविश्रान्तत्वात् ।

Translation: Is the property of *being the objecthood* (objecthood-ness) limited by cloth-ness etc. an ontologically separate entity or not? If the first alternative is accepted, then what harm is there in regarding objecthood as a separate ontological entity? If the second alternative is accepted, then objecthood-ness cannot be a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property, as the very nature of the cognition or of its object is located completely and wholly in each of them.

Explanation: Gadādhara here shows that this attempt, too, cannot succeed. He asks: What is the ontological status of the property of *being objecthood* thus defined? Is it ontologically identical with the nature of both the cognition and its object or not? If the objecthood-ness be regarded as an ontologically separate type of entity, then what harm is there in postulating objecthood as an ontologically separate type of entity? If, on the other hand, objecthoodness be regarded as being ontologically identical with the cognition and the object, then it ceases to remain a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property. For the nature of cognition in itself is completely located in the cognition; so also is the case with the nature of the object. So if objecthood-ness be identified with the nature of the cognition and also the nature of the object then objecthood-ness would reside in each of them. This is because according to Navya-Nyāya there is nothing in the ontology which can have both the nature of the cognition and the nature of, say, a piece of cloth. According to Navya-Nyāya, in ontology there are only individual objects, but no collection or totality. Thus objecthood being identical with the cognition and its object, objecthood-ness as the nature of cognition and the nature of the piece of cloth will come to reside in each of them and hence will not be a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property.

7.112 *Reply Continued*

Text

एवं तद्रूपेण घटादिवृत्तित्वं विषयतात्वेन घटादिवृत्तित्वादतिरिक्तं

न वा? आद्ये किमपराद्धमतिरिक्तविषयतया ? अन्त्ये च तद्रूपेण घटादिवृत्तित्वं तादृशज्ञानीयस्वात्मकविषयताया अक्षतमेव ।

Translation: Thus, is residence in jar etc., cognized under that mode, ontologically different from residence in the jar cognized under the mode of being objecthood, or not? In the first alternative, what harm is there if objecthood is conceived as an independent reality? In the second alternative, residence in the jar etc., conceived under that mode (under the mode of being objecthood limited by cloth-ness) continues to belong to the objecthood which is identical with such a cognition.

Explanation: Moreover, there is a further objection to this theory. The question here is whether objecthood-ness is ontologically different from residence in the jar. In the conjunctive cognition a jar and a piece of cloth are both objects. Hence objecthood of this cognition resides in the jar and also in the piece of cloth. This residence in the jar of the objecthood of the conjunctive cognition can be cognized under two modes—one mode making the conjunctive cognition false. If we cognize residence (of objecthood) in the jar under the mode of being objecthood limited by cloth-ness the conjunctive cognition itself becomes false, being the cognition of a jar as a piece of cloth and the piece of cloth as a jar. There is, however, a second mode under which residence (of objecthood) in the jar etc., can be cognized, i.e. under the mode of being objecthood (not limited by cloth-ness). Now the question is whether residence in the jar etc., cognized under the two modes, is ontologically different or not. If they are regarded as different, then what harm is there in regarding objecthood as ontologically different form of the nature of the object and its cognition? If they are regarded as ontologically identical—residence (of objecthood) in the jar cognized under the mode being objecthood limited by cloth-ness and under the mode of being objecthood not so limited—then the conjunctive cognition becomes false as the objecthood which resides in the jar can be cognized as being limited by cloth-ness.

VII. REJECTION OF THE THEORY

8. ARGUMENT FOR THE REJECTION

Text

एवं जातिमान् घट इत्यादौ घटत्वाद्येकविषयवृत्तेरेकज्ञानीयविषयताया जातित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वतदनवच्छिन्नत्वाभ्यां द्वैविध्यमनुपपन्नम्; ज्ञानस्य विषयस्य च द्वैविध्यविरहात्। तथाच जातिमानित्याद्याकारकैकविधघटत्वादिविषयताशालिज्ञानात् तादृशज्ञानस्य विलक्षणविषयताशालित्वानुपपत्त्या विलक्षणाकारकतानुपपत्तिः, तस्मात् विषयत्वमतिरिक्तमेव ।

Translation: Thus in (the cognition) 'universal possessing is the jar' the objecthood of one cognition resident in the one object, jarness, cannot be said to be twofold—being limited by universalness and not limited by it—the cognition as well as the object lacking twofoldness. So also the cognition 'universal possessing' which has one objecthood resident in jarness cannot be distinguished from the former cognition, as the two cognitions cannot be said to have distinct objecthoods. Hence it cannot be established that they have different forms. Hence objecthood is a separate ontological reality.

Explanation: Gadādhara gives here another argument to establish the theory that objecthood must be accorded a separate ontological status. He is criticizing here the traditional Navya-Nyāya reductionist theory that objecthood is ontologically identical with both the cognition and the object.

Gadādhara points out a further difficulty of this position. He takes two examples of cognition which are of different forms and have different objects and hence different objecthoods.

(i) The first example is of a cognition of the form 'universal-possessing is the jar' where jarness becomes the object in a two-fold way. (a) Jarness as the limitor of the qualificandumness resident in the jar is cognized in and through itself without a further mode. (b) But jarness as the qualifier—the universal in 'universal-possessing' is simply jarness—being mentioned as a universal is cognized under the mode of universalness. Thus jarness is cognized in a twofold way, once under the mode of universalness, in (b), and without such mode in (a). This means that, in (b), the objecthood resident in jarness is limited by universalness,

in (a) it is not so limited. Thus there are two different objecthoods resident in jarness in this cognition.

If, however, objecthood be identified with cognition and object then there cannot be two objecthoods in jarness. For, the cognition is one cognition and so also is the object, jarness, although the limitors of the objecthood being different, the objecthoods themselves must be different. As the traditional Navya-Nyāya theory identifies objecthoods with cognition and object and as different limitors of objecthood cannot make any difference to the object, there can, therefore, be only one objecthood on this theory. But then this cognition (i) cannot be distinguished from the following cognition.

(ii) This cognition is of the form 'universal-possessing' in which one cognizes a particular jar only through the mode of jarness. This jarness again being mentioned as a universal is cognized under the mode of universalness. But here there is no cognition of jarness without a mode because the word 'jar' is not used. This cognition is different from cognition (i) because in the latter the jar is first cognized as possessing jarness in and through itself without a further mode and also cognized under the mode of universalness as the word 'universal' is used. But in this cognition as the word 'jar' is not used, but the word 'universal' is used, jarness is cognized in only one way, under the mode of universalness. Here the objecthood resident in jarness is limited by universalness. So in this case also there is one cognition and one object, jarness. If objecthood be identified with cognition and object then the two cognitions (i) and (ii) cannot be distinguished from one another although their objecthoods are distinct, their forms being distinct.

Thus in order to distinguish between these cognitions of different forms objecthood has to be accorded a separate ontological status.

VIII. INFINITE REGRESS OF RELATIONS AND ITS SOLUTION

Text


अथ विषयतावद् विषयऽनुयोगिताऽऽख्यस्तत्सम्बन्धो ज्ञाने प्रतियोगिताऽऽख्यस्तत्सम्बन्धश्च तुल्ययुक्त्याऽतिरिक्त एव उपगन्तव्यः । स्व-

रूपानतिरिक्तत्वे ज्ञानविषयनिष्ठयोस्तत्सम्बन्धयोरविलक्षणतापत्त्या ज्ञानस्येव विषयस्यापि सविषयकत्वम्, विषयवद् ज्ञानस्यापि तद्विषयत्वमापद्येत । एवं विषयताया ज्ञानघटादिनिष्ठेन सम्बन्धेन समं कालाभावादिनिष्ठसम्बन्धस्यापि अनतिरिक्तत्वेन वैलक्षण्यानुपपत्त्या कालाभावादीनामपि घटादिविषयकत्वापत्तिः, घटज्ञानादिविषयकत्वापत्तिश्च । एवं तुल्ययुक्त्या तादृशसम्बन्धस्यापि सम्बन्धः, तत्सम्बन्धादिरपि अतिरिक्तः स्वीकरणीय इत्यनवस्थितसम्बन्धधाराकल्पनप्रसङ्गः । एवं विषयतासम्बन्धेऽपि ज्ञानस्य तदीयतानियामको निरूप्यत्वाख्यसम्बन्धविशेषसस्तुल्ययुक्त्याऽतिरिक्तः, एवं तत्सम्बन्धादिरपि इति तत्रापि सम्बन्धधाराऽनवस्थापत्तिः इति चेत् ? का क्षतिः; न हि प्रामाणिकानवस्थाया दूषणावहत्वम् ।

Translation: Then, like objecthood, its relation to the object, i.e. being the first member, and its relation to the cognition, i.e. being the second member, should be regarded as ontologically separate for similar reasons. If these relations be regarded as ontologically non-different from objecthood then the two relations of cognition and an object to the objecthood being indistinguishable, the object, too, like the cognition, will have an object; and, like the object, the cognition, too, will have objecthood. So also objecthood being ontologically identical with its relations to cognition and jar etc., the relation of objecthood to the negation of time etc., also being identical with objecthood, these relations of objecthood to cognition and object, on the one hand, and of objecthood to the negation of time etc., become indistinguishable. Thus it would follow that negation of time etc., too, will have the jar etc., as its object, and also the cognition of the object as its object. Hence for the same reason the relation of this relation of objecthood has to be admitted as being ontologically different from other entities; and so on ad infinitum. Thus the cognition will have to be related to the relation of objecthood which is of the nature of determiner-determined relation, must also be ontologically a separate reality and so on ad infinitum.

The reply to the objection is that there is no harm in this infinite regress of ontologically real relations, all different from each other, as this infinite regress is supported by cogent reasons and is therefore not a defect.

Explanation: If objecthood has to be regarded as an ontologically separate reality then the relations of objecthood to cognition on the one hand, and to the object on the other, have also to be regarded as independent realities. These relations of objecthood to cognition and to object cannot be identified with objecthood itself without reducing them to objecthood. But this nature of objecthood will also be the relation of objecthood to the negation of time etc., and hence the negation of time etc., being related by the same relation to objecthood as those of the cognition and also its object to objecthood, the negation of time etc., will be the same as the cognition and also the same as the object. But this is absurd. Thus their supposition that objecthood is an ontologically independent reality not reducible to the object itself and/or the cognition itself carries with it the further demand that the relation of objecthood, the relation of the relation of objecthood and so on, to the object and also to the cognition, must also be independent reals. Thus there will be an infinite regress of real relations between objecthood and object, and also to cognition. This may be represented by the following diagram:



The point here is that objecthood which is the relation between cognition and object has become a real entity, thus needing further and further relations on both sides—thus generating infinite regress on both the sides—on the side of the first term, and also of the second term of objecthood. At no stage, can

these infinite relations be identified ontologically with the terms themselves without thereby making objecthood itself an unregulated relation between cognition and object; many things other than the cognition and the object are related by the self-linking objecthood directly, or indirectly, perhaps, by a very long chain of relations. Hence, not merely objecthood, the direct relation between cognition and object, but also all subsequent relations have to be awarded ontological independence, leading to two infinite regresser of relations.

The reply to this is simply to say that infinite regresses of this nature are not logically harmful; for they have been established by valid arguments. They cannot, therefore, be adduced to prove the invalidity of the arguments themselves.

IX. COGNITIONHOOD AS AN INDEPENDENT REALITY

Text

विषयतावद् विषयित्वरूपज्ञानानुयोगिकविषयसम्बन्धोऽपि अतिरिक्त एव, न तु विषयताप्रतियोगित्वमेव विषयित्वम्; विषयित्वमेवातिरिक्तं तत्प्रतियोगित्वमेव विषयत्वमित्यस्यापि वक्तुं शक्यतया द्वयोरेवातिरिक्ततासिद्धेरिति।

Translation: Like objecthood its converse, cognitionhood,—the relation with cognition as the first term and the object as a second term—has to be regarded as an independent real. Cognitionhood cannot be reduced to being the second term of the relation of objecthood, for it can be argued other way around that objecthood itself, is the converse of this relation which is, therefore, fundamental. Hence both objectivity and its converse are to be regarded as independent reals.

Explanation: The relation of cognition to its object is objecthood. The converse of this relation is the relation of the object to its cognition. This converse relation may, therefore, be called 'cognitionhood' in the manner of 'objecthood'. Now the question is: What is the ontological status of this relation of cognitionhood? It cannot be reduced to objecthood ontologically by holding that

cognitionhood is the abstract of the second term of objecthood. The point may be explained thus:

(a) Objecthood $= (\lambda x)$ (x is the object of cognition y).
(b) Cognitionhood $= (\lambda y)$ (x is the object of cognition y).

Now, *ontologically*, cognitionhood, as *being* the second term of objecthood, may be identified with objecthood itself. For being the second term of a relation, is not an ontologically independent property, but is identical with the relation. But against this argument, it is pointed out here, that there is no way of determining which of the two relations—objecthood or cognitionhood—is ontologically fundamental and which one is to be reduced to being the first or the second term. Hence both objecthood and cognitionhood have to be accorded independent ontological reality.

X. DIFFERENCE OF OBJECTHOOD

Text

विषयता च विषयभेदाद् भिद्यते, अन्यथा घटपटावित्यादिसमूहालम्बनीय-घटपटादिनिष्ठविषयताया ऐक्ये पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या तादृशज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वापत्तेः घटाद्येकैकविषयकज्ञानीयैकैकवृत्तिविषयतातः समूहालम्बने नानाविषय-वृत्त्यतिरिक्तैकविषयताकल्पनप्रसङ्गेन गौरवाच्च, अस्मन्नये समूहालम्बने क्लृप्तप्रत्येकज्ञानीयविषयतानामेवोपगमाद् ज्ञानभेदेन विषयताभेदे माना-भावात् ।

Translation: Objecthood must be conceived to become different by difference of objects, otherwise in the conjunctive cognition 'the jar and the piece of cloth' if the objecthood resident in the jar and the piece of cloth were identical, then by the arguments given above such a cognition would be erroneous.

If to explain a conjunctive cognition resulting from objecthood, resident singly in individual objects, of a cognition of, a single object like the jar etc., it is postulated to be the determiner of single objecthoods, over and above one objecthood resident in different objects, then this postulation will be heavy; on our theory (on the other hand) objecthood of *each* cognition which is to be assumed necessarily (in any case) can explain the

possibility of conjunctive cognition; as there is no justification for the theory that objecthood differs when cognitions differ.

Explanation: Now that objecthood has been postulated to be an independent reality, the question arises whether objecthoods would differ with the difference in the objects or with the difference in cognitions. Gadādhara holds that objecthoods would differ with the difference in objects, but not with the difference in cognitions. Objecthoods resident in different objects have to be conceived as different for otherwise by identifying objecthoods resident in different objects, all conjunctive cognitions could be shown to be false. A conjunctive cognition like the cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth may result from two different cognitions of the jar and of the piece of cloth. When one has two different cognitions of the jar and of the piece of cloth and *then* has the single conjunctive cognition of the jar and the piece of cloth, how many objecthoods are to be postulated to explain such a conjunctive cognition? A cognition determines the objecthood which is limited by a property resident in the object. In the case of the above conjunctive cognition the question is; how many determiners of objecthood must be assumed? To postulate that over and above the determiners of the single objecthoods resident singly in the jar and in the piece of cloth, the determiner of one objecthood resident in both the jar and the piece of cloth will be too heavy. Gadādhara argues that on his theory in a conjunctive cognition resulting from two or more separate cognitions of individual objects, there will be single objecthoods resident in single objects and there will not be an additional objecthood resident in the totality of two or more objects. Even those who postulate an additional objecthood resident in the totality have also to postulate single objecthoods determined by the single cognitions. Thus the postulation of objecthoods determined by the separate single cognitions is necessary. The main point of the opponents, here, is: as the two cognitions of the jar and of the piece of cloth produce a separate conjunctive cognition, the objecthoods determined by the single cognitions will be different from the objecthood determined by the conjunctive cognition which is a different cognition. Gadādhara refutes this contention and argues

that even though the cognitions—non-conjunctive and conjunctive—are different still the objects of the non-conjunctive cognitions remain the same as the objects of the resulting conjunctive cognition. The principle therefore is: objecthoods will differ if objects differ, not if the cognitions differ.

XI. QUALIFICANDUM-NESS AND QUALIFIER-NESS AS DISTINCT OBJECTHOODS

Text

एतेन—घट इत्यादिविशिष्टबुद्धेर्विशेष्यविशेषणभावापन्नेषु घटघटत्वादिषु एकैव विषयता, न तु विशेष्यनिष्ठा विशेषणनिष्ठा च विषयता भिन्ना—इति मतं हेयमेव; विशेष्यनिष्ठविशेष्यतात्मकविषयतया समं विशेषणनिष्ठप्रकारतात्मकविषयताया अभेदस्यासम्भवदुक्तिकत्वात्, तथा सति तादृशबुद्धौ घटप्रकारकत्वघटत्वविशेष्यकत्वयोरापत्तेः । न च प्रकारताविशेष्यतयोर्विषयतारूपतायामेवेयमनुपपत्तिः, सैव न, अपि तु पदार्थान्तरे एव ते, तयोर्विषयतात्वे मानाभावादिति वाच्यम्; विषयेऽतिरिक्तविषयतानां तत्र च विषयतात्वस्य कल्पनामपेक्ष्य विषयवृत्तित्वेन क्लृप्तानां प्रकारताविशेष्यतानां विषयतात्वकल्पनस्यैव न्याय्यत्वात् ।

Translation: It will follow from this that the theory—that in the qualified cognition of the jar, the objecthoods resieent in the jar and jarness which fnnction as the qualificandum and the qualifier respectively of the qualified cognition are identical, the objecthood resident in the qualificandum and the objecthood resident in the qualifier are not different—is to be rejected. The objecthood which is the qualificandumness itself, and is resident in the qualificandum, cannot possibly be identified with the objecthood which is identical with the qualifier-ness resident in the qualifier; for in that case the qualified cognition could be interpreted as the cognition with the jar as the qualifier and the jar-ness as the qualificandum. It cannot also be contended—that the very objecthood of qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness cannot be justified and that these two are different ontological realities, there being no justification for regarding them as kinds of objecthood—for it is more proper to postulate the objecthoodness of qualifierness and qualificandum-ness which have to be, in any case, postulated as residing in the object, rather than to

postulate ontologically additional types of objecthoods resident in the object, and separate objecthood-ness residing in this new type of objecthood.

Explanation: As a consequence of the theory that objecthood as a separate reality differs with the difference in objects, the theory that the qualificandum and the qualifier of a qualified cognition have one objecthood has to be rejected. In the qualified cognition 'the jar', the jar is the qualificandum and jar-ness is the qualifier. The one cognition of the jar relates itself in two different ways by two different relations, to the qualificandum and to the qualifier which are elements in the complex object cognized. As objecthood is the relation of cognition to object, and as the cognition has two different relations to the qnalificandum and to the qualifier, the cognition therefore determines two objecthoods resident in the qualificandum and the qualifier. Hence the theory that there is one objecthood, determined by the cognition which is one, resident in both the qualificandum and the qualifier has to be rejected. If the objecthood resident in the qualificandum, i.e. qualificandum-ness, and the objecthood resident in the qualifier, i.e. qualifierness, be identified, then there will be no way of determining which element in the object is the qualifier or the qualificandum. In the cognition of the jar one would be able to say that the jar is the qualifier and jar-ness is the qualificandum of the cognition as there is total identity of the objecthoods resident in them. Thus there will be no way of distinguishing between the qualificandum and the qualifier *as objects*, i.e. by means of different objecthoods resident in them. It may be objected here that qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are not different objecthoods because they are not objecthoods at all. Like objecthood, qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are two additional objecthoods resident in the qualificandum and the qualifier.

Against this objection Gadādhara points out that it involves multiplication of entities—qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness as additional objecthoods, and also an additional objecthood-ness in them etc. It is much simpler to hold that qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are objecthoods.

9.1 *Criticism of the Theory*

Text

यत्तु—निर्विकल्पकीया प्रकारताविशेष्यताभिन्नत्वेनोभयमतसिद्धा या विषयता विशिष्टज्ञानस्यापि सैव विषये सम्बन्धः, तत एव च विशिष्टबुद्धेरपि सविषयकत्वनिर्वाहोऽस्तु किं प्रकारतादीनां विषयतात्वोपगमेन, प्रकारतादीनां विषयतानात्मकत्वेऽपि तद्वैलक्षण्यस्य ज्ञानवैलक्षण्यसम्पादकत्वे न कश्चिद्विरोधः—इत्यपि हेयमेव ।

Translation: This theory also has to be rejected: the objecthood of indeterminate cognition, which is admitted by both sides (of the debate) to be different from qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness, is the relation of the qualified cognieion to its object. Hence how a qualified cognition can have an object can be explained thus. So why should qualifier-ness etc., be regarded as objecthood? Even if qualifier-ness etc. be not identified with objecthood, still there is no contradiction in holding that a difference of qualifier-ness etc. would make the cognition different.

Explanation: Gadādhara examines here an objection that even if qualifier-ness etc. be not identified with objecthood, still all facts about cognition can be explained. The suggestion is that the objecthood datermined by an indeterminate cognition is neither the qualifier-ness or the qualificandum-ness of a qualified cognition. This is because in indeterminate cognition the object is directly presented, but is not cognized through any mode, and hence the object directly cognized does not have a relational structure of something *cognized as* something. Hence there is neither any qualificandum nor any qualifier in indeterminate congnition. Yet this type of cognition always has an object. The objecthood resident in the object of an indeterminate cognition, is, therefore, different from both qualificandumness and qualifierness. This is a new type of objecthood. This is admitted by both Gadādhara and his opponents.

Now the suggestion is that even the object of a qualified cognition in which a qualificandum and a qualifier must be distinguished, may be related to the determinate cognition by the objecthood which is admitted by all in indeterminate cognition. There is no need at all to postulate that qualificandumness and

qualifierness are forms of objecthood. A qualified cognition has an object because the object has this objecthood of indeterminate cognition.

Now even if qualifierness and qualificandumness are not forms of objecthood, i.e. even if the qualifier and the qualificandum are not regarded *as* objects of the qualified cognition, still there is no difficulty in the view that different qualifiers or different qualificanda make the qualified cognitions different. Cognitions may be made different not merely by difference in what is regarded *as* their objects. Gadādhara now gives arguments why this suggestion, too, has to be rejected.

9.11 *Gadādhara's Reply*

Text

प्रकारताविशेष्यतयोर्विषयतात्वानुपगमे व्याप्यपक्षविशेष्यकपरामर्शयो-र्व्याप्यविषयतानिरूपितपक्षविषयताशालित्वेनानुगमय्यानुमितिहेतुत्वा-सम्भवात् कारणताबाहुल्यापत्तेर्निर्विकल्पकीयविषयतायाः परस्परं निरूप्यनिरूपकभावविरहात् ।

Translation: If qualifier-ness and qualificandum-ness be not regarded as objecthoods, then the causes of the two forms of consideration—the pervaded being the qualificandum and the locus of the inference being the qualificandum—cannot be given a general enunciation by stating the common feature of both; the alternative of stating the general causation by stating the common feature of having the objecthood resident in the pervader determined by the objecthood resident in the locus of the inference is not possible. Hence different causes have to be postulated to explain the two forms of considerations.

Explanation: Gadādhara points out various difficulties in the theory that qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are not objecthoods. Here he states the first objection by pointing out that a causal law for inferential cognition cannot be stated in general terms to cover two different types of cases. According to Navya-Nyāya the cognition of the conclusion of an inference is produced directly by another cognition which is called consideration. Thus the cognition of the conclusion 'the hill is fire-possessing' may

be produced by two different types of consideration: (i) the cognition that the hill possess smoke pervaded by fire will cause the inferential cognition that the hill possesses fire. (ii) A different consideration 'smoke pervaded by fire is on the hill' would also produce the same inferential cognition. The problem here is to state a general causal law that would cover both these types of causes. The difference between these two types of consideration is simply this that the qualificandum and the qualifier of the one are interchanged in the other. If qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness be not regarded as objecthoods there is no way of stating this general causal law. But if they are regarded as objecthoods then one objecthood resident in the qualificandum determines, or is determined by, the objecthood resident in the qualifier. Hence by simply saying that the *objecthood* resident in the pervaded (smoke) determines the objecthood resident in the locus of inference, a general statement of what is common to the two forms of consideration is obtained. The difference between the qualificandum and the qualifier is ignored by treating them as objecthoods. It is only in this way that the general causal law of inferential cognition can be stated.

If qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness be not regarded as objecthoods, nothing common to both can be found and hence the general law of causation cannot be stated. The only alternative that remains open is to state special causal laws. But this implies heaviness as many causal laws involve many limiting properties of cause-ness and effect-ness. Hence regarding qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness as objecthoods makes for simplicity.

9.11 *Reply Continued*

Text

एवं संसर्गज्ञानस्यानुपनायकतामते उपनीतभानं प्रति उपनायकज्ञानस्य तत्प्रकारकत्वेन तद्विशेष्यकत्वेन च हेतुताद्वयप्रसङ्गः, मन्मते तु प्रकारता-विशेष्यते संसर्गताभिन्नविषयतात्वेनानुगमय्य एकहेतुताकल्पनसम्भवात् ।

Translation: So also on the theory that cognition of a relation cannot be a cause of associational cognition, such a cause would be a cognition of something as a qualifier or of something as a

qualificandum; and hence there would be two causes in such a case. On my theory, however, qualifierness and qualificandumness both have the common feature of being objecthood different from relation-ness, and hence one causal law can be formulated.

Explanation: Another objection to the theory that qualifierness and qualificandumness are not objecthoods is, again, based on the impossibility of formulating a general law of causation, this time, of associational cognition. Associational cognition is, as a rule, a kind of perception. The usual example of such a cognition is the visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as fragrant. Now fragrance is not an object of visual perception. Yet a person who had previously smelled a piece of sandlwood and cognized it to be fragrant, would perceive visually that a piece of sandalwood is fragrant, if he remembers his past experience. In the present visual perception only the qualificandum is visually perceived, the qualifier, however, is not visually perceived, but is still the object of present cognition. As all perceptual cognitions require some sort of direct relation with the object, and as in this case, fragrance is not an object of visual perception, the present memory of the past olfactory experience is necessary to explain how a piece of sandalwood which is visually perceived as fragrant. The Navya-Nyāya theory is that the present memory cognition is the relation which explains this sort of hybrid perception. Now in this example it is the qualifier which becomes the object of present perception by being presented, or fetched out, by memory which functions as the perceptual relation between eyes and fragrance. According to one section of Navya-Nyāya philosophers in this type of associational direct cognition the object related to the relevant sense organs by memory cognitions or any other preceding cognition can only be either a qualificandum or a qualifier of the hybrid perception. The present memory cognition or the preceding cognition which functions as the direct relation between the inappropriate sense organs and the object, must therefore, be a cause of the hybrid perception. As cause of the hybrid perception the present memory cognition must precede the hybrid cognition which it produces. The important point to be noted here is that even though the piece of sandalwood is visually perceived and its fragrance

remembered from past experience still the resulting cognition is not of the form 'a visual perception of a piece of sandalwood and a memory of its fragrance', but of the form 'a visual perception of piece of sandalwood as fragrant'. The memory cognition or any other type of cognition which produces a hybrid perceptual cognition cannot be of a relation as a relation. Whatever is remembered or otherwise presented to consciousness, so that it becomes an object of the hybrid perception cannot be a relation, but only the qualificandum or the qualifier. Thus a memory cognition of a qualificandum or of a qualifier is the cause of the hybrid associational perception. Now as sometimes the memory of the qualifier, and sometimes the memory of the qualificandum, is the cause of this type of cognition, the problem is how to state a general causal law which will cover both the cases. If both qualifierness and qualificandumness be regarded as objecthoods, then qualificandumness and qualifierness can be said to have the common property, objecthood other than relationness. In this way a general causal law for hybrid perceptions can be stated. If there is nothing common between qualificandumness and qualifierness, then a general statement of the causal law becomes impossible. There will be then only two special causal laws involving two different limitors of causeness etc. and it would thus become a heavier theory.

9.11 *Reply Continued*

Text

एवं निर्विकल्पकीयविषयतायाः, विशिष्टबुद्धावुपगमे घटत्वादिनिर्विकल्पकादिव जातित्वादिना घटत्वादिज्ञानादपि स्वरूपतो घटत्वादिप्रकाररिकाया घट इत्याद्याकारकविशिष्टबुद्धेरापत्तिः । न च स्वरूपतस्तद्विशिष्टबुद्धौ तद्विशेष्यकतज्ज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात् नायं दोष इति वाच्यम्; तथा सति जातिर्घटश्चेत्यादिज्ञानाद् घट इत्यादिविशिष्टबुद्ध्यनुपपत्तेरिति ।

Translation: So also if the objecthood of indeterminate cognition be identified with the objecthood of qualified cognition, then like the indeterminate cognition of jarness, the cognition of jarness under the mode of universalness would produce the qualified cognition of the form '(a) jar' which has jarness pure and simple as the qualifier without being cognized through any mode.

It cannot be said that—the cause of a qualified cognition with that (jarness) pure and simple as the qualifier is a cognition of that (jarness pure and simple) with that (the jar) as the qualificandum and hence this defect is avoided.

For, in that case, a qualified cognition of the form '(the jar)' cannot be produced by the conjunctive cognition of the form '(the) universal and (the) jar'.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara shows the inadequacy of the theory which does away with qualificandumness and qualifierness as objecthoods by holding that the objecthood of qualified cognition is the objecthood of indeterminate cognition. In indeterminate cognition, which must be perceptual in nature, an object is cognized directly, without any mode; this indeterminate cognition very roughly corresponds, in this respect, to knowledge by acquaintance of Russell. Now the theory which Gadādhara criticises is that cognition through modes is possible only as a consequence of a cognition without any mode. The first stage of all cognitions through modes is therefore a cognition without a mode. But, then, a cognition without a mode has an object, has a relation to this object, which is objecthood of the cognition without any mode. Now this objecthood is different from qualifierness and qualificandumness of a cognition with modes. A cognition with modes need not be assumed to have any different sort of objecthood as the objecthood of the indeterminate cognition may be supposed to function as the objecthood also in the qualified cognition which is produced by the indeterminate cognition.

Gadādhara points out the inadequacy of such identification of the objecthoods of the two types of cognitions. His argument is this: A qualified cognition of a jar under the mode jarness is produced by a cognition without mode of jarness pure and simple. Jarness can be so cognized because a universal, when not denoted by a word, is cognized directly without any mode. So one has to cognize jarness first without any mode, in order to cognize a particular jar through the mode of jarness. This is granted by all Nyāya philosophers.

But then, suppose, jarness has been denoted by the word 'universal'. Then jarness has to be cognized under the mode of

being a universal (universalness) as jarness is a universal. Now after cognizing jarness through this mode, one ought to have the qualified cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness pure and simple, not again under the mode of universalness in its turn. For to cognize jarness under the mode of universalness in a qualified cognition and to cognize jarness pure and simple in an indeterminate perception, would make no difference to the objecthood of jarness; and it is as having objecthood of the indeterminate cognition, that jarness has become the object of the qualified cognition of jarness under the mode of universalness. So just as the indeterminate perception of jarness pure and simple, so also the qualified cognition of jarness under the mode of universalness, would produce the qualified cognition of the jar under the mode of jarness pure and simple.

Now to avoid this difficulty, the supporters of the theory which Gadādhara criticizes here, may argue that the cognition which would produce the cognition of the jar under the mode of jarness pure and simple, must be a cognition which has the jar as the qualificandum and the cognition of jarness pure and simple as the qualifier. This theory is different from the usual Navya-Nyāya theory according to which a cognition of only the qualifier is the cause of a qualified cognition. But here the additional factor, that there be a cognition having the jar as its qualificandum, is stipulated as necessary. Mere cognition of the qualifier would not be sufficient, for, jarness cognized under the mode of universalness and jarness cognized under no mode in indeterminate cognition have the same objectivity, and cognition of jarness pure and simple as the *object of the* indeterminate *cognition* would both be the cause of the qualified cognition. But this causation is not possible. Hence an *additional* factor that a cognition having the jar as its qualificandum, is stipulated as a cause. Thus a cognition of jarness under the mode of universalness is not a cognition having the jar as the qualificandum and hence is not the cause of the qualified cognition.

But this attempt to save this theory does not succeed. For, even a conjunctive cognition of the form '(the) universal (jarness) and (the) jar' produces the qualified cognition of the jar under the mode of jarness pure and simple. Such a case cannot be explained on the suggested theory. For although the conjunctive

cognition has the jar as its qualificandum, it does not have jarness pure and simple as its qualifier, for jarness as the mode of the jar has been cognized under the further mode of universalness.

So the theory that objecthood of qualified cognition is really the objecthood of indeterminate cognition has to be rejected.

XII. ONLY QUALIFICANDUMNESS IS OBJECTHOOD OF QUALIFIED COGNITION

10.1 *Arguments for the Theory*

Text

यत्तु—विशिष्टबुद्धिविषयता विशेष्यमात्रे न तु विशेषणेऽपि मानाभावात् । न च विनिगमनाविरहः; घट इत्यादिज्ञानानन्तरं घटं जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायेन घटरूपविशेष्येण समं ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धावगाहनाद्, घटादिरूपविशेष्ये ज्ञानस्य विषयतात्मकसम्बन्धस्यावश्योपेयत्वात् । घटत्वं जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायस्तु तत्रासिद्ध एव; तस्य घटत्वत्वविशिष्टवैशिशिष्ट्यावगाहित्वेन घटत्वत्वप्रकारकव्यवसायानन्तरमेव तत्सम्भवात्, घट इत्यादिव्यवसायस्य च स्वरूपत एवं घटत्वादिप्रकारकतया घटत्वत्वाद्यप्रकारकत्वात् ।

Translation: The theory is that—the objecthood of a qualified cognition is only in the qualificandum not in the qualifier for absence of valid reasons. It cannot be said that there is no ground for preference; for the secondary (introspective) cognition following upon the primary cognition of the form '(a) jar' etc. is of the form 'I am cognizing a jar' etc. shows that the relation of the cognition to the qualificandum such as the jar, which relation is identical with objecthood, is to be necessarily postulated. In this case the secondary cognition 'I am cognizing jarness' is not justified, for, this secondary cognition cognizes jarness as qualified by jarnessness and is possible only if the primary cognition has jarnessness as its qualifier. And the primary cognition '(a) jar' etc. has jarness in itself (without the mode of jarnessness) as its qualifier and hence does not have jarnessness as its qualifier.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains another theory of objecthood according to which it is only the qualificandum of a qualified cognition that has objecthood. The point to be noted here is that the object is not to be identified with *what* is cognized. In a qualified cognition the three elements in the objective complex, the qualificandum, the qualifier and the qualification, are all cognized and there is no dispute over this. The dispute here centres round the point whether all the three factors cognized in a qualified cognition have to be regarded as objects of the cognition. The theory here is that only the qualificandum of a qualified cognition has objecthood, but not the qualifier. One may ask here : What harm is there if one makes the supposition other way round that it is the qualifier alone which has objecthood and not the qualificandum? The answer is that the secondary introspective cognition following upon the primary cognition '(a) jar' has the form 'I am knowing the jar', not the form 'I am knowing jarness'. Now according to Nyāya whenever one is cognizing a jar, for example when one sees a jar, one does not know, in determinate perception, only the thing, but knows the thing under the mode of jarness. Thus when one sees a jar one has the qualified cognition of the object, jar (the qualificandum), under the mode of jarness (the qualifier). In Western philosophy it is usual to distinguish between two senses of 'know', 'see', etc.— in one sense these verbs take an accusative and in the other sense these verbs take a that-clause as their objects. In Nyāya these two senses are not distinguished, for even when these verbs take an accusative, the corresponding cognition is always of something *as* something. Thus cognition of a jar is interpreted as the cognition of the thing jar under the mode of jarness. Now this jarness, being itself a universal, is cognized in and through itself and does not require to be cognized under any further mode. Thus even though in the primary cognition jarness is cognized, still in the secondary cognition of this primary cognition one does not have jarness as the object of the primary cognition. This absence of jarness as an object of the primary cognition as revealed in its introspective awareness is the reason, according to the upholders of this theory, for denying objecthood to the qualifier of a cognition (in this case, to jarness). In order to have jarness as the object of a primary cognition as revealed in intro-

spection, one has to have a primary cognition of jarness under the mode of jarnessness. It is only when one has cognized jarness under a mode that one can have an introspective awareness of a primary cognition of jarness. But as in this case jarness is not cognized under any mode in the primary cognition, the secondary cognition cannot be of the form 'I am cognizing jarness'.

10.1 *Argument Continued*

Text

ज्ञानांशे स्वरूपतो घटत्वादिविशेषणकोऽनुव्यवसायोऽपि न तत्र सम्भवति; ससम्बन्धिकपदार्थप्रत्यक्षस्य किञ्चिद्विशिष्टसम्बन्धिवैशिष्ट्यावगाहित्वनियमात् ।

Translation: In that case the secondary cognition of a primary cognition in which jarness by itself is manifested, too, is not possible, for the rule is: In the case of perceptual cognition of a real which is related to a term which in turn is related to something else, this term of the relation has to be cognized as qualified by something.

Explanation: It cannot also be argued that as in the primary cognition jarness has been cognized in itself, so also in the secondary cognition one would have jarness in itself as the object of the primary cognition. The reason why this line of argument does not succeed is this: The secondary cognition of a primary cognition is direct awareness; it is perception, although inner, of the primary cognition. Now there is a law of perceiving something which is related to something which, in its turn, is related to a third thing. Now the secondary perception is of the primary cognition which is related, say, to jarness which again is related to the perceived jar. Now the law of perception in such a case is that to perceive a thing as related to a term already related, the term has to be cognized as qualified by something. In symbols, if *a* is related to *b* which is related to *c*, then, in order to perceive *b*, it is necessary to perceive it as qualified by something, i.e. under some mode. The primary cognition is to be perceived by the secondary perception; but the primary cognition (*a*), is

related to jarness (*b*) which, again, is related to, (inheres in), the cognized jar (*c*). So jarness (*b*), has to be cognized as qualified by something, i.e. has to be cognized under some mode; hence the secondary cognition cannot cognize (perceptually) jarness in itself as related to (as an object of) the primary cognition.

10.11 *Criticism*

Text

न चायं घट इत्यादिव्यवसायानन्तरं घटत्वेनेमं जानामीत्याद्याकारकानुव्यवसायेन घटत्वादिरूपविशेषणेनापि समं ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धावगाहनात् तत्रापि विशिष्टधीविषयताभ्युपगम आवश्यक इति वाच्यम्;

Translation: One cannot also argue as follows: Immediately after the primary cognition '(a) jar', one has the secondary perception of the form 'I am cognizing a jar (as qualified) by jarness'; and hence, the relation of the primary cognition to the qualifier (jarness), too, is revealed in the secondary cognition, hence, objecthood of a qualified cognition has to be admitted in the qualifier, too.

10.111 *Reply*

Text

यतस्तत्र ज्ञानान्वयिवैशिष्टचं न तृतीयार्थः, अपि तु द्वितीयार्थविषयतान्वयिघटत्वादिप्रकारकत्वम् ।

Translation: For, the meaning of the *tṛtīyā* (the third declension) in '*by* jarness' is not being related to cognition, but only having jarness etc. being related to objecthood which is meant by *dvitīyā* (the second declension), as its qualifier.

Explanation: 10.11—10.111—When one has a cognition '(a) jar' one has the cognition of a jar as a jar, i.e. a jar under the mode of jarness. In Sanskrit, this is often stated as the cognition of a jar by jarness using the instrumental case with 'jarness'. The question here is: what is the meaning of this instrumental case? Does it not mean that there is a relation of jarness to the cogni-

tion? If such a relation is meant by the instrumental case of 'jarness', then jarness becomes a locus of objectivity of this cognition. So this interpretation of the instrumental case of jarness has to be rejected. The correct meaning is that the instrumental case denotes a relation to the objectivity denoted by the accusative case of *ghaṭa* (the jar),—I cognize the jar by jarness, where the 'jar' is in the accusative case which means objectivity of the cognition. The instrumental case of 'jarness' means simply that jarness is related to the objectivity, denoted by the accusative case, resident in the jar. This relation which jarness has to the jar which is the object of the cognition is to be the mode of the cognition. Now the question is whether to be the mode under which an object of a cognition is cognized is itself an object of cognition or not.

10.2 *Another Criticism*

Text

न च विषयतानिष्ठं घटत्वादिप्रकारकत्वं घटत्वादिनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपकत्वं तदभ्युपगमे च विशेषणीभूतघटत्वादेर्विशिष्टधीविषयतासिद्धिर्निष्प्रत्यूहैव, प्रकारताया विषयताविशेषात्मकत्वादिति वाच्यम्;

Translation: It cannot be said that the property of having a mode of jarness etc. resident in the objecthood is really the property of being the determiner of modeness resident in jarness etc. If this is admitted then the objectivity of jarness which has become a qualifier will certainly have the objecthood of the qualified cognition, for modeness is a special form of objecthood.

Explanation: It has been asserted above that jarness is related to the objecthood resident in the jar as its mode. This means that the objectivity of the jar has the modeness of jarness. Now what is to have the modeness of jarness? It is nothing but being the determiner of the modeness resident in jarness. If jarness is the mode, then the modeness is resident in jarness; and the objectivity resident in the jar determines, (i.e. has the property of being the determiner of) the modeness resident in jarness. The point here is this: the jar is the object of the cognition, and jarness is the mode of the object. Now if being the mode, i.e. modeness, be a property which is determined by the objectivity

of the jar, then jarness itself becomes an object of the cognition. In a qualified cognition, there are a qualificandum and a qualifier which is usually the same as the mode of the qualificandum. Now the theory holds that it is only the qualificandum of the cognition which has objectivity and the qualifier is only related to the objectivity of the qualificandum as its mode. A question is now asked about the nature of this relation. The relation is the property, having jarness as the mode, resident in the objectivity of the jar. But if having (jarness as) the mode is being the determiner of modeness resident in jarness, then jarness itself possess objectivity, for whatever is determined by objectivity resident in the qualificandum, i.e. by qualificandumness, is qualifierness. And as qualificandum-ness is objectivity of the qualificandum, so also, qualifierness is objectivity resident in the qualifier. Only objectivity of the qualificandum or the qualifier determines or is determined by the objectivity resident in the qualifier or the qualificandum.

10.21 *Reply*

Text

यतो विषयतानिष्ठं घटत्वादिप्रकारकत्वं न घटत्वादिनिष्ठप्रकारताख्य-विषयतानिरूपकत्वम्, अपि तु घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वम् । अवच्छिन्नत्वञ्च प्रतियोगित्वकारणत्वाधिकरणत्वादाविव विषयतादावपि घटत्वादेः सम्बन्धविशेष एव, स चातिरिक्तोऽनतिरिक्तो वेत्यन्यदेतत् ।

Translation: For, the property of having jarness as the mode, resident in the objectivity, is not the property of being the determiner of the objectivity called modeness resident in jarness, but is the property of being limited by jarness; the property of being limited is a special relation of jarness to objecthood, etc., as also to the properties of (i) counterpositiveness, (ii) causeness, (iii) locusness etc.; whether this special relation is ontologically identical with its terms or not is a separate question.

Explanation: The answer to the above objection is that the objectivity resident in the qualificandum *does not determine*, but is limited by, the modeness of jarness; hence jarness does not have objectivity determined by the objectivity of the jar. The point of the reply is this—when a jar is cognized under the mode

of jarness, it is often said that the jar is the qualificandum *of* the qualifier, jarness, in the cognition. Thus qualificandum and qualifier become correlatives, for there is nothing like a qualificandum tout *court* which is not *of* some qualifier. But then the qualificandum-ness and the qualifierness become the determiner of each other. The reply is that, although a qualificandum must be relative to a qualifier of a cognition, still it is not necessary to hold that the qualificandum-ness *determines* the qualifierness; it is enough if the qualificandum-ness is *limited by* jarness resident in the qualifier. Now the property of being limited by is a relation, and whether this relation is ontologically identical with its terms or not is a separate question.

10.21 *Reply Continued: Different Solutions*

Text

इयांस्तु विशेषः—प्रतियोगित्वादावन्यूनानतिप्रसक्तत्वमवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावे तन्त्रम्, न तु विषयतास्थले; व्यधिकरणधर्मस्यापि विषयतावच्छेदकत्वात्। विशेषणनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितत्वमेव वा विषयतानिष्ठं तत्प्रकारकत्वम्। अस्तु वा विशेषणे विषयतानिरूपितः प्रकारताख्यधर्मविशेषः, तथापि तस्य विषयतात्वे ज्ञानप्रतियोगिकत्वे च मानाभावः—इत्यतिरिक्तविषयतावादिनां प्राचीनैकदेशिनां मतम्, तदपि अनुपादेयमेव।

Translation: There is, however, a difference—The limitor-limited relation to the counterpositiveness etc. is governed by coextensionality, but not so in the case of objecthood, as even a property which is contra-located can be a limitor of objecthood. Or, being determined by modeness resident in the qualifier is the objecthood's having it as the mode. Or, let a property determined by objecthood, and called modeness, be admitted in the qualifier, yet there is no proof that this property is objecthood and has cognition as the second term of the relation.

This is the theory of one section of philosophers of the old Nyāya School who have argued for special ontological status of objecthood. But this theory, too, has to be rejected.

Explanation: It has been argued that the relation of objecthood to modeness of jarness is the limitor-limited relation, like the

limitor-limited relation of counterpositiveness etc. Now it is pointed out that there is a difference between these cases. In the case of counterpositiveness etc. the rule is that the limitor and the limited must have the same extension—must be present in exactly the same loci. But in the case of objectivity its limitor need not be coextensive with it. One may know an object through a property which cannot be located in it. Thus when one cognizes a jar under the mode of potness, i.e. cognizes a jar as a pot, his cognition is necessarily false. Yet the objecthood resident in the jar—the jar *is* the object of this cognition —is limited by potness which cannot be located in a jar. Such a property is called a contra-located property.

Although this is a solution of the problem raised by the opponent still other solutions are suggested. (i) One alternative is to hold that the property, resident in the jar, of having jarness as a mode is the property of being determined by modeness resident in the qualifier; when the jar is cognized under the mode of jarness, jarness *is* the *mode of* the cognition *of* the jar; i.e. the objecthood resident in the jar has jarness as its mode.

It has been already stated that the objecthood (resident in the jar) has jarness as its mode; i.e. the mode is related to the objecthood; the objecthood *has the mode* jarness. The qualifier is the mode, i.e. *has the modeness* resident in it. Thus we have two relations: (a) having the mode (b) being determined by the modeness resident in the qualifier. The relation between that which has the mode (objectivity) and that which has the modeness (jarness, the qualifier) may be stated thus:

The property of having the mode (which objectivity has) is *determined by* the modeness which the qualifier (jarness) has. The jarness has the modeness *of* the mode which objectivity has. What is the relation which 'of' stands for here? It is the relation of determining. So we have: jarness has the modeness determining the property (which objectivity has) of having the mode. But in this case it is not objectivity which is determining the modeness which jarness has; it is the other way round—it is the modeness which determines the property of having the mode. Hence the qualifierness resident in jarness, not being determined by objectivity resident in the qualificandum, (the jar) is not a kind of objectivity.

(ii) Or, let the modeness resident in the qualifier, be determined by objectivity; still it does not follow that, therefore, modeness is a kind of objectivity, that modeness is related in the characteristic manner to the cognition of which jarness is the mode. Here the law underlying the objection is challenged; whatever is determined by objectivity is itself objectivity.

Now this is the position of a section of philosophers who belonged to the older Nyāya. Their arguments seem to support Gadādhara's position that objectivity must be given an independent ontological status. Yet Gadādhara maintains that their arguments are invalid and that their position cannot be supported. This is because Gadādhara holds that modeness or qualifierness is objectivity just as much as qualificandum-ness; that the qualifier of a cognition is as much its object as its qualificandum—a position refuted by these philosophers. So now we come to Gadādhara's theory.

XIII. GADĀDHARA'S THEORY

11.1 *Arguments against the Earlier Theory*

Text

विशेषणस्य विशिष्टज्ञानाविषयत्वे तद्धर्मविशिष्टज्ञानानन्तरं तद्धर्मविशिष्टज्ञानानुपपत्तेः, विशिष्टबुद्धौ विशेषणविषयकज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात्, भवन्मते तद्विशिष्टज्ञानस्य तद्विषयकत्वाभावेन तदहेतुत्वात् । एवं विशिष्टज्ञानाद् विशेषणविषयकोपनीतभानस्याप्यनुपपत्तिः; तदुपनीतभाने तद्विषयकज्ञानस्यैव हेतुत्वात् । एतादृशयुक्त्या विशेषणस्य विशिष्टधीविषयताया आवश्यकत्वे चोक्तलाघवात् तन्निष्टप्रकारताया एव विषयतात्वसिद्धिरित्यवधेयम् ।

Translation: If the qualifier does not have objectivity of a qualified cognition, then immediately after cognizing something qualified by that, a qualified cognition of that thing under the *mode* of that would not arise; for a cognition of a qualifier *as an object* is necessary to produce a qualified cognition; for, on your theory, the qualifier of a cognition is not an object of this cognition and hence, is not a cause of the qualified cognition. So also

an associational cognition having the qualifier as its object cannot arise from a qualified cognition, for an associational cognition of something can arise only from a cognition of that thing as an object. Because of these reasons it follows necessarily that the qualifier has objecthood of qualified cognition; and also because of the above-mentioned lightness, it is established that the modeness resident in the qualifier has objecthoodness.

Explanation: Gadādhara gives here his own theory about the objectivity of the qualifier of a qualified cognition. He refutes the theory that objecthood is a separate ontological reality but belongs only to the qualificandum of a qualified cognition. Gadādhara gives here two points of criticism against this theory.

(i) According to Nyāya a qualified cognition requires a prior cognition of the qualifier. In Nyāya terminology cognition of the qualifier is a cause of the qualified cognition. Now Gadādhara points out that this cognition of a qualifier is a cause of the qualified cognition only if the qualifier is cognized as an object. According to the theory of the older logicians, the qualifier in a qualified cognition is only related to the objecthood of the qualificandum but itself does not have any objecthood. So they cannot explain how a cognition of the qualifier in a qualified cognition can be a cause of another qualified cognition, as the qualifier does not have any objecthood. According to Navya-Nyāya, so long as one continues to look at an object, say, a jar, one continues to have a series of perceptions of the jar. The first of perception of the jar is a qualified cognition of the jar as jar-ness-possessing. Now the cognition of the qualifier jar-ness in this qualified cognition produces the next perception, which is again a qualified cognition. On the theory criticized here, this would be impossible, for in the first perception jarness does not have objectivity, is not cognized as an object, and hence could not be the cause of the next qualified cognition.

(ii) Similarly in the case of associational visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as fragrant, a prior cognition of fragrance as an object is necessary. That is, for associational cognition, too, a prior cognition of the qualifier as an object is necessary. But as the opponents do not admit that the qualifier of a qualified cognition can have any objecthood, and fragrance of a piece of

sandalwood can be smelt only in the form of a qualified cognition where the fragrance is the qualifier, it will not be a cause of the associational cognition unless it is cognized as an object of the qualified cognition. Hence the theory of the opponents has to be rejected. It is necessary, on this ground, to postulate the objecthood of the qualifier of a qualified cognition, the modeness resident in the qualifier will have objecthood-ness.

11.11 *Reply*

Text

अथ तद्विशिष्टबुद्धौ तदुपनीतभाने च स्ववृत्तित्वस्वप्रकारकत्वान्यतरसम्बन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा या विषयता तच्छालिज्ञानत्वेनैव हेतुता वाच्या, इत्थञ्च विशेषणस्य विशिष्टज्ञानाविषयत्वेऽपि तद्विशिष्टज्ञानात् तद्विशिष्टज्ञानान्तरस्य तदुपनीतभानस्य च नानुपपत्तिः । न चोपदर्शितकारणतावच्छेदककोटावन्यतरसम्बन्धेन तद्वैशिष्टचस्य विषयतायां निवेशे अन्यतरत्वघटकभेदयोर्मिथो विशेष्यविशेषणभावे विनिगमनाविरहेण कारणताबाहुल्यमिति वाच्यम् । यतस्तादृशान्यतरस्य अन्यतरत्वेन न सम्बन्धता, अपि तु स्वरूपत एव ।

Translation: Now of a qualified cognition of *that*[3] and the associational cognition of *that*[3] the cognition which is the cause has objecthood related to that by either of these two relations—(i) residence in itself, (ii) being the determiner of its modeness. Therefore there is no problem in explaining how another qualified cognition of *that*[3] or an associational cognition of *that*[3], even if the qualifier does not have objecthood of the qualified cognition. It cannot be also said that in inserting *either or* in the relation of that with objecthood, this theory becomes heavy by postulating many different causal relations in the absence of any principle of determination of the qualifier-qualificandumness of the two differences constituting the alternation. For the alternation of the two relations is not under the mode of alternationness but is in itself (under no mode at all).

Explanation: This is another attempt to support the theory that the qualifier of a qualified cognition does not have objecthood of the qualified cognition and to show that still there is no

3. that=the qualifier of the qualified cognition.

difficulty in explaining how a qualified cognition can be a cause of another qualified cognition or of associational cognition. Gadāhara's criticism was that unless the qualifier have objecthood, a qualified cognition with that qualifier would not be able to be a cause of subsequent qualified cognition. Now the opponents of Gadādhara answer that it is not always necessary to relate objecthood directly to the qualifier. When a qualified cognition with something as the qualifier is caused by an indeterminate perception of that thing, then this intermediate perception of that thing as an object becomes the cause. Here the objecthood resident in the reality cognized in the indeterminate cognition directly belongs to that reality. Thus the objecthood in this case becomes the cause of the qualified cognition as residing in the reality. Yet this sort of direct relation to objectivity is not possible in all cases. For example, when something is cognized as a qualifier in a qualified cognition, and that qualified cognition produces another qualified cognition with the same thing as a qualifier then a cognition of a qualifier is not a cognition of the qualifier as an object. There is, however, an objecthood resident in the qualificandum of the qualified cognition and this objecthood determines the qualifier of the qualified cognition. Thus the objecthood resident in the qualificandum of the qualified cognition is related to that reality by the relation of being the determiner of the modeness resident in that reality. Hence the objecthood belongs to the reality which is cognized as the qualifier in a qualified cognition by an indirect and composite relation—being the determiner of the mode-ness resident in itself (i.e. the reality). In order to cover both these two types of cases the relation of objecthood to that which becomes a qualifier in the resulting qualified cognition, must be a sum of those two relations.

Against this solution of the opponents of Gadādhara it may be argued that really there are two different relations limiting the cause-ness resident in a cognition of something; if the cognition of that which becomes a qualifier in the resulting qualified cognition be indeterminate perception then the objecthood resident in that becomes a cause by one relation. If, however, the qualified cognition of that becomes a cause of another qualified cognition with that as the qualifier then the objectivity becomes a cause by

the second relation. Thus there are two different causal relations, and this postulation is heavy.

The opponent's reply to this objection is to treat the sum of the two relations not *as* a sum where there can be no preference for one relation as the first term of the sum or as the second term thus where there seem to be two different sums:

AUB or BUA

Now, according to Western logicians, these two sums are identical for U is commutative. But according to Nyāya AUB is different from BUA because the first term of the sum is regarded as the qualificandum and the second term as the qualifier. This shows that according to Nyāya the sum by itself is not the relation but the sum has to be cognized as the relation. As the sum can be cognized in two, equally valid ways, there is no reason to prefer the one to the other. The opponents reply to this objection by pointing out that the sum of the two relations is cognized not *as* a sum with a qualificandum and a qualifier, not *as* anything, but in and through itself. Thus there cannot be two ways of cognizing the sum of the two relations.

11.12 *Objection to Reply and Its Refutation*

Text

न चैवमप्यननुगमात् कारणताधिक्यं व्यभिचारश्चेति वाच्यम्; सम्बन्धाननुगमेऽपि तावन्निष्ठसम्बन्धताया ऐक्योपगमेन तद्दोषानवकाशात् । अत एव सम्बन्धाननुगमो न दोषायेति प्राचां प्रवादोऽपि । न चैवमपि स्ववृत्तित्वस्वप्रकारकत्वान्यतरसम्बन्धेन तद्विशिष्टविषयतामपेक्ष्य स्ववृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेन तद्विशिष्टविषयताया लाघवेन तद्विशिष्टबुद्ध्यादिजनकतावच्छेदकत्वसिद्धेर्निष्प्रत्यूहतया विशेषणस्यापि विशिष्टधीविषयत्वं दुर्वारमिति वाच्यम्; प्रकारतायां विषयतात्वोपगमे घटत्वादिरूपेण घटादिविषयकस्मरणादौ तथाविधज्ञानस्य घटत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितघटादिनिष्ठविशेष्यताशालिज्ञानत्वेन घटादिनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितघटत्वादिप्रकारताशालिज्ञानत्वेन वा हेतुत्वे गौरवात् । अस्मन्मते च नैतादृशविनिगमनाविरहावकाशः; विशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारताया, ज्ञानप्रतियोगिकत्वाभावेन परम्परासम्बन्धेनैव तस्या जनकतावच्छेदकत्वस्योपगन्तव्य-

तया तदपेक्षया प्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतायाः प्रतियोगितासम्बन्धेन जन-
कतावच्छेदकत्वे लाघवस्यैव विनिगमकत्वात् ।

Translation: It cannot also be said that as there is no common property there will be multiplicity of causal relation and also deviation. Even though there is no common relation still if a unity of the relation-ness resident in the relations can be shown, then there will not be any possibility of those defects. Hence the old saying: absence of common feature of relation is not a defect. It cannot also be said that compared to objecthood qualified by that by either residence in itself or being the determiner of the modeness residence in itself, it is lighter to postulate that the-objecthood is qualified by that by the relation of residence in itself, and hence that it is limitor of the causeness of the qualified cognition of that. Hence the qualifier, too, has objecthood. For, if objecthood be ascribed to the qualifier, then in memory cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness, the cognition of that form becomes its cause either as a cognition having qualificandum-ness which is resident in the jar and which is determined by qualifierness resident in jarness, or as a cognition having the qualifierness which is resident in jarness and which is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the jar, and this supposition will be heavy. On our theory, on the other hand, there is no room for lack of such preference, the qualifierness determined by qualificandumness, being not related to cognition, can be regarded as the limitor of causeness only by a chain of relations; it is much simpler to hold that the qualificandumness determined by the qualifierness is the limitor of causeness by the relation of being the second term (of the cognition).

Explanation: The opponents of Gadādhara now reply to further objections. The first objection is that even if the two relations whose sum is the relation of objecthood to the qualifier of a qualified cognition, is cognized in and through itself, still the two relations do not have any common feature. So there are really two causal relations; and also there will be deviation. For when one causal relation is absent, then the other relation will hold; hence none of them will be necessary, either being sufficient. The reply to this objection is that it is not necessary to

state a feature common to *relations* in order to obtain one general causal law. What is necessary, and also sufficient, is to find a feature common to all the causes, i.e. to find out a general property as the limitor of causeness. In support of this theory, the opponents also quote a maxim formulated by older Naiyāyikas that it is not necessary to find out a common feature of relations in order to state a general law of causation. Moreover, even though the relations have not been brought under a common feature, still if the relation-ness of the relations is one, then there will be neither a plurality of causal laws, nor deviation.

The second objection is that it is much simpler to postulate objecthood of the qualifier of a qualified cognition, which can be the limitor of causeness of the qualified cognition by being directly related to the qualifier. Otherwise, one has to postulate the sum of two relations by which objecthood can be related, in the two cases of cognition, to the qualifier of the qualified cognition. The reply to this objection is that this theory, too, in spite of its apparent simplicity, involves heaviness. If modeness is objecthood, then in the memory cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness, there will be no knowing what form of cognition would be its cause. The Nyāya theory is that a memory is causally connected with a previous cognition, and that the memory cognition has the same form as the previous cognition which is its cause. 'Having the same form', in the case of cognitions, means that the cognitions have the same qualifiers, and the same qualificanda. But, now if the qualifier be accorded objectivity, then there will be two alternative causes of the cognition. For a cognition having the same qualifier and qualificandum as another cognition, may still be analysed differently. A qualifier of a cognition is qualifier only in relation to the qualificandum of the cognition, and the qualificandum of a cognition is qualificandum only in relation to the qualifier of the cognition. Now there is no way of choosing between these two different situations. In the technical language of Navya-Nyāya the two situations are distinguished in this way: in one case, the cognition has the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar determined by the qualifierness resident in jarness; in the other case, the cognition has the qualifierness which is resident in jarness and which is determined by the qualificandumness resident

in the jar. Thus although both the cognitions are of a jar under the mode of jarness, still they are different cognitions. There is no way of choosing one rather than the other as the cause of the memory cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness. Either cognition would be able to produce the same memory cognition. Hence according objectivity to the qualifier of a qualified cognition creates more difficulties than it solves.

If objecthood be denied to the qualifier, then there will be only one analysis of a cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness. It will be a cognition having its qualificandumness determined by qualifierness which will be the cause of the memory cognition.

11.121 *Refutation of the Theory by Some Navya-Nyāya Philosophers*

Text

मैवम्; उक्तविशेषणज्ञानादिकारणतावच्छेदकलाघवेन प्रकारतायां विषयतात्वस्य ज्ञानप्रतियोगिकत्वस्य च सिद्धावेव दर्शितस्मरणादिहेतुतायां विनिगमनाविरहावतारेण गौरवावतारात्, तादृशगौरवस्य फलमुखत्वेनादोषत्वात्, यत्सिद्धिमुपजीव्य गौरवावतारस्तत्सिद्धौ तस्य विरोधित्वासम्भवात्।

Translation: No, even though objecthoodness and being the second term of a cognition are proved in the modeness on the ground of simplicity of the limitor of causeness of the said cognition of the qualifier, still to impute heaviness because of lack of choice regarding the cause of the abovementioned memory cognition is unjustified. For such heaviness being necessary is harmless; if heaviness is imputed only on the basis of what is already established, then that heaviness cannot nullify the established fact.

Explanation: Gadādhara here explains the reasons offered by some Navya-Nyāya philosophers to show the inadequacy of the opponents' arguments to deny objectivity to the qualifier. The opponents have found the defect of heaviness in the theory which ascribes objectivity to the qualifier, although they have conceded apparent simplicity to this theory. Now Gadādhara shows that their arguments to prove heaviness of the theory are untenable.

They have argued that there will be no reason to choose one of the two alternative causal laws for memory cognition. Now this heaviness is not a defect of this theory because it is established on the basis of facts. It is only because the opponents have admitted that the facts of the case prove this theory that they can bring the charge of heaviness against it. The point here is that if one brings the charge of heaviness against a theory only by presupposing it, then this heaviness cannot go against the theory. Thus heaviness of a theory is not always a defect.

11.121 *Refutation Continued*

Text

एवं घटवद्भूतलमित्यादिविशिष्टबुद्ध्यनन्तरं भूतलं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायवद् घटं ज्ञानामीत्याद्याकारकस्य ज्ञाने घटादिसम्बन्धावगाहिनोऽनुव्यवसायस्यापि सर्वानुभवसिद्धतया विशेषणेऽपि विषयतात्मकज्ञानसम्बन्ध आवश्यकः । न च तत्र स्वप्रकारकविषयताप्रतियोगित्वरूपपरम्परासम्बन्ध एव ज्ञाने घटस्यानुव्यवसायेन गृह्यते इति वाच्यम्; विशेषणीभूतघटादिरेव तादृशविशिष्टबुद्धिविषयः, न तु भूतलादिरूपविशेष्यम्, भूतलं जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायेन तु स्वविशेष्यकविषयताप्रतियोगित्वरूपभूतलादिनिरूपितपरम्परासम्बन्ध एव ज्ञानादौ गृह्यते इत्यस्यापि सुवचतया विनिगमनाविरहेण विशेषणविशेष्ययोरुभयोरेव विशिष्टधीविषयतासिद्धेर्निराबाधत्वात् इत्याहुः ।

Translation: Thus immediately after the qualified cognition 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' like the secondary cognition 'I am cognizing the ground' another secondary cognition 'I am cognizing the jar' in which the relation between the jar and the cognition is revealed, is also confirmed by everyone. Hence it is necessary to postulate, in the qualifier, objecthood which is really a relation to cognition. It cannot be said here tnat in the above secondary cognition a chain relation of the jar to the cognition is cognized, this chain relation being *being the second term* (successor) of (of the relation to) *the objecthood having itself as mode*. For only the jar itself, which has become the qualifier, is the object of the qualified cognition of that form, but not the ground which is the qualificandum. Moreover in the secondary cognition 'I am

cognizing the ground' it can also be easily said that a chain relation between the ground and the cognition is cognized, the chain relation being that which is determined by the ground and which is the successorness of the objecthood having itself as the qualificandum. Thus as there is no reason for choosing one of the alternatives rather than the other it is established that the objecthood of a qualified cognition belongs to both the qualifier and the qualificandum. This is what they say.

Explanation: Now Gadādhara gives an example of a qualified cognition, both the qualifier and the qualificandum of which are cognized in the secondary cognition. The primary cognition 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' is cognized in the secondary introspective cognition not merely as 'I am cognizing the ground' but also as 'I am cognizing the jar' where the relation between the jar and the primary cognition is cognized. Gadādhara claims that this sort of introspective awareness is universal. Therefore it is necessary to postulate that the qualifier, too, has objectivity which is merely a relation of the qualifier to the primary cognition.

Now it may be objected that it is not necessary. The facts may be explained as well on the theory that only the qualificandum of a qualified cognition has objectivity. When one cognizes 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' the objectivity resident in the ground (the qualificandum of the cognition) is related to the jar (the qualifier) by a relation and the jar is related *through* it to the cognition. The chain relation is like this: the objectivity which is resident in the qualificandum which has the jar as its mode. So the objectivity of the qualificandum is related to the jar by the relation *having it (the jar) as the mode*. The cognition, again, is related to the objectivity by being its second term. Thus the cognition is related to the qualifier by the chain relation—being the second term of objectivity which has the jar as its mode. It is this relation of the jar to the cognition which is cognized in the secondary cognition. But this does not require the postulation of any objectivity of the qualifier.

Gadādhara's reply to this argument is that in such a case one could not introspectively cognize the jar except through the cognition of the ground which alone is the object of the primary

cognition. But this is not so. One cognizes introspectively that one is cognizing only the jar but not the ground. This introspective evidence clearly supports the theory that the qualifier alone can also have objectivity, i.e. a relation to the primary cognition.

Gadādhara also points out that the argument of the opponent can also show that the qualificandum, too, can be related to the primary cognition by a chain relation in the following way. Let us assume that objecthood belongs only to the qualifier, i.e. the cognition is related directly only to the qualifier by being the successor to objecthood. The ground is the qualificandum of the qualifier which has objectivity, i.e. the objectivity resident in the qualifier which has the ground as *its* qualificandum and is determined by it. Therefore the cognition has the relation to the ground as being the second term of the objectivity which has it (the ground) as its qualificandum and which is determined by it.

The cognition being determined by its second term, namely the objectivity which has the ground as its qualificandum, is thus related to the ground. Thus there are two ways of explaining the relations of the ground and the jar to the primary cognition —(i) One may say that it is the jar which is indirectly related by the chain relation to the primary cognition; or (ii) one may as well say that it is the ground which is indirectly related by the chain relation to the primary cognition. Now Gadādhara points out that both these alternatives are equally correct and there is no reason to choose one rather than the other. So it is established that the qualifier of a qualified cognition has objectivity as much as the qualificandum.

Now these replies to the position of the opponent that it is the qualificandum alone which has objectivity are not Gadādhara's own replies. They are the replies given by others who also accept Gadādhara's theory that both the qualifier and the qualificandum have the objectivity. Gadādhara has given his own arguments before (XI—9.11).

XIV. GADĀDHARA'S THEORY: RELATIONS HAVE OBJECTHOOD OF QUALIFIED COGNITIONS

Text

विशेष्यताप्रकारतावत् संसर्गत्वस्यापि विषयताविशेषात्मकत्वात्, संसर्गस्यापि विशिष्टधीविषयत्वम् ॥

Translation: Like qualificandumness and qualifierness the qualificationness, too, is a special kind of objectivity; hence, the qualification, too, has objectivity of qualified cognition.

Explanation: The object of qualified cognition is a relational complex having three elements—a qualificandum, a qualifier and a relation between them. Now as the whole relational complex is what is cognized, and, as according to Nyāya, the relational complex is not an ontological entity over and above the three elements, all the three elements have to be accorded different types of objectivity.

XV. RELATIONS ARE NOT OBJECTS OF QUALIFIED COGNITIONS

12.1 *Arguments for the Theory*

Text

अत्रोच्छृङ्खलाः—संसर्गस्य विशिष्टधीविषयत्वे मानाभावः; घट इत्यादिज्ञानानन्तरं समवायं जानामीत्याद्याकारकानुव्यवसायस्यासिद्धत्वात्, तादृशानुव्यवसायस्य समवायत्वविशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहितया समवायत्वप्रकारकज्ञानानन्तरमेव सम्भवात् ।

Translation: Here the propounders of relationlessness [argue]: There is no justification for objecthood of relations in a qualified cognition; for, there is no secondary introspective evidence 'I cognize inherence' immediately following on the (primary) cognition 'a jar'. Such a secondary cognition would have to cognize the relation of what is related to (qualified by) inherenceness and hence can follow only a primary cognition having inherenceness as its qualifier.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains the position of those who deny that when a relational complex is cognized, the relation between the qualificandum and the qualifier, is also cognized as an object. Their argument is that in order to cognize a relation like inherence in a secondary cognition it is necessary to cognize inherence under the mode of inherenceness in the primary cognition. But when we cognize a jar our cognition has the jar as its qualificandum and jarness as the qualifier and inherence as the relation between them. Thus in such a cognition only the jar, the qualificandum, is cognized under the mode of jarness which is the qualifier and is not cognized, in its turn, under another mode as jarness is a universal not referred to by any word and hence is cognized in and through itself. So also the relation between the jar and its mode, the jarness, is cognized under no mode. Yet to be able to have a secondary cognition of the form 'I cognize inherence' it is necessary to cognize inherence under a mode, inherenceness, in the primary cognition. But as this is not the case inherence cannot have objectivity of the primary cognition of the jar.

The point here is that in order to determine whether an element in the relational complex functions as an object in the cognition the only direct method is introspective evidence of the primary cognition. If in introspection we find that we have cognized the relation as an object, only then can we say that the relation has objectivity of the primary cognition. Besides this direct evidence, there are other arguments based on sure facts about cognition which may be given to prove a theory about objectivity.

12.11 *Objections*

Text

अथ विशिष्टबुद्धेः संसर्गानवगाहित्वे बाधबुद्धिप्रतिबन्धकतायाः संसर्ग-विशेषनियन्त्रितत्वासम्भवात् कपालधर्मिकसंयोगादिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकघटाद्यभाववत्तानिश्चयस्य समानधर्मितावच्छेदककं किञ्चि-देव घटादिप्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रतिबध्यं न तु सर्वमित्यनुभवव्याकोपः ।

Translation: Then in case a relation is not cognized in a qualified cognition, it becomes impossible to regulate, by means of a

relation, the preventerness of cognition of a contradiction. The certain cognition of the negation of a jar, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the relation of contact etc., as what possess pot-halves as its property, can block a cognition with the jar as its qualifier and having the limitor of the same property-possesser-ness, but not all cognitions. This theory thus contradicts this experience.

Explanation: Here the opponents of the theory that relations do not have objectivity of qualified cognitions give the following argument based upon the preventer-prevented relations among cognitions. In logic and epistemology Navya-Nyāya uses extensively various facts, generalized into laws, about certain cognitions blocking certain other cognitions. This blocking of cognitions by cognitions may be based upon the nature of the object cognized or may be independent of the objects. Navya-Nyāya builds its epistemological and logical theories mainly on the first type of blocking. Now it is a rule of Navya-Nyāya that a cognition of the form '*a* as *b*-possessing' is blocked by a cognition of the form '*a* as negation-of-*b*-possessing.' Yet the '-possessing' in '*b*-possessing' involves necessarily a relation, and this relation has to be built into the blocking cognition as the limiting relation of the counter-positiveness resident in *b* in '(negation-of-b)-possessing'. To talk of 'absence of *b*', it is necessary to specify what it is for *b* to be present, i.e. to specify the relation in which *b* will occur in a locus. By varying these relations which limit the counterpositiveness resident in the counterpositive of a negation, different negations are obtained. Thus if a jar is present on the ground, it is present there, say, by the relation of contact. Now to say that the jar is absent, one has to refer to this relation of contact. Otherwise, even though a jar be present on the ground, one may still say truly that the jar is not present in the sense in which a jar is present in its halves. The relation of the jar to its halves is inherence, and the jar does not inhere in the ground, so even when one cognizes that the jar is on the ground, one may also cognize truly that the jar is not on the ground if relations are omitted from the consideration.

The cognition 'the jar is present on the ground' will prevent or block the cognition 'the jar is not on the ground' if and only

if being present on the ground in 'being not present on the ground' is by the same relation in which the jar was cognized to be present on the ground in the first cognition. Thus if relations are not cognized in qualified cognition, then a cognition of a relational complex cannot block the cognition of the contradictory relational complex.

12.111 *Refutation and Criticism of Refutation*

Text

न च बाधबुद्धिप्रतिबन्धकतायाः सम्बन्धविशेषनियन्त्रितत्वानुरोधेन तत्प्रतिबध्यसधर्मितावच्छेदकबुद्धेः सम्बन्धावगाहित्वसिद्धावपि निर्धर्मितावच्छेदकबुद्धेस्तथात्वं निर्युक्तिकमिति वाच्यम्; निर्धर्मितावच्छेदकविशिष्टबुद्धेरपि ग्राह्यधर्मिकावृत्तित्वज्ञानप्रतिबध्यतया अवृत्तित्वज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकतायाः सम्बन्धविशेषनियन्त्रितत्वानुरोधेन तत्रापि सम्बन्धावगाहित्वस्यावश्यकत्वात् । एवं प्रमात्वभ्रमत्वयोः सम्बन्धविशेषनियन्त्रितत्वानुरोधेनापि सकलविशिष्टबुद्धीनां सम्बन्धावगाहित्वमावश्यकम्, तयोस्तथात्वानुपगमे कपालविशेष्यकं घटादिप्रकारकं किञ्चिदेव ज्ञानं प्रमा, तथाविधञ्च किञ्चिदेव ज्ञानं भ्रम इति प्रतीतिर्न स्यात्, अपि तु कपालादेः समवायेन घटादिमत्तया तथाविधं सकलमेव ज्ञानं प्रमा स्यात्, संयोगादिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नघटाद्यभाववत्तया च तथाविधं सकलमेव ज्ञानं भ्रमः स्यात् इति चेत्? न;

Translation: It cannot be said that—even if being a preventer of contradictory cognition is regulated by relations relevant to particular cases, hence in the case of prevented cognitions with limitors of substratumness relations are cognized (in the primary cognitions), still in the case of cognitions without such limitors, this does not hold. For, even cognitions without limitors of substratum-ness are prevented by cognitions of non-residence in the cognized substratum, hence the preventerness of the cognition of non-residence has to be regulated by relevant relations; so even in such cases the cognition of relations has to be postulated. So also being true or false cognition is regulated by relevant relations; and hence all qualified cognitions must cognize relations. If being a true cognition or being a false cognition be not regulated by relevant relations, then one would not cognize

some cognition with the pot-halves as the qualificandum and the pot as the qualifier to be a true cognition, and some cognition as false; all cognitions of pot-possessingness of the pot-halves by inherence would be true, and all cognitions under the mode of absence of pots by the relation of contact will be automatically false.

Explanation: Now the opponents of the theory that relevant relations have to be cognized in qualified cognitions, argue in the following way. It is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of qualified cognitions.

(A) In one type of cognition like the cognition 'the jar is blue' we have the following elements:

(i) the qualificandum of the cognition is the jar
(ii) the limitor of the qualificandumness is jarness
(iii) the qualifier is the blue colour
(iv) the limitor of the qualifier-ness is blue-ness
(v) the cognized relation, i.e. the qualification is inherence
(vi) the limiting relation of the qualifier-ness is inherence, which is the same as (v) above.

The relation cognized is always the limiting relation of the qualifierness resident in the qualifier of the qualified cognition. In simple language the relation cognized, even though it is *between* the qualifier and the qualificant, is still to be taken as falling on the side of the qualifier and not on the side of qualificandum.

(B) In the other type of cognition like
(a) 'the jar' or (b) 'jar-ness-possessing',

we have the following elements:

(a)
(i) the qualificandum of the cognition—the jar
(ii) the limitor of the qualificandum-ness—nil
(iii) the qualifier—jarness
(iv) the limitor of qualifierness—nil
(v) the qualification—inherence.

(b)

(i) the qualificandum—any jar
(ii) the limitor of qualificandumness—nil
(iii) the qualifier—jarness
(iv) the limitor of qualifierness—nil
(v) the qualification—inherence.

These two instances of qualified cognitions are, in a sense, degenerate, for there is no limitor of qualificandum-ness over and above the qualifier. In a qualified cognition there must be a qualificandum, a qualifier, and a relation between the two. So in (a) jar-ness has to be regarded as the qualifier. In this case the qualificandum is not a substratum of any further property for jar-ness is simply the mode under which the qualificandum is cognized. So this type of degenerate cognition is called cognition without limitor of substratumness, to mean that in such cognition nothing has been predicated of the qualificandum, only the qualificandum has been cognized under a mode which has become its qualifier.

In contemporary symbolic logic a similar case will be of existential proposition like 'horses exist'. Here there is no predicate for existence is not a predicate and goes into the quantifier thus:

(c) $(\exists x)(Hx)$

This is different from ordinary particular propositions like 'Horses are gentle' which is symbolized as

(d) $(\exists x)(Hu.Gx)$

where there are subject and predicate.

(b) For a degenerate qualified cognition which has a qualifier which functions as the mode of cognition under which alone the qualificandumness is cognized, a corresponding example in symbolic logic will be propositions having 'everything' or 'all' like 'everything is finite' which is symbolized thus:

(e) $(x)(Fx)$

where there is no subject and contrasts with the usual A propositions which are symbolised thus:

(f) $(x)(Gx \supset Fx)$

where the subject term of the English sentence has become the

antecedent and the predicate the consequent in the symbolization. (b) therefore does not have any limitor of qualificandumness, for the qualificandum is cognized only under qualifier which is its only mode.

In (A), the qualificandum cognized under a mode is related to a qualifier which again is cognized under its own mode. This is the usual type of qualified cognition.

Now the argument of the opponents is that in cases like (B, (a), (b)) where there is no limitor of substratumness—because nothing has been predicated of the qualificandum, except the mode under which it is cognized,—no relation need be cognized. For only when a qualificandum cognized under a mode has some other property as its qualifier, it is a substratum. If it is not a substratum, nothing has been predicated of it, and hence no relation between it and the qualifier (the predicate) can be cognized. Thus in such cases of qualified cognitions, no relation can be cognized, even if it be granted that in cases like (A), relations are cognized.

But this argument of the opponent is invalid foreven qualified cognitions of the degenerate type are still prevented by cognition of a certain sort thus: in the case (a) the cognition 'the jar' will be prevented by the cognition that jar-ness does not reside in it. Thus this cognition of non-residence will prevent both the cognitions (B, (a), (b)). Now it is a rule that the preventer-prevented relation cannot obtain between two cognitions without relations being cognized in them, so even in these degenerate cases of qualified cognition relations are cognized.

Moreover a true cognition as well as the false cognition is necessarily regulated by relevant relations. For a cognition of a single isolated object without any relation to any qualifier must be a cognition which cannot be stated in a language. The approximate expressions would be 'this' or 'something'. Now such an indeterminate cognition cannot be regarded as either true or false. A true cognition is true because, and only because, it cognizes a qualificandum as related to a qualifier by a relevant relation which corresponds to the factual situation. So also with a false cognition.

Thus all qualified cognitions, true or false, must cognize relations between the qualificandum and the qualifier. If this be not

admitted that it cannot be explained why only some cognitions with the pot-halves as their qualificandum, the pot as their qualifier and inherence as qualification, are true, while others are false. If a qualified cognition did not cognize the relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum, then if it is true once, it will be always true; for a qualified cognition which is true in one case, can be false only in the case where the relevant relation does not hold. But if the cognition cannot take note of the difference between these two types of cases—by failing to cognize the relation then it will be true always. So also is the case of false cognitions.

12.112 *Refutation of the Reply, Criticism of the Refutation and Its Reply*

Text

विशिष्टबुद्धेः सम्बन्धविषयकत्वानभ्युपगमेऽपि तटस्थेन संसर्गेण समं प्रकारताया अवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावोपगमात्, बाधबुद्धिप्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदकस्य प्रमात्वभ्रमत्वयोश्च सम्बन्धविशेषावच्छिन्नप्रकारताघटितत्वादुक्तानुपपत्तिवारणसम्भवात् । न च प्रकारतानिरूपितसांसर्गिकविषयताश्रयत्वमेव संसर्गस्य प्रकारतावच्छेदकत्वमन्यस्य दुर्घचत्वादिति संसर्गस्य विशिष्टधीविषयत्वसिद्धिर्निष्प्रत्यूहैवेति वाच्यम्; प्रतियोगित्वादिनिरूपिताया इव प्रकारतानिरूपिताया अपि संसर्गनिष्ठावच्छेदकतायाः स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपत्वात् पदार्थान्तररूपत्वाद्वा विषयताविशेषात्मकत्वेऽपि तद्रूपतायास्तुल्यत्वात् तस्या विषयतात्वस्य निर्युक्तिकत्वात् । तादृशावच्छेदकताविशेष एव च संसर्गतापदार्थः, न तु विषयताविशेषः ।

Translation: Even if qualified cognitions do not have relations as objects, still relations, though not objects of qualified cognitions, and qualifierness may be related by the limitor-limited relation. It is then possible to avoid the difficulty of explaining truth and falsity, and the limitor of preventedness by contradictory cognition, in terms of the qualifierness limited by appropriate relations.

It cannot also be said that 'relations being the limitor of the qualifierness' simply means their being the locus of relational objectivity determined by qualifierness, any other definition being

difficult to state. Hence objectivity of relations in qualified cognitions is conclusively established.

For, the limitorness resident in relations and determined by qualifierness has either the property of being a self-linking relation or of being an independent reality, like the limitorness determined by counterpositiveness. By admitting objecthood of a special kind of this limitorness does not make any difference; moreover the postulation of this objectivity is wholly unjustified. Functioning as a relation in qualified cognition is just being such a limitor, and not a special kind of objecthood.

Explanation: The usual Navya-Nyāya theory which Gadādhara accepts is that the three elements of a relational structure, *a*, *R*, *b*, are all objects of the qualified cognition of *a-R-b*. The position of the opponents is that there is no reason to ascribe objectivity to the relation, *R*. The difficulties which are alleged to be involved in this position are not unanswerable. It is enough to admit that a relation standing between the qualifier and the qualificandum which are objects of the qualified cognition, can yet be the limitor of qualifierness of the cognition. If this is admitted there is no difficulty in explaining how the cognition of a contradictory proposition is prevented by the cognition of the proposition itself. For the rule of prevention or blocking of one cognition by another is this:

Rule of Prevention: A cognition having qualifier-ness limited by a relation, is prevented by a cognition of the negation the counterpositive-ness of which is limited by that relation.

This may be explained as follows:

If we have the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' where the jar is the qualifier and contact is the limiting-relation of a qualifier-ness, the cognition which will be prevented by this cognition is that the pot is not in contact with the ground. If we change the relation which is the limiting-relation of the counterpositive-ness then the relation of preventer-prevented will not operate. What is necessary here is to identify the relation limiting the qualifier-ness of the affirmative cognition with the limiting-relation of the counter-positiveness in the negative cognition. Thus even to state the laws of prevention of one cognition by another it is necessary to hold that relations of qualified

cognitions are limitors of qualifier-ness (in affirmative cognition) and of counterpositive-ness (in negative cognition). Now the question is whether we can say that a relation cognized in a qualified cognition can be a limitor of the qualifier-ness which is one form of objectivity, without itself possessing objectivity. The relation will be cognized and yet be not an object of the cognition. The answer to this question will depend upon the way in which the concept of a limiting-relation is understood. Usually the cognized relation is conceived as limiting the qualifier-ness of a qualified cognition. This property of the cognized relation may be identified with relational objectivity determined by qualifierness. Thus there are two properties of the cognized relation—

(i) being the limitor of qualifierness.
(ii) having relational objectivity determined by qualifierness.

Thus when one cognizes '*a*-possessing is *b* by *R*' (*b-R-a*), then it is *R* which determines the qualifier of the cognition. In Navya-Nyāya technical language *R* is the limiting relation of the qualifierness. Now what is this property of being the limitor of qualifierness? It may be said that *R* is the limitor of qualifierness, because and only because, *R* has objectivity determined by qualifierness. The *R* is uniquely described by stating that it is that relation which has *b* as its second term *in this cognition*. That is, *R* limits the qualifierness of *b*, because and only because its objectivity is determined by qualifierness resident in *b*. And hence it is simpler to identify (i) and (ii).

Now the opponents argue that it is not necessary to define limitorness of qualifierness in this way. It may be that the limitorness which is resident in the cognized relation and which is determined by qualifierness is not objectivity of the qualified cognition, but is a self-linking relation, or an independent ontological reality. Even if objecthood of cognized relations is admitted then the same question about objecthood may be asked—Is it a self-linking relation or an independent reality?

Thus to be cognized as a relation in a qualified cognition is not to be its object, but is to have limitorness determined by qualifierness which is a kind of objectivity of the qualified cognition.

12.12 *Further Objections to the Theory: Objections to Objections, and Their Reply*

Text

अथ संसर्गस्य विशिष्टबुद्ध्यविषयत्वे तत्संसर्गकज्ञानात् तद्विशिष्टबुद्धि-तदुपनीतभानानुदयप्रसङ्गः । न च ततस्तयोरुत्पादस्यानुभविकत्वाभावादिष्टापत्तिः; तथा सति स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वादिविशिष्टवाचकमनःपदाद्यधीनशाब्दबोधानुपपत्तेः । तथाहि मनःपदात् स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वप्रकारिका शाब्दधीर्भविष्यति, तत्र च स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकशक्तिज्ञानपदार्थोपस्थित्यादिः कारणम्; जातित्वादिना तत्प्रकारकशक्तिज्ञानादितो जातित्वादिनैव तत्प्रकारकशाब्दबोधोदयात्, अन्यथा कदाचित् जातित्वादिना तत्प्रकारकः कदाचित् स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकः शाब्दबोध उत्पद्यते इत्यत्र नियामकाभावप्रसङ्गात् । स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकशक्तिज्ञानपदार्थोपस्थित्यादिकञ्च स्वरूपतस्तद्विषयकज्ञानं विना न सम्भवति; स्वरूपतस्तद्विशिष्टबुद्धौ स्वरूपतस्तद्विषयकज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात् । स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वादिविषयकञ्च निर्विकल्पकज्ञानं न सम्भवति; अतीन्द्रियस्य निर्विकल्पकावेद्यत्वात्, निर्विकल्पकस्य लौकिकत्वनियमात्* । स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकज्ञानस्यापेक्षणे च तत्रापि तादृशज्ञानस्यापेक्षणीयतया अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । अस्मन्मते च स्वरूपतः संसर्गविधया किञ्चिज्ज्ञाने मनस्त्वादिभानं स्वीकृत्व तन्मूलकात् स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकशक्त्यादिज्ञानात् तथाविधशाब्दधिय उपपत्तिः । न चैवं स्वरूपतो निखिलजातिसंसर्गकज्ञानात् स्वरूपतो निखिलजातिप्रकारकज्ञानसम्भवेन सार्वज्ञ्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । फलबलात् कस्यचिदेव पदार्थस्य कदाचित्संसर्गविधया भानोपगमेन स्वरूपतः संसर्गविधया निखिलजातिभानस्य कदाऽप्यनभ्युपगमात्—इति चेत् ? न;

Translation: Now, then if relations be not regarded as objects of qualified cognitions, then it would follow that from a cognition of that relation of that a qualified cognition of that and also associational cognition of that could not arise.

It cannot be said that this is no objection really because it can be admitted that neither such a qualified cognition nor such an associational cognition is introspectively felt as arising from such a cognition.

*Reading in A: '*nirvikalpakasyālaukikatva-niyamāt*'.

For, if this were the case then there will be the following difficulty.

The word '*manas*' which means that which is qualified by *manastva* would not produce the corresponding verbal cognition. For, then, the word '*manas*' would produce the verbal cognition with *manastva* in itself as the qualifier as the cause of such a cognition is cognition which is of power (of the word to mean) and which has that in itself as its qualifier, and memory of the meant, etc. If the cognition of the power (of the word) had as its qualifier, *manastva* under the mode of being a universal, then the resulting verbal cognition would have *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier. If this causal relation (between the form of the cognition of the power and the resulting verbal cognition) be not admitted then sometimes a verbal cognition having *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier, and sometimes a verbal cognition with *manastva* in itself as the qualifier will result from the word, and hence there will be no regularity. Cognition of the power with that in itself as its qualifier, as also the memory cognition with that in itself as its qualifier of the meaning of the word, is not possible without a prior cognition with that in itself as its object. For the cause of a qualified cognition with that in itself as its qualifier is a cognition having that in itself as its object. Indeterminate cognition, too, having *manastva* in itself as its object, is not possible, for a supersensible real cannot be cognized in indeterminate cognition, the rule being an indeterminate cognition can have only ordinariness. If a cognition having that in itself as its qualifier be needed then, that, too, will need such a cognition, and hence an infinite regress will follow. On our theory, however, it may very well be admitted that *manastva* in itself can be cognized as a relation in some cognition, and on this basis from the cognition of power with that in itself as its qualifier, will result a verbal cognition of that form.

It cannot also be said that from a cognition in this way of all universals as a relation there may be a cognition having all universals as its qualifier, resulting in omniscience.

For by admitting on the strength of facts, the possibility of a cognition in which a real entity is cognized as a relation, one is not forced to admit a cognition in which all universals in them-

selves are cognized as its qualifier—which is contrary to all experience.

Explanation: Now Gadādhara explains the position of some Navya-Nyāya philosophers who argue that relations are objects of qualified cognitions. Their argument is in two parts which we shall now explain.

PART I

In this part they try to show that a cognition of a relation to some object would not be able to produce a qualified cognition of that object or an associational cognition of that object.

Now it may be argued that this difficulty is no difficulty for no introspective evidence corroborating this causal connection between cognitions of these forms is available and hence this is a desirable consequence rather than a difficulty.

But this cannot be regarded as a desirable consequence for the following reasons:

(i) The word '*manas*' means something having *manastva* which is not under any further mode. Anyone who knows this meaning of the word would have the corresponding verbal cognition. In order to explain how one gets the cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier from hearing the word '*manas*' one has to rely on a causal law.

(a) One must know the meaning of the word '*manas*', this 'knowing the meaning' means here that by hearing the word, one would get the cognition of *manastva* in itself as the qualifier. (b) One must also remember the meant object.

Now where (a) one knows that the word '*manas*' means something possessing *manastva*, but under the mode of being a universal and (b) remembers this meaning, one will have, by hearing the word '*manas*', a cognition with *manastva under the mode of being a universal* as its qualifier.

If this causal relation between the cognition of the meaning of the word, and the cognition which results from hearing this word, be not admitted, then one would have to admit that by hearing the same word '*manas*', sometimes a cognition with *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier,

and sometimes a cognition with *manastva* without any mode as its qualifier would result. If, however, this causal relation is admitted, then the form of the resulting verbal cognition will depend upon how one has known the meaning of the word.

Now, one can cognize the meaning of '*manas*' as something possessing *manastva* in itself as the qualifier of the cognition if one has the *prior* non-verbal cognition of *manastva* in itself as its object. For if one does not already have a cognition of something as its object one cannot have a cognition with that thing as its qualifier. A qualified cognition in which something is cognized under no mode requires as its cause a prior cognition of that something also not under any mode (not necessarily as the qualifier). When one cognizes something as a jar, one has a cognition with jarness in itself as the qualifier. In order to have this cognition one must have a prior indeterminate cognition of jarness; although it will not be a qualifier in this cognition—an indeterminate cognition has no qualifier, no qualificandum, either.

Now although jarness in itself, under no mode, can be cognized in indeterminate cognition, *manastva* cannot be cognized in such a way. For, according to Nyāya, *manas* is of atomic size, and therefore cannot be an object of ordinary perception; and hence the universal of *manas*, *manastva*, too, cannot be an object of ordinary perception. Now Nyāya holds that only an object of ordinary perception can be an object of indeterminate perception. No super-sensible object can be ever perceived in indeterminate perception. So one cannot perceive *manastva* in itself as one perceives jarness in itself.

If, for a cognition of something in itself as its qualifier, another such cognition is necessary then there will be an infinite regress. This means that a qualified cognition with something-in-itself as its qualifier cannot require another such qualified cognition as its ultimate cause. This regress of causal cognitions, the succeeding ones being caused by preceding ones, stops when one reaches an indeterminate perception of something in itself which will then function as the qualifier in succeeding qualified cognitions. But as we have already seen that, according to Nyāya, such indeterminate perception of *manastva* is impossible

so the problem remains how to explain the possibility of a qualified verbal cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier.

PART II

On the basis of these arguments these Navya-Nyāya philosophers postulate that relations are objects of qualified cognitions. For, then, *manastva* can, in itself, be cognized as a relation in some qualified cognition. This cognition of *manastva* as an object will explain the possibility of a later qualified cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. Thus relations have to be regarded as objects of qualified cognitions.

It may be objected here that if *manastava* in itself can be cognized as a relation in some cognition, and then this cognition of *manastva* in itself can produce a qualified cognition, here in the present example, a verbal cognition, with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, then one may as well argue that all universals, and not merely *manastva*, can be cognized in themselves as relation in some cognition which will then produce a qualified cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier. This will mean omniscience. For to have a qualified cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier will necessarily have all reals as instances of these universals for the qualificandum of this cognition. Thus this cognition will be the cognition of all reals which are instances of universals and will amount to omniscience.

The reply to this objection is that the cognition of a universal in itself as a relation is to be postulated only when it becomes necessary to explain facts. As omniscience is not a fact, i.e. as a cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier is never experienced, there is no reason to postulate a cognition of all universals in themselves as a relation in some cognition.

12.121 *Reply to Objections, Objections to Reply, and Their Reply*

Text

तत्संसर्गकज्ञानस्य तद्विशिष्टबुद्ध्याद्यजनकत्वेऽपिस्वरूपतो मनस्त्वप्रकार-कस्मरणमूलकतथाविधशक्त्यादिज्ञानात्तथाविधशाब्दबोधनिर्वाहात् । न

च स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकस्मरणे स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकानुभवस्यापेक्षिततया तदसम्भवेन तदसम्भव इति वाच्यम्; भवान्तरप्रभवानुभवाहितसंस्कारादेव तथाविधस्मरणोपपत्तेः। न च जन्मान्तरीयतथानुभवेऽपि पर्यनुयोगतादवस्थ्यम्; तत्र तत्प्राक्तनजन्मजाततथाविधानुभवाहितसंस्कारमूलकस्मरणस्य गतित्वात्, जन्मप्रवाहस्यानादितया तादृशानवस्थाया अकिञ्चित्करत्वात् ।

Translation: Even if a cognition with that as a relation does not produce a cognition with that as its qualifier, still a memory cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier can produce a cognition of power of that form. Hence the possibility of a verbal cognition of that form can be explained.

It cannot be said that, for a memory cognition with that in itself as its qualifier, an experience with that in itself as its qualifier is necessary; and as this is impossible, that, too, is impossible.

For, the possibility of that kind of memory cognition is due to memory impression of experience transmitted from a previous birth.

It cannot be also said that even in the case of experience of that form in a previous birth, the situation in that birth would be the same.

For, it is possible to hold that even in that birth memory impressions are transmitted from a still previous birth; the series of births having no beginning, the infinite regress in this case has little value.

Explanation: The theory that cognition of something as a relation produces cognition of that something as a qualifier is not necessary. For even without such a theory one can explain the possibility of a verbal cognition having *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. For one can hold that there can be a memory-cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. And this memory-cognition lies at the root of the cognition of the meaning of the word '*manas*'. From this cognition of the meaning one can come to have a verbal cognition of that form.

Now it may be argued against this theory that in order to have a memory-cognition with *manastva* in itself one must have a prior experience with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. But as

we have already seen that it is not possible to have an informative cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, a re-collective cognition of this form is impossible.

The answer to this objection is that even though there may not be any impression of an informative cognition of this form in this life, still such a memory cognition in this life is possible by impressions left in the self in a previous birth.

It may be objected here that this postulation of improssions which one may acquire in a previous life as the causes of memory-cognition in this life does not really solve the difficulty. For the question now is how one could have received such impressions in a previous life. For in that life, too, an informative cognition of this form is impossible and hence in that life, too, no one could have such memory impressions.

The reply to this objection is to be found in the Navya-Nyāya theory that the series of previous lives does not have a beginning. Hence it is possible to argue always that such memory-impressions in a previous life would produce an informative cognition in the next life.

This infinite regress of previous lives does not create any serious logical difficulty as it is supposed to be a fact.

12.122 *An Alternative Answer*

Text

अथवा जातित्वादिना मनस्त्वप्रकारकैतद्भवीयानुभवप्रभवसंस्कारादेव स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकस्मरणमुत्पद्यते सामान्यतस्तत्प्रकारकस्मरणे तत्प्रकारकत्वेनैव ज्ञानसंस्कारयोः कारणत्वात्, स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकस्मृतौ स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकत्वेन तयोर्हेतुताया अप्रामाणिकत्वात् ।

Translation: Or, a memory cognition having that in itself as its qualifier can arise from impressions caused by an informative cognition (experience) in this very life which has *manastva* under the mode of universalness as its qualifier. The rule here is that a memory cognition *having that as its* qualifier in general terms is caused by an impression only if both (the memory cognition and experience) have *that as their qualifier*. There is no justification for the theory that a memory cognition with *that in itself as*

its qualifier is caused by an impression of a past cognition having *that in itself* as its qualifier.

Explanation: There is also the possibility of an alternative solution. Instead of assuming a beginning-less series of lives of an individual, it is possible to explain the facts. The causal law of impressions and memory cognition which they produce is this:

Law 1: A memory cognition with something as its qualifier is caused by an impression of that form (i.e. of something as its qualifier).

Now this Law simply states that a memory cognition of something as a qualifier requires the prior existence of impressions of the same form. But the theory criticized here requires much more. The law which it invokes is this:

Law 2: A memory cognition of something as its qualifier *without any mode* is caused by an impression having that something as its qualifier *without any mode.*

But Law 2 is much stronger than Law 1. Law 1 states, in general terms, the causal relation between impressions and memory cognitions produced by them, while Law 2 introduces special features into the causal law. But this law is not corroborated by introspective evidence, or on other grounds. There is no reason to postulate such special causal laws between impressions and memory cognitions.

12.123 *Objections to the Alternative Answer and Their Reply*

Text

न चैवं जातित्वादिना मनस्त्वादिप्रकारकस्मरणमात्रस्यैव स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकत्वापत्तिरिति केवलं जातिमानित्याकारकस्य स्मरणस्य विलोपप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्; स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकस्मरणे उद्‌बोधकविशेषस्यैव नियामकत्वात् मन इत्याद्याकारकस्मरणं यत्रानुभवसिद्धं तत्रैव तादृशोद्‌बोधकस्य फलबलेन कल्पनीयत्वात्, अन्यथा जातित्वेन स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वप्रकारकक्रमिकानुभवद्वयाहितसंस्कारवतः पुंसो भवन्मतेऽपि स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वाप्रकारकजातिमानित्याकारक मनस्त्वप्रकारकस्मरणविलोपापत्तिः । न च जातित्वेन मनस्त्वप्रकारकसंस्कारात् स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वप्रकारकस्मरणं न सम्भवति तत्र मनस्त्वांशे जातित्वभाने बाधका-

भावादिति वाच्यम्; तदंशे जातित्वभानेऽपि जातिमन्मनश्चेत्याकार-
कस्य तदंशे द्विविधविषयताशालिनः स्मरणस्य सम्भवात् ॥

Translation: It cannot also be said that—

All memory cognitions having *manastva* under the mode of universalness as its qualifier will have *manastva* in itself as its qualifier; hence, a memory cognition of the form, 'universal-possessing' will be impossible.

For, memory cognitions with that in itself as their qualifier are controlled by special excitors which are, therefore, to be postulated on the strength of the resulting cognition only where a memory cognition of the form '*manas*' is confirmed in introspection. Otherwise a person having two kinds of impressions caused by two successive cognitions—one with *manastva* under the mode of universalness, the other with *manastva* in itself as the qualifier—cannot have, even on your theory, a memory cognition without having *manastva* in itself as its qualifier as in 'universal-possessing'; and with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier.

It cannot be said that—

It is not possible to have a memory cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier from an impression with *manastva* under the mode of universalness; in that case, there is no impediment to the cognition of universalness in that part (as the mode of the qualifier) in the conjunctive cognition of the form 'universal-possessing and *manas*' it is possible to have a memory cognition with two types of objecthood in that part (i.e. of the qualifier).

Explanation: It can be argued against this theory that it leads to various difficulties. If every memory cognition which has *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier, becomes a cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, then there can be no memory cognition of the form 'universal-possessing'. The point here is that only if a person has a memory cognition of *manas* under the mode of *manastva* which is again cognized under its mode of being a universal, he can have the memory cognition of something (*manas*) under the mode of a universal. This means that only if a person has cognized *manastva* as a universal can remember *manas* as possessing a universal, i.e. as being an instance of a universal. If a person has cognized *manastva* in

and through itself, without cognizing it to be a universal, he cannot cognize *manas* as having a universal.

The reply to this objection is to be found in the conditions under which impressions give rise to memory cognitions. In order to produce a certain memory cognition the impression has to be made active by certain factors. Now the factors which activate the impressions will determine the form of the resulting memory cognition. Whether one will have a memory cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, or a cognition with *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier, will be completely determined by how the impression has been activated; thus the form of the memory cognition will be completely determined by the exciting factors which activate the impression. But it is only by a sort of back calculation that one can infer how the excitors have activated the impression. It is therefore necessary to know first what form of memory cognition one has, and then to infer the presence of the corresponding excitors.

If it be not admitted that it is only on the strength of the form of the resulting memory cognition that the excitors are postulated, then there will be the following difficulty. Suppose some one has two successive (informative) cognitions—first he has a cognition of *manastva* under the mode of being a universal, as its qualifier and, next he has the cognition of *manasṭva* in itself as its qualifier. In such a case, these two cognitions will leave their impressions on the self of that person. This person may, therefore, have the (conjunctive) memory cognition of *manastva in itself* as a qualifier, and *manastva* in itself as not a qualifier.

An objection to this theory is that if the impression has *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier then it cannot cause the memory cognition having *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. The reason is that there is nothing to prevent the mode of *manastva*—its being a universal—getting manifested in the memory cognition.

The answer to this objection is to be found by examining a more complex example of memory cognition. It is possible to have a memory cognition of a conjunctive type of the form 'universal-possessing and *manas*'. This memory cognition being a conjunctive cognition has two objecthoods resident in the two objects.

Although one conjunct, universal-possessing, is cognized under the mode of being a universal, the other conjunct, *masas*, is cognized under the mode *manastva* which is as a matter of fact a universal but is not cognized under the mode of being a universal.

12.124 *Further Explanation of the Theory: Objections and Replies*

Text

वस्तुतस्तु जातित्वांशे मोषदशायां तथाविधसंस्कारान्मन इत्याकार-
कस्मरणं निराबाधमेव ।तदंशे मोषश्च तद्भासकोद्बोधकासमवधानम् ।
न च किञ्चिद्रूपेण तत्प्रकारकसंस्कारादपि स्वरूपतस्तत्प्रकारकस्मरणस्य
मोषवशादुत्पत्तौ जातित्वादिसामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिजन्यतत्प्रकारकनिखिलजा-
तिविषयकानुभवाहितसंस्काराज्जातित्वाद्यंशे मोषदशायां स्वरूपतो निखि-
लजातिप्रकारकस्मरणसम्भवात् सार्वज्ञ्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्; उद्बोधकस्य
फलबलकल्पनीयतया जातित्वाद्यंशे मोषदशायां निखिलजातिभासकोद्बो-
धकस्याकल्पनेनापत्तिविरहात्—इत्यलं पल्लवितेन ॥

Translation: Really there is no difficulty in holding that a memory cognition of the form '*manas*' results from an impression in which the mode of univeral-ness has been suppressed (not recollected) but which has otherwise the same form. Suppression of that part is due just to the absence of its excitor.

It cannot be said that even if a memory cognition with that in itself as its qualifier results from an impression with that as its qualifier under some mode when the mode of the qualifier is suppressed, still if one has a cognition of all universals under the mode of universal-ness, resulting from universal-ness by *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*, then one may have a memory cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier, when the mode of universal-ness is suppressed in the memory cognition. But this will result in one's being omniscient.

For, as it is the result to be explained which completely determines what excitors have to be postulated, during the suppression of universal-ness there is no objection to non-postulation of excitors for the recollection of all universals. No further discussion on this point is necessary.

Explanation: But there is a simpler solution. A memory cognition is caused by an impression of a previous (informative) cognition. The problem here is that of finding out how the form of the impression is related to the form of memory cognition which it produces. The assumption of the critics was that the impression and the resulting memory cognition must have exactly the same form. If in the impression the qualifier *manastva* were under the mode of being a universal the resulting memory cognition will have exactly the same form, e.g. will have *manastva* under the same mode as its qualifier.

Now the solution lies in noticing that an impression may fail to produce a memory cognition of exactly the same form. This is because parts of the impression may not be activated in producing the memory cognition. This is possible because impressions produce memory cognition only when they are activated. Otherwise there will be no regularity in production of memory cognition; for a person always has a very large number of impressions in his self. If there is no control over which impression is to be active at a certain moment of time in a certain situation then any one, or more, of the impressions will produce memory cognitions almost in a chaotic fashion. Thus it is necessary to postulate some excitors of impressions, some factors which activate an impression in a given situation, to produce a corresponding memory-cognition.

It may so happen that certain excitors make a complex impression active but not in all its parts. In such a case the complex impression will produce a memory cognition which will fail to have exactly the same form as the impression. In modern terminology, the memory cognition in such a case will have less structure than the impression. Thus even though the impression has *manastva* under a mode as its qualifier the resulting cognition may have *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, its mode not being reproduced in the memory cognition because of the inadequacy of activating factors.

It may be objected here that if an impression with a qualifier under a mode can produce a memory cognition with a qualifier in itself without any mode because of inadequate exciting factors then one may become omniscient in the following way. According to Nyāya when one perceives an object as an instance of a

universal, he also perceives the universal. Moreover he also perceives in a special way all instances of the universal also; this is borne out by the fact that after perceiving only one instance of the universal when he perceives another he *recognises* it to be an instance of the same universal. Now as recognition is impossible without a prior cognition, it has to be admitted that when one perceives one instance of a universal one perceives also, in an extraordinary fashion, all instances of the universal, not however their special features, but only *as instances of the universal.*

Now, suppose one perceives universalness and through this mode cognizes all universals. Thus he will have an impression of all universals under the mode of universal-ness. If this mode is not reproduced in the memory cognition because of inadequate exciting factors then one will have a memory of all universals as the qualifier. This will amount to omniscience.

The reply to this objection is to be found by noticing that excitors are postulated only to explain certain features of a memory cognition. There is, therefore, no harm in not postulating the existence of excitors which activate impression in such a way that they produce the memory cognition of all universals under no mode as its qualifier. Certainly, there is no such memory cognition, and, hence, there is no need to postulate exciting factors to explain it.

12.2 *The Theory Established: Not of Navya-Nyāya*

Text

इत्थं च विशिष्टसंविदः सम्बन्धानवलम्बिता न कथंचिदपि कञ्चिदनिर्वाहमावहन्तीति युक्तितन्त्रं न तन्त्रसिद्धान्तविरोधः प्रतिरुणद्धि ॥

Translation: And in this way the argument that a qualified cognition does not have the relation as its object does not lead to any insoluble difficulty anywhere, hence contradicting the established theory of the system cannot prevent (invalidate) this theory justified by arguments.

12.21 *Another Type of Objection*

Text

केचित्तु—विशिष्टसंसर्गबुद्धौ विशिष्टसंसर्गघटकविशेषणीयसंसर्गतायां

प्रकारतात्वं तथाविधविशेष्यीयसंसर्गतायां विशेष्यतात्वमावश्यकम्; अन्यथा कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वरूपेण प्रतियोगितासंसर्गककम्बुग्रीवादिमान् नास्तीत्याद्याकारकबुद्धेर्भ्रमत्वानुपपत्तेः। तथाहि—तादृशज्ञानमभावांशे प्रतियोगितासम्बन्धेन न घटस्य भ्रमः; तेन सम्बन्धेनाभावस्य घटवत्त्वात्। नापि कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितासम्बन्धेन तदंशे तस्य भ्रमः; विशिष्टसम्बन्धाप्रसिद्धेः। नापि स्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितात्वसम्बन्धेन तदंशे कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वस्य भ्रमः; तदंशे तस्याप्रकारत्वात्, तथा सति तादृशधर्मविशिष्टत्वेनाभावोल्लेखापत्तेः। अत एव प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वसम्बन्धेन तादृशधर्मांशेऽभावस्य भ्रम इत्यपि न, तद्धर्मांशेऽभावस्याप्रकारत्वात्। नापि प्रतियोगित्वांशे कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वावच्छिन्नत्वस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वांशे कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वस्य वा भ्रमः, तस्य संसर्गघटकतयाऽप्रकारत्वादिति। तस्मात्संसर्गताविशेषे प्रकारतात्वविशेष्यतात्वे स्वीकृत्य पश्चात्प्रक्षिप्तपक्ष एवापेक्षणीय इति संसर्गस्यापि विशिष्टधीविषयतासिद्धिः प्रकारतात्वादेर्विषयतात्वव्याप्यत्वादित्याहुः॥

Translation: Some hold: In a cognition of a qualified relation the relationness of the qualifier is a constituent of the qualified relation, and must be regarded also as a modeness. So also the relationness of the qualificandum must be regarded as qualificandumness. For otherwise the cognition of the form 'a conch-shell-necked (thing) does not exist in the relation of counter-positiveness as being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness' cannot be explained as an erroneous cognition. There is no error in the cognition of the jar by the relation of *counterpositiveness* to the negation, for, the jar is related to the negation by that relation. Nor can it be said that the error is in the cognition of the negation as related to the jar by the relation of *counterpositiveness limited by conch-shell-neckedness*, for there is no such qualified relation. Nor can it be said that the error is in the cognition of the negation as related to conch-shell-neckedness by the relation of *being a determiner of the counter-positiveness limited by itself*, for, it is not a qualifier of that. If it were a qualifier of the negation then the negation would have been stated as being qualified by such a property.

Therefore it cannot also be said that there is erroneous cognition of negation in such a property by the relation, *being the limitor of counterpositiveness*, because negation is not the quali-

fier of that property. Nor can it be said that the cognition is erroneous, the error being of being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness in counterpositiveness, nor of conch-shell necked-ness in the limitor-ness of counter-positive-ness; because that is not a mode, being a constituent of the relation. Hence it is necessary to postulate qualifier-ness and qualificandum-ness in particular relation-ness and then to postulate objecthood of qualified cognition in relation, qualifier-ness, etc. being pervaded by objecthood.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains a theory of objectivity of relations propounded by a section of Navya-Nyāya philosophers. The argument of these philosophers is complicated, hence requires a detailed explanation. There are three parts of this argument.

In Part I these philosophers argue that the constituent relations of a qualified relation cognized in a qualified cognition have qualifierness and qualificandumness of the qualified cognition.

In Part II they show why this ascription of qualifierness and qualificandumness to constituent relations is necessary.

In Part III they argue that as qualifierness and the qualificandumness are kinds of objectivity, and as they have been ascribed to the constituent relations of the qualified relation, the qualified relation itself must be ascribed objectivity. Hence relations of qualified cognitions must have objectivity, at least in the special case of qualified relations. Now we shall explain these three parts of their arguments.

PART I

In every qualified cognition a relation of a qualifier to (in) a qualificandum gets cognized. Now this relation itself may be a simple relation or may be cognized as a relation qualified in some way or the other. This qualified relation itself must have a qualifier and a qualificandum both of which are relations. These relations are called 'constituents' of the qualified relation. It is necessary here to explain the Navya-Nyāya concept of constituent element (*ghaṭaka*).

A constituent element of a complex object is defined in terms of a certain relation (pervasion) between the cognition of the element and the cognition of the complex object. Whenever one has a cognition of a complex object one has a cognition of the element too. These two cognitions are related by the relation of pervasion and not of succession. This means that every cognition of the complex object is also a cognition of the element. But the converse of this is not necessarily true. One may have a cognition of the element which is not a cognition of the complex object. Thus the technical definition is as follows:

Def: x is a constituent of $y = x$ is the object of every cognition which is also a cognition of y.

$$(C)\ (z)\ [Czyt_1 \supset Czxt_1]$$

Whenever a qualified relation is cognized, the qualifier relation is also cognized; hence the qualifier relation is a constituent of the qualified relation. So also the qualificandum relation is a constituent of the qualified relation. The point here is that when a relation is qualified it has two constituent relations. Now these philosophers argue that these constituents relations which are cognized as relations must also be cognized as a qualificandum and a qualifier. Thus the qualifier relation will be a relation as well as a qualifier. This is stated in the technical language of Navya-Nyāya in the following way. The qualifier relation has relationness. This relationness has to be also a modeness (for, the qualifier relation is a qualifier or a mode), and hence the relationness resident in the qualifier relation possesses mode-ness ness. So also the qualificandum relation is a relation and also a qualificandum of the qualified relation. Thus the relation-ness-resident in the qualificandum relation of the qualified relation possesses qualificandum-ness-ness.

PART II

The reason for postulating both relation-ness and qualifier-ness in the qualifier relation is this. In the example of a cognition of the form 'a conch-shell-necked thing (which is a jar) does not exist' is the cognition of the negation *of* the conch-shell-necked thing. This means that there is a relation between the

negation and the conch-shell-necked thing indicated by 'of'. Here the negation is the qualificandum and the conch-shell-necked-ness is the qualifier of the cognition. Because this is a qualified cognition a relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum has to be cognized. The conch-shell-necked thing is the counter-positive of the negation, and is related to the negation by the relation of *being the counterpositive of* or simply *counter-positive-ness*. This is because the counterpositive is assumed to be ontologically identical with the negation of the negation of the counterpositive, and hence the negation of the counter-positive is itself the counterpositive of the counterpositive. Hence the counterpositive as the second term is related to the negation as the first term by the relation of counterpositive-ness. This is because the second term of a relation of this kind is related to the first term by the abstract property of the first term. Now if the negation as the first term is related to the conch-shell-necked thing as the second term by the relation of *counterpositiveness* then this relation is a simple relation and not a qualified relation. Therefore, this relation of *counterpositive-ness* has to be made more complex with the addition of a qualifier. This is to cognize the counterpositive-ness *as* being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness. This point may be explained by a simpler example.

Suppose we cognize that the ground is pot-possessing, i.e. that a pot is on the ground by the relation of contact. Now this contact holds between the ground as its first term and the pot as its second term. To say that the pot is the second term *of* contact is to say that there is a further relation between pot and contact. Now the pot is cognized under the mode of pot-ness and has also the property of being the second term of contact—being the successor of contact. This means that the successor-ness resident in the pot is limited by potness. So instead of cognizing the relation of contact to pot as simply successor-ness, we may also cognize successor-ness *as* limited by pot-ness as the relation between pot and contact. Although successor-ness is a simple relation, still successor-ness *as* limited by pot-ness is a qualified relation in which successor-ness is the qualificandum and being limited by pot-ness, the qualifier. Thus in the complex qualified relation, successor-ness as limited by pot-ness, there are two

constituent relations—the qualifier relation is *being limited by pot-ness*, and the qualificandum relation is *successor-ness*.

In the present example of a cognition of the form 'a conch-shell-necked thing does not exist' the relation between the negation as the first term and the conch-shell-necked thing as the second term is not simply *counterpositive-ness*, but the qualified relation *counterpositive-ness as limited by conch-shell-necked-ness*.

Now this cognition of the negation as the qualificandum and conch-shell-necked-ness as the qualifier related by the qualified relation is an erroneous cognition. According to Navya-Nyāya only a qualified cognition can be erroneous. Yet it is usual to analyse the erroneous qualified cognition into a qualificandum which is cognized correctly and a qualifier which is cognized as related to the qualificandum by a certain relation when it is not so related. Thus every erroneous cognition is erroneous only in the qualifier but not in the qualificandum. It is usual, therefore, to speak of two *parts* of a cognized object, the qualificandum and the qualifier and to say that the cognition is erroneous in the qualifier part.

In the example given in the text the cognition of the form 'a conch-shell-necked-thing does not exist by the said relation' is erroneous, but the problem here is that in this erroneous cognition the qualifier cannot be said to be not related by that relation. The problem arises because of the assumption made here:

> *Assumption*: A heavy property cannot be a limitor in the case where a lighter-property can be found.

In this example the property of having a conch-shell-neck is much heavier than jar-ness. Yet a conch-shell-necked-thing is ontologically identical with a jar. Hence to cognize that a conch-shell-necked-thing does not exist is to have a cognition of a negation the counter-positive of which is the conch-shell-necked-thing and the limitor of the counterpositiveness should apparently be conch-shell-necked-ness. Yet because of the Assumption the limitor here of the counterpositiveness will be jar-ness which is a simple unanalysable universal and is much lighter than the analysable complex property of having such a neck. Hence it cannot be said that the mistake here lies in ascribing

the jar to the negation in the relation of counter-positive-ness, for the jar is really the counterpositive of the negation.

It cannot also be said that the cognition is mistaken in ascribing the jar to the negation in the relation, *counterpositive-ness limited by conch-shell-necked-ness*; for such a qualified relation is not possible as the counterpositiveness *cannot* have conch-shell-necked-ness as its limitor for it is a very heavy analysable property. Hence the complex relation counterpositiveness *limited by* conch-shell-necked-ness is impossible.

It cannot also be said that the mistake lies in ascribing conch-shell-necked-ness to the negation in the relation *being the determiner of the counterpositive-ness limited by itself* because this is not the qualifier of the negation. In the cognition of negation of conch-shell-necked-thing, conch-shell-necked-ness is the limitor of a counterpositiveness resident in a conch-shell-necked-thing. The negation itself is the determiner of this counterpositive-ness. Thus the relation between the negation as the first term and the conch-shell-necked-ness (the qualifier) as the second term is the property resident in the first term—i.e. being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself (conch-shell-necked-ness). Yet the cognition cannot be mistaken in thus ascribing the second term (the qualifier) to the negation, because the qualifier is not so ascribed to the negation. It is true that every negation is necessarily a *negation of* a counterpositive yet the abstract property resident in the counterpositive is not a qualifier of the negation. Thus in the cognition of negation of a jar, jarness is not a qualifier of the negation. For, if it were so, then the negation would have been stated *as* jarness-possessing, i.e. negation of jarness. But the negation of a jar cannot be said to be jarness-possessing—only a jar can be so—and hence jarness, and in the example discussed in the text, conch-shell-necked-ness, cannot be a qualifier of the negation.

It cannot also be said that the mistake lies in ascribing negation to conch-shell-necked-ness, for the negation is not its qualifier but is rather its qualificandum. The qualifier and the qualificandum of a cognition cannot be interchanged without changing the cognition.

It cannot be also said that the mistake lies in ascribing the property of being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness to counter-

positive-ness, for it being a constituent of the relation cannot be a qualifier. If one could say this then the explanation of the mistake committed in the cognition could have been explained. For example, in the cognition of negation of a jar, the jar is the counterpositive, i.e. possesses counterpositive-ness. This counterpositive-ness is limited by jar-ness. A cognition of such a negation can be shown to be erroneous if one could say that the ascription of jar-ness to counterpositive-ness were mistaken, for to be limited by jarness is to be qualified by it—jarness is the limitor of counterpositiveness if and only if, it is the mode under which the counterpositive is cognized. Yet in the present case such an explanation is impossible, for being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness is a part of the relation and hence cannot be the qualifier also.

Similarly it cannot be said that a cognition is mistaken in so far as it ascribes conch-shell-necked-ness to limitor-ness of counterpositive-ness.

Thus all possible ways of explaining the erroneous-ness of such a cognition lead to no solution. The only way left is to admit that even a relation can be a qualifier or qualificandum of the cognition in such cases of qualified-relations. If this is admitted then one can easily say that the cognition is mistaken in ascribing the property of being limited by the conch-shell-necked-ness which although being a constituent relation, is still a qualifier, to the counterpositive-ness. This ascription is a mistake, for as we have already explained, the assumption is that the heavy property cannot be a limitor.

PART III

Now we come to the last part of the argument of these philosophers. Having shown that it is necessary to regard a relation as a qualifier or a qualificandum of a qualified cognition they argue that objectivity, too has to be ascribed to the cognized relation. The argument is this: Qualifierness and qualificandumness are kinds of objectivity. And if they are to be ascribed to constituent relations then the qualified relation of which they are constituents must also be ascribed objectivity of the qualified cognition.

12.211 *The Objection Examined: An Alternative Theory*

Text

तदपि न शोभनतया प्रतिभाति; उक्तबुद्धौ प्रतियोगिविशेषणतापन्नस्य कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वादेरभावांशे प्रकारतोपगमे क्षतिविरहेण तदंशे तद्भ्रमत्वस्यैव सम्भवात्, स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रकारतास्थल एव विशेषणवत्त्वेन विशेष्योल्लेखात् । अत एव दण्डी चैत्रः कुण्डलीत्यादिविशिष्टानुयोगिकवैशिष्ट्यबुद्धौ समानकालीनत्वसम्बन्धेन विशेष्यतावच्छेदकदण्डादेर्विधेयकुण्डलाद्यंशेप्रकारत्वेऽपि न दण्डवत्कुण्डलीत्याद्याकारकता । न च प्रकारतायाः पारतन्त्र्यं दुर्निर्वचमिति वाच्यम्; उक्तस्थले प्रतियोगिनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छेदेनैवाभावांशे कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वादेः प्रकारतोपगमात् तद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छिन्नत्वस्यैव तत्पारतन्त्र्यपदार्थत्वात् ।।

Translation: This, too, does not appear to be correct, for there is no harm in holding that in that cognition conch-shell-neckedness which is a qualifier of the counter-positive has also a modeness of the negation. Hence it is possible that a mistake be in that with regard to the negation, for, it is only in the case of independent modeness that the qualificandum is mentioned as possessing the qualifier. Hence in the qualified cognition with a qualified predecessor as in 'Stick-possessing Caitra, possesses ear-rings', the stick which is the limitor of qualificandum-ness by the relation of simultaneity has mode-ness with regard to ear-rings; and yet it does not produce a qualified cognition of the form 'stick-possessing is ear-ring-possessing'. It cannot also be said that the dependence of mode-ness cannot be explained. For in the above instance mode-ness can be ascribed to conch-shell-necked-ness with regard to the negation as something limiting the mode-ness determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counter-positive; for dependence (of mode-ness) on that belongs only to that which is limited by modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in that.

Explanation: The above theory that a relation is also a qualifier of the qualificandum of the cognition is rejected. A simpler, hence, better, alternative theory is proposed here. This theory is based on a distinction between an independent mode of a quali-

ficandum and a dependent mode. A negation is the qualificandum of which the counterpositive is the qualifier. The qualifier resides in the negation by the relation of being the determiner of the counterpositive-ness. For example, in the negation of the jar the jar is the counterpositive *of* the negation. This means that the negation is the determiner of the counterpositive-ness resident in the jar. To cognize negation of the jar is to cognize that the negation is jar-possessing by the relation *being determiner of counterpositive-ness.*

But what about jarness? Jar being the counterpositive of the negation, jarness is the limitor of this counterpositive-ness. The jar has counterpositive-ness limited by jarness. Jarness, therefore, is a direct qualifier of the jar while the jar is the direct qualifier of the negation. But jarness is not a direct qualifier of the negation. The negation is *not* a negation *of jarness,* but of the jar.

It is now proposed to introduce a new concept of dependent modeness and to regard jarness as the dependent mode of the negation. Thus dependence of jarness, is on the counterpositive, i.e. the jar; it is only by being a direct qualifier of the jar that jarness becomes a mode of the negation.

This difference between an independent mode and a dependent mode is reflected in the language expressing the cognition. In the case of an independent mode the qualificandum is always mentioned as the mode-possessing. For example, jarness is an independent mode of the jar, and hence the jar is always mentioned as jarness-possessing. Although a dependent mode is a mode of the qualificandum, the qualificandum is never said to be the dependent-mode-possessing. This difference between a dependent and an independent mode is explained by means of a complex example—Caitra with a stick (in his hand) has ear-rings. Here Caitra is the qualificandum and ear-rings its qualifier. The stick which is a property of Caitra is the limitor of the qualificandumness resident in Caitra. Thus both the stick and the ear-rings are qualifiers of Caitra. But the stick is a dependent mode of ear-rings. To admit this is not to say that the cognition is of the form 'stick-possessing is the ear-ring-possessor'. From *a* is an independent mode of *b* and *b* is an independent mode of *c*, we cannot get *a* is an independent mode of *c*, but get *a* is a

dependent mode of *c*. Thus the relation, being an independent mode, is intransitive. The suffix '-possessing' can be used only with an independent mode.

Now what is the definition of being a dependent mode? We must notice that *a* has two modenesses, (i) the (independent) modeness of *b*, and (ii) the (dependent) modeness of *c*. Modeness dependent on *b* is that modeness which is limited by modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in *b*. Let us explain this definition.

a is a mode of *c*, simply because it is a mode of *b*. The two modenesses resident in *a* are related by the relation limitor-limited. The modeness of *c* resident in *a* is limited by the modeness of *b* resident in *a*. Now what is the modeness of *b* resident in *a*? This is a relation of independent modeness which is defined as modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in *b*. If *a* is the independent mode of *b*, then *b* is the qualificandum of *a*. This means that *b* has qualificandumness which determines the modeness resident in *a*. Now having defined independent modeness, modeness dependent on *b* resident in *a* is defined as the modeness resident in *a* which is limited by the independent modeness of *b* resident in *a*.

So also in the example discussed by the supporters of the earlier theory, negation of conch-shell-necked-thing, conch-shell-necked-ness which is the limitor of the counterpositiveness becomes a dependent mode of the negation itself. This explains why the cognition is erroneous for this dependent mode is a wrong mode of the negation. It is, therefore, not necessary to postulate that a relation cognized in a qualified cognition of a special type is also a qualifier of the qualificandum of the cognition.

12.212 *Another Definition of Dependent Modeness: Objections and Answer*

Text

यत्तु—तत्र प्रतियोगिविशेष्यतयाऽभावविशेष्यतया च निरूपिता एकैव प्रकारता स्वीक्रियते, स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रकारतास्थले तु विशेष्यभेदेन प्रकारताभेदः, तादृशप्रकारताया एकैकसाधारणत्वात् । एवञ्च तदीय-

विशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारताऽभिन्नत्वमेव, तत्पारतन्त्र्यम् । न चैवं सति तादृशज्ञानस्याभावांश इव प्रतियोग्यंशेऽपि स्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-कत्वसम्बन्धेन कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वप्रकारकत्वापत्तिः, अभावविशेष्यतानि-रूपिततत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रकारताया एव भवन्मते प्रतियोगिविशेष्य-तानिरूपितप्रकारतात्मकत्वात् तथा च तादृशज्ञानं प्रतियोग्यंशेऽपि तस्य भ्रमः स्यादिति वाच्यम्; तादृशज्ञानस्य हि प्रतियोगिनिष्ठविशेष्य-तानिरूपिततत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नकम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वप्रकारताशालित्वेऽपि प्रति-योगिनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपिता या तादृशसंसर्गनिष्ठसंसर्गता तन्निरू-पकतद्धर्मप्रकारताकत्वं नास्ति तादृशसंसर्गनिष्ठसंसर्गताया अभावविशे-ष्यतयैव समं निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोपगमात् । इत्थं च तन्निष्ठविशेष्य-तानिरूपिततत्संसर्गनिष्ठसंसर्गतानिरूपकतद्धर्मप्रकारताकत्वमेव तदंशे तत्सम्बन्धेन तद्धर्मप्रकारकत्वमतो न दर्शितातिप्रसङ्गः—इति ।

Translation: (Another objection) In that case the mode-ness determined by qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive is the same as that determined by the qualificandumness resident in the negation. But in the case of *independent modeness* it differs with the different qualificanda and hence the above mentioned two mode-nesses are different, each being common to each. So also dependence (of modeness) on tha is merely the non-difference of the modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in that.

It cannot also be said that—in that case just as a cognition of that form has conch-shell-necked-ness as modeness with regard to the negation, so also it has modeness with regard to the counterpositive by the relation, being determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself. As in your theory the modeness limited by that relation and determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation is identical with the modeness determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive, a cognition of that form would be erroneous with regard to the counterpositive too.

For, a cognition of that form does have the mode-ness—conch-shell-necked-ness—limited by that relation and determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive. Yet it does not have the property of being a determiner of mode-ness of that property which is the determiner of the relation-ness

which is resident in such a relation, and is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the counterpositive. The relationness resident in such a relation has determiner-determined relation only with the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation. Thus modeness of that property, in that relation, and with regard to that, is merely the modeness of that property which is the determiner of the relationness which is resident in that relation and is determined by qualificandum-ness resident in that.

Hence there is no over-extension as has been alleged.

Explanation: Here an alternative theory of dependent and independent modeness is proposed. In negation of *b* there are two qualificandum-nesses; the negation is the qualificandum of *b* and has, therefore, this qualificandum-ness; *b* which is the counterpositive of the negation is in its turn, qualified by *b*-ness (in the symbolic representation—*a*) which is the limitor of the counter-positive-ness resident in *b*. Hence *b*, too, has the qualificandum-ness of *b*-ness (i.e. *a*). In the earlier theory the two modenesses resident in *b*-ness (i.e. *a*) were related to each other by the limitor-limited relation. Now it is proposed that instead of relating two modenesses resident in the same object by this relation, it would be better to identify these two modenesses. These two modenesses are indeed determined by two different qualificandumnesses, *b*-ness (a) is the independent mode of *b*, i.e. the modeness resident in *b*-ness (*a*) is determined by qualificandum-ness resident in *b* which is the counter-positive of the negation. Again, *b*-ness (*a*) is the dependent mode of the negation, i.e. this modeness resident in *b*-ness (*a*) is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation. These two modenesses—one determined by the qualificandumness of the counterpositive, and the other by that of the negation—being resident in the same object—*b*-ness (*a*), are to be regarded as identical. This is the theory propounded by Jagadīśa, an earlier contemporary of Gadādhara who rejects this theory.

This identification of two modenesses resident in the same object is recommended only in the case of dependent modeness. In the case of independent modenesses, even if they are resident in the same object, they cannot be identified. For example, in the cognition that both *a* and *b* are *c*, *c*-ness is the mode of both *a*


and *b*, i.e. has two modenesses—one determined by the qualificandumness resident in *a*, and the other by that resident in *b*. But as these two modenesses are independent modenesses they cannot be identified even though they both reside in *c*-ness. So in the case of independent modeness it varies with varying qualificanda. Thus the definition of dependence of modeness on some object is: being identical with the modeness determined by qualificandum-ness resident in that object.

The definition of dependence of modeness is in terms of independent modeness. A property which is an independent mode of some object becomes a dependent mode of another object if and only if the former object is an independent mode of the latter object. Thus much is accepted by both Jagadīśa and Gadādhara. They differ in their analysis of the two modenesses which the dependent mode has. According to Jagadīśa the dependent modeness and the independent modeness although *of* two different objects are still identical. But two modenesses are to be distinguished even if they belong to the same object, if they are independent modes of two different objects. Gadādhara, however, wants to have the same relation obtaining between two modenesses belonging to the same object, whether both these two modenesses be independent modenesses, or, one dependent, the other independent.

Now Gadādhara points out the difficulty in this theory. As the two modenesses resident in conch-shell-necked-ness are identical, the modeness determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the conch-shell-necked-thing which is the counter-positive of the negation—negation of a conch-shell-necked-thing—may be a wrong mode of the counterpositive. It is really a wrong mode of the negation, but if this mode-ness be identified with the mode-ness with regard to the counterpositive then as the modeness is wrong with regard to the negation, it will be wrong with regard to the counterpositive also. But this is absurd. For conch-shell-necked-ness necessarily belongs to a conch-shell-necked-thing, although it may fail to belong to the negation. Thus the modeness resident in conch-shell-necked-ness with regard to conch-shell-necked-thing is necessary. Hence this mode cannot be a wrong mode of the counterpositive. Yet if this modeness be identified with the merely contingent modeness resident

in conch-shell-necked-ness with regard to the negation, conch-shell-necked-ness becomes a contingent, possibly wrong, mode of the conch-shell-necked-thing.

The reply to this objection which is really to the effect that the definition of dependence of mode-ness is too wide as it is identical with independent mode-ness resident in the same object, is found by adding more structure to this definition. We shall explain this further point with a simple example. In the cognition of negation of a jar the jar is the counterpositive, jar-ness is the limitor of counter-positiveness. Jarness is related to the jar by inherence. The jar which is the counterpositive of the negation is related to it by the relation being the determiner of the counterpositive-ness resident in the jar. The jar-ness is related to the negation by being the determiner of counterpositiveness limited by itself. The relation-ness resident in the relation between jar-ness and negation is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation, but not by the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar which is the counterpositive.



R_1 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness resident the jar (for the negation determines this counterpositiveness).

R_2 = Inherence

R_3 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself.

Relationness resident in

R_2 is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar

Relationness resident in

R₃ is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the negation.

So if having modeness (of a property in the relevant relation with regard to that) by a cognition is defined as having modeness of that property which is the determiner of the relation-ness resident in the relevant relation determined by the qualificandumness resident in that then this defect of being a too-wide definition is avoided.

Now it cannot be said that conch-shell-necked-ness is a mode of the conch-shell-necked thing in the relevant relation *being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself*, i.e. R_3. For the relation-ness resident in R_3 is *not* determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive—the conch-shell-necked thing. So the charge of the defintion being too wide is avoided.

12.2121 *Rejection of the Alternative Definition*

Text

तदसत्; तथा सति प्रतियोग्यंशे तादृशज्ञानीयकम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वप्रकारताया अपि अभावपारतन्त्र्यापत्तेः, तद्विशिष्टबोधकशब्देन प्रतियोग्यनुल्लेखापत्तेः ।

Translation: This theory is untenable. If it were true then the modeness in conch-shell-necked-ness in a cognition of that form, with regard to the counterpositive would also become dependent upon the negation, and also of not mentioning the counterpositive by an expression producing the cognition of something qualified by that.

Explanation: Even this clarification does not really save this theory for if the dependent modeness resident in conch-shell-necked-ness be identified with the independent modeness resident in it, then the independent modeness becomes the dependent modeness. In the example under discussion conch-shell-necked-ness which is dependent upon the counterpositive in order to be a mode of the negation, can be regarded as dependent upon the

negation in order to be a mode of the counterpositive. But the fact is that it, being an independent mode of the counterpositive, becomes the dependent mode of the negation, its dependence being on the counterpositive. Now if the dependent and independent modenesses be identified, then one would be justified in saying that it being an independent mode of the negation, becomes the dependent mode of the counterpositive, its dependence being on the negation.

Moreover, the qualificandum is not mentioned as the dependent-mode-possessing; hence the counterpositive ought not be mentioned as conch-shell-necked-ness-possessing. Yet a conch-shell-necked thing is necessarily mentioned as 'conch-shell-necked-ness-possessing'.

12.22 *Argument for the Main Objection*

Text

अथ प्रतियोगिविशेषणीभूतधर्मस्याभावांशे निरुक्तप्रकारताकल्पनापेक्षया संसर्गतायां प्रकारतात्वादिकल्पनमेवोचितं धर्मिकल्पनातो धर्मकल्पनाया लघुत्वात् । न च भवन्मतेऽपि तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नत्वांशे प्रतियोगिसंसर्गीभूतप्रतियोगित्वविशेषणतया संसर्गतायाः कल्पनीयतया धर्मिकल्पनमावश्यकमिति वाच्यम्; भवन्मतेऽप्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वांशे तद्धर्मनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितसंसर्गतायाः कल्पनीयतया संसर्गताकल्पनस्य तुल्यत्वादिति चेत्? न;

Translation: (Another objection). It would be lighter to postulate modeness-ness in relationness rather than the postulating mode-ness, of the above mentioned form, of a property which is the qualifier of the counterpositive, with regard to the negation; for it is lighter to postulate a property than to postulate an entity possessing the property.

It cannot also be said that—even on your theory a relationness being limited by that property, has to be postulated as the qualifier of the counterpositive-ness which has become the relation of the counterpositive; and hence it is necessary to postulate a substratum of a property.

For even on your theory in the part—the property of being a determiner of limited counterpositive-ness—relation-ness deter-

mined by mode-ness resident in that property has to be postulated, as postulation of relation-ness is equally present in both.

Explanation: Here an objection to theory of dependent and independent modes is stated. It is pointed out that postulation of something possessing a property is heavier than the postulation of merely the property. The philosophers who advocate the theory of dependent modeness, postulate a kind of modeness, and also its property modeness-ness. But if relation-ness is assumed also as modeness, then only modeness-ness is postulated in relationness. Hence this theory is lighter, and is, therefore, justified.

An objection to this claim can be raised in the following way. Those who regard a cognized relation also as a mode, consider cases only of qualified relations. The relation mentioned in the example under discussion is, counterpositiveness *as* being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness. But what does 'as' mean here: It must mean some sort of relation possessing relation-ness, as a qualifier of counterpositiveness which itself is a relation to the counterpositive. So if relation-ness is postulated, relation-ness-ness, too, has to be postulated. Thus relation-ness becomes something with possesses a property, and its postulation makes this theory as heavy as the other theory.

This objection is answered in the following way. In the other theory of dependent modeness, too, additional relationness has to be postulated, and hence so far as postulation of relation-ness is concerned, both the theories share the same heaviness. Now we shall explain how the other theory, too, has to postulate additional relation-ness.

According to this theory, the relation between the dependent mode and the negation is being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited *by* itself. Now what does 'by' mean here? It means that itself is the limitor, i.e. has limitorness resident in it and the counterpositiveness has limitedness resident in it. The relation between limitorness and limitedness is determiner-determined relation which is to be cognized under the mode of relation-ness. Thus even this theory has to postulate additional relation-ness; thus the two theories stand or fall together on this account.

12.22 *Argument Continued*

Text

अभावांशे प्रतियोगिविशेषणधर्मस्य प्रकारतामते प्रतियोगिप्रकारता-निरूपिता या प्रतियोगित्वनिष्ठसंसर्गता, सैव प्रतियोगिविशेषणनिष्ठ-प्रकारतानिरूपिता याऽवच्छिन्नत्वनिष्ठसंसर्गता तन्निरूपिताऽपि, एताव-तैव तादृशधर्मस्य स्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वरूपसंसर्गभाननिर्वाहात् । एवञ्च तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नत्वविशेषितप्रतियोगितानिरूपकत्वे प्रतियोगिसं-सर्गतावादिनस्तव मम चावच्छिन्नत्वप्रतियोगित्वनिरूपकत्वेष्वैकैकसंसर्ग-ताकल्पनस्य तुल्यतया तव तादृशावच्छिन्नत्वनिष्ठसंसर्गतानिरूपिततत्त-द्धर्मनिष्ठसंसर्गतानिरूपिततद्धर्मनिष्ठप्रकारताकल्पनस्य तुल्यतया भवतां संसर्गतायां प्रकारतात्वादिकल्पनस्याधिक्यात् । न च भवन्मतेऽपि तादृशप्रकारतायाः पारतन्त्र्यनिर्वाहाय तत्र प्रतियोगिनिष्ठविशेष्यतानि-रूपितप्रकारतावच्छिन्नत्वकल्पनमधिकमिति वाच्यम्; भवन्मतेऽपि तत्त-द्धर्मनिष्ठप्रकारताविशेषात्मकसंसर्गतायामवच्छिन्नत्वानुयोगिकसम्बन्ध-विशेषावच्छिन्नत्वस्याधिकस्य कल्पनीयतया साम्यात् ।

Translation: On the theory that the qualifier property of the counterpositive has modeness with regard to the negation, the relationness which is resident in the counterpositiveness and is determined by modeness of the counterpositive also determined by the relation-ness which is resident in limitedness and is determined by the modeness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive. This is sufficient to explain such a property being cognized as the relation—being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself. So also, as your theory advocates relation-ness of the counterpositive to (in) being the determiner of the counterpositiveness qualified by limited-ness by that property, so also my theory recommends the postulation of one counterpositive-ness in being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited in that way; hence in this respect the two theories are at par. Again both the theories are the same in postulating modeness which is resident in that property and is determined by relationness resident in that property and by relation-ness resident in being limited in that way. But you have to further postulate modenessness in relationness, which is an additional reality.

It cannot also be said that—even on your theory to explain dependence of that type of modeness, you have to postulate an additional limitedness of modeness determined by qualificandumness resident in the counterpositive.

For even on your theory in the relationness which is the particular mode-ness resident in each of those properties, the additional property of being limited by the particular relation with limitedness as the predecessor, has to be postulated; and hence both the theories are equal in this respect.

Explanation: The chain of arguments for and against the theory that cognized relations cannot be accorded objecthood of these cognitions ends here. We shall give a detailed analysis of all the arguments for and against this theory.


In all these arguments a basic example of a cognition of negation is analysed and explained. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse this example in detail. As this example is of a cognition of a negation we shall begin by studying a simple example of a negation. In the cognition of the negation of a jar we have to note the following.

R_2 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness

the jar $\xrightarrow{R_2}$ negation of the jar
(counterpositive)

In 'negation of the jar' the 'of' stands for a relation. The first task is to be clear about two different ways in which the relation between the jar and its negation can be explained. The arrow in the diagram is to be interpreted in a manner which is opposite to the usual Western method of representation. The tip of the arrow indicates the predecessor (*anuyogin*) of the relation instead of the successor. Thus the arrow indicates a relation between the counterpositive and its negation with the negation as its predecessor and the counterpositive as its successor. In the idiom of Navya-Nyāya the counterpositive is *related in* the negation by the relation, being the determiner of the counterpositiveness resident in the counterpositive, for the negation is that which determines this counterpositive-ness. This is because the negation and its counterpositive are correlatives. This is the usual analysis.


But there is a different analysis based on the law of double negation, thus:



In this diagram the negation of the jar itself has become the counterpositive of the jar which is identical with the negation of the negation of the jar. Here R_2^* is simply counterpositive-ness, because the negation (of the jar) is the counterpositive of the jar. Thus we have two different analyses of the relation between the negation and its counterpositive:


(a) R_2 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness
(b) R_2^* = counterpositiveness.

It is to be noted here that the converse of R_2 is R_2^* in the usual analysis, thus:



for the jar is the counterpositive of the negation according to the usual analysis.

With this explanation of the two different relations obtaining between the negation and its counterpositive, we now study the more complicated example of negation discussed in these arguments. This negation is the negation of a conch-shell-necked thing. The first argument against the theory analyses this negation in the following way:




where conch-shell-necked-ness is the limitor of the counter-positiveness resident in c-s-n thing. This limitor, c-s-n-ness, is the qualifier of the c-s-n-thing. The argument uses the relation between the c-s-n-thing and its negation, not simply R_2*, but $R^A = R_2$* *as* being limited by c-s-n-ness.

i.e. R_2* *as* R_1—possessing

Now R^A is a qualified relation in which R_2* is the qualificandum and R_1 is the qualifier. This argument tries to prove that there must be a mode-ness-ness in the relation-ness resident in R_1, a constituent relation in R^A, and a qualificandum-ness-ness in the relation-ness resident in R_2*, the other constituent relation in R^A. This simply means that R_1 is also to be a mode over and above being a relation and R_2* a qualificandum over and above being a relation in the cognition of this negation.

The argument which tries to refute this theory of additional mode-ness-ness etc. in the constituent relation-ness establishes a distinction between a dependent mode and an independent mode in the cognition of the negation of c-s-n-thing, thus:



Where the counterpositive is an independent mode of the negation by the relation R_2, and c-s-n-ness is the independent mode of the counterpositive by R_1. The problem is to understand the nature of R_3. The previous argument introduced the concept of a qualified relation in order to explain the relation of c-s-n-ness to the negation through R_2*. But the present argument introduces the concept of dependent mode in order to explain the nature of R_3. C-s-n-ness is a dependent mode of the negation, its dependence being on the counterpositive. Thus c-s-n-ness has two modenesses, one independent modeness of the c-s-n-thing and the dependent modeness of the negation. This argu-

ment has used the relation of *being limited by* between these two different modenesses.

A different theory of dependent modeness (resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive) with regard to the negation is then proposed. It identifies the independent modeness with the dependent modeness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive.


Then the merits and demerits of these two theories are discussed. The real problem emerges here as the problem of analysing what may be represented in set theoretic terminology as the relative product of two relations. In the above diagram R_3 may be regarded as the relative product of R_1 and R_2. Three different analyses are given by Gadādhara on this point.

(i) According to the theory of qualified relation, there is no R_3; R_2* is cognized only *as* R_1 i.e. as being limited by c-s-n-ness. Thus the concept of qualified relation eliminates the need for relative product. This is possible only because Navya-Nyāya deals only with cognitions of relations, and cognitions of the so-called relative product of relations may be, and is, analysed differently in terms of qualified relations.

(ii) According to one theory of dependent modeness a relative product of R_1 and R_2* is itself a relation between R_1 and R_2*. R_1 and R_2* are related in a certain way to form a chain relation. But according to Navya-Nyāya, a relation by definition produces a qualified cognition the object of which involves a qualifier and a qualificandum. Thus when R_1 and R_2* are related to form a chain relation in the above example R_1 becomes the qualifier of R_2*. Again, to be a qualifier an object has to be a term, usually the second term, of a relation cognized. Thus if R_1 becomes the qualifier then there must be a relation, S_1, of which it becomes the second term and R_2* the first term.

(iii) The other theory using the first form of the relation between dependent and independent modenesses explains the relative product of R_1 and R_2 in an altogether different way. Here R_1 and R_2 do not need to be related by a further relation as qualifier and qualificandum. The explanation given here uses the

converse of R_2 instead of R_2 thus:



The counterpositive is an independent mode of the negation by R_2 (not by R_2*). The relation-ness resident in R_2*is determined by the modeness resident in the counterpositive.

Being limited by, again, is a relation (R_1) and, therefore, has a relation-ness resident in it. This relation-ness is determined by the independent modeness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive. This theory of dependent modes, now, asserts that the relation-ness resident in R_1 is also the determiner of the relation-ness resident in R_2*. That is, the relation-ness resident in R_2* is determined by both the independent modeness resident in the counterpositive and also the relation-ness determined by independent modeness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive, namely, the, limitor of the counterpositiveness resident in the counterpositive. It is claimed, on behalf of this theory, that we cognize R_3 as one relation only because of this dual determination of the relationness resident in R_2*.

The problem here is this. We may represent R_3 as R_1/R_2. Yet R_1 and R_2 are two relations, then how is it that they constitute one relation R_3? The usual set theoretic definition is that

(SD) $xR_3y = (\exists z)(xR_1z \,.\, z\breve{R}_2y)$; or,
$(\exists z)(xR_1z \,.\, yR_2z)$.

In the above diagram, using the arrow in the way explained above, we have the following:

(a) cR_1l
(b) $cR_2{}^*n$

(where '*c*' is short for 'counterpositive', '*n*' for 'negation' and '*l*' for 'limitor of the counterpositiveness').
Now using R_2 (the converse), instead of R_2^* in (b), we get

(c) nR_2c

Then from (a) and (c), we get

(d) nR_2/R_1l,

where R_2/R_1 is R_3, with n as its predecessor and l as its successors. This Navya-Nyāya theory assures the existence of a z in (SD), by stipulating that the relation-ness resident in R_2^* be determined by (i) the modeness resident in c, (the predecessor of R_2^*) and, (ii) the relation-ness which is resident in R_1 (with c as its predecessor) and determined by l (the successor of R_1).

This Navya-Nyāya explanation of why R_3 is cognized as one relation differs radically from the explanation given in (i). There it was claimed that when R_1 and R_2^* combine in a certain way to constitute R_3, additional relations are to be postulated to explain how R_1 can become the qualifier of R_2^*. The present Navya-Nyāya theory does away with the need of additional relations. The cognition of R_3 is not a cognition of a qualified relation, but of a complex relation in which the constituent relations, or rather the relation-nesses residing in them, are related as the determiner and the determined, not as a qualifier and a qualificandum. To say that the relation-ness resident in R_2^* is determined by modeness resident in c, and also by the relation-ness resident in R_1 and determined by l, is to say that c is predecessor both R_2^* and R_1 (in (a) and (b)). To get the relative product, it is necessary to use the converse of R_2^*, and hence R_3 becomes *being the determiner of the counterpositiveness* (R_2, *not* R_2^*), *limited by itself* (l), of which n is the predecessor and l the successor.

We must emphasize a fundamental difference of Navya-Nyāya from set theory. If Navya-Nyāya philosophers wanted merely to say that c is the first term of both R_2^* and R_1, they could have said so directly (by using '*anuyogin*'). They would not have needed to bring in modeness, relation-ness, etc. It is necessary for them to bring in these concepts only because they are dealing with *cognitions* of relations, not with relations.

If relations are cognized, their terms are also necessarily cognized as qualifiers and qualificanda. A mode is a special kind of

qualifier, modeness a special kind of qualifierness. To say that *c* is *cognized as* a term of a relation and also as a mode of *n*, is to say that the relationness resident in *c*-ness (R^*_2) is *determined by* the modeness resident in *c*; and so also with the relation-ness resident in R_1.

12.3 *Final Reply*

Text

अथवा किमेतावता सूक्ष्मगवेषणायासेन, अस्तु संसर्गताविशेषाणां प्रकारतादिविशेषरूपता, नैतावतापि संसर्गस्य विशिष्टधीविषयतासिद्धिः । झटिति विघटितनिर्युक्तिकसिद्धान्तानुरोधनिःसङ्ख्यश्रृङ्खलानां विषयतात्वस्य प्रकारतात्वादिव्यापकताभङ्गभीरुतया दुरभिभवत्वात्—इति वदन्ति ॥

Translation: Or, what is the use of such subtle arguments given so far? Granted that particular relationness has particular modeness etc. but by this objecthood (of qualified cognition) of relations is not established. It is difficult to overcome objecthoodness of innumerable chains postulated to save the hasty illogical theory, for fear of violating pervaderness by modeness-ness etc. (of objecthoodness).

XVI. RELATION-NESS AND QUALIFIER-NESS ETC.

13. GADĀDHARA'S THEORY

Text

संसर्गतया च समं प्रकारताया विशष्यतायाश्च निरूप्यनिरूपकभावाख्यः सम्बन्धविशेषोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । स च सम्बन्धः कार्यत्वकारणत्वाधेयत्वाधारत्वप्रतियोगित्वानुयोगित्वादीनां मिथस्तादृशसम्बन्ध इव स्वरूपविशेषः पदार्थान्तरमेव वा, अन्यथा तत्र तेन सम्बन्धेन तत्प्रकारकमित्येतदर्थस्य दुर्वचत्वात् ।

Translation: It is also to be admitted that there is a relation of determiner-determined-ness between relationness on the one hand and modeness as well as qualificandumness on the other.

And that relation is either a particular self-linking relation or a separate ontological reality, just like the relation with cause-ness and effect-ness, super-stratumness and substratumness, successor-ness and predecessor-ness. Otherwise the meaning of 'having that as a mode by that relation' cannot be explained.

Explanation: In a qualified cognition the object is of the form —*a* as *b*-possessing by the relation *R*, where *a* is the qualificandum, *b* the qualifier and *R* the relation between *a* as the predecessor and *b* as the successor. Now the fact is that *a* is the qualificandum of *this* cognition, and *b* is the qualifier of the qualificandum in this cognition, and *R* is the relation cognized between *a* and *b* as cognized in this cognition. Thus the qualifier, the qualificandum and the relation between them, are relative to each other and also to the cognition. This relativeness of the qualifier etc. is analysed in Navya-Nyāya in terms of the relation—*the determiner-determined-ness*. This relation holds not between the qualifier, the qualificandum and the relation, but between the qualifierness resident in the qualifier and qualificandumness resident in the qualificandum. So also the relationness which is simply the objecthood of the cognized relation, i.e. the relation of the cognition to the cognized relation, is determined by the qualifier-ness and the qualificandumness.

Whenever a new relation is postulated, Navya-Nyāya philosophers discuss the ontological question of its reality. Gadādhara postulates determiner-determined-ness as a relation between relationness on the one hand and qualifier-ness and qualificandumness on the other. He, therefore, has to settle the question of the ontological status of this new relation. Gadādhara's position is that as this relation is an epistemological relation, its ontological status may be left open. It may be regarded as a self-linking relation, i.e. may be reduced to one of its terms ontologically; or it may be accorded a separate ontological reality. But his point is that unless such a relation is admitted we cannot explain the meaning of 'that is the qualifier relative to that (qualificandum) by that relation'.

Here we may note the fundamental difference between the Navya-Nyāya theory of modes of cognition and Frege's theory of modes of presentation of the object referred to by a name.

Frege has introduced the concept of mode of presentation of the object in order to distinguish between the cognitive values of two types of true identity statements. Frege's theory of mode of presentation of the object has the following characteristics.

(i) Every name presents an object under a definite mode of presentation.
(ii) This mode of presentation of the object by a name is the sense of the name.
(iii) The sense illuminates only, one aspect of the object referred to by the name, provided the object exists.
(iv) This sense cannot be identified with physical properties of the physical objects.
(v) The sense of the name is a route from the name to the object.
(vi) The sense of a name offers a criterion of identity of the object referred to by the name.

According to Navya-Nyāya, the mode of cognition of an object is not necessarily tied to its presentation by a name. The mode of presentation of the object is necessarily a property of the object, for otherwise the object cannot be correctly presented under that mode. A property, according to Navya-Nyāya, is the successor of a relation of a certain sort, namely, occurrence-exacting relation, of which the predecessor is that which possesses that property. According to Navya-Nyāya, a fundamental mode of cognition is of an object as some property-possessing. But to say that an object possesses a property is to say that the object is related to that property by an occurrence exacting relation. So whenever any property is cognized as a mode it is always cognized as the successor of an occurrence-exacting relation. Thus every cognition of some object under some mode is a cognition of that object possessing a property by a certain relation. Now according to Gadādhara this cognized relation will be related to the cognition by relation-ness, which will be relative to the qualifier-ness and the qualificandum-ness determined by the cognition. Thus the cognition determines the qualifier-ness of its qualifier, the qualificandum-ness of its qualificandum and the relationness of the relation. Moreover there is internal relativity of these properties which again determine each other.

What Gadādhara insists here is that relation-ness, too, must be relative to the qualifier-ness etc.

13.1 *Criticism and Reply*

Text

न च तत्संसर्गकत्वे सति तन्निष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपिततत्प्रकारताकत्वमेव तत्र तेन सम्बन्धेन तत्प्रकारकत्वमिति वाच्यम्; तथा सति भूतलादौ संयोगेन घटादिकं समवायेन च रूपादिकमवगाहमानाया धियो भूतलांशे संयोगेन रूपादिप्रकारकत्वस्य समवायेन च घटादिप्रकारकत्वस्यापत्तेः। एवं समवायेन कपालांशे संयोगेन च भूतलांशे घटमवगाहमानाया बुद्धेः समवायेन भूतलांशे संयोगेन च कपालांशे घटप्रकारकत्वापत्तेः। तत्स्वीकारे च तन्निष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपिततदीयसंसर्गतानिरूपिता या तदीयप्रकारता तत्प्रतियोगित्वमेव तदंशे तेन सम्बन्धेन तत्प्रकारकत्वम्, यस्य यः सम्बन्धो यत्र भासते तदीयविशेष्यतातदीयप्रकारताभ्यामेव तदीयसंसर्गताया निरूप्यनिरूपकभावान्नोक्तातिप्रसङ्गः ॥

Translation: It cannot be said that to have that as its mode of that by that relation is merely to say that the cognition has as its object that relation and also that as its mode, the modeness being determined by the qualificandumness resident in that.

For, if that were the case, then the cognition cognizing a jar on the ground by the relation of contact and colour by the relation of inherence, can be interpreted as a cognition having colour as its mode, the modeness being by contact, and the jar its mode, the modeness being by inherence. So also a cognition cognizing a jar in its halves by the relation of inherence and on the ground by the relation of contact can be interpreted as a cognition with jar as its mode with respect to the ground by inherence and with respect to its halves by contact. If that is admitted then having that as its mode in that relation with respect to that is being the counterpositive of that which is determined by the relation-ness with respect (to) that which (relationness) is, in its turn, determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in that. If a relation of that in (to) that is cognized, then the qualificandumness of that, and the qualifierness of that are related by the determiner-determined-ness relation to that relation; hence there is no over-extension.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara presents an argument against the theory that a relationness of a cognized relation is related by the determiner-determined-ness relation to the qualifier-ness and the qualificandumness. Here there is no disagreement on the theory that the qualifier, qualificandum and the relation are all cognized in a qualified cognition. The dispute is only on the question whether relationness is to be so related to the qualifier-ness etc.

The counter-theory proposed here tries to explain what is meant by having a qualifier of a qualificandum in or by a certain relation. The definition proposed of this is that the cognition will be of that relation and will have qualifierness resident in whatever be the qualifier determined by the qualificandumness resident in whatever be the qualificandum. That is, the relation will be cognized but the relationness resident in it will neither determine nor be determined by the qualifierness or the qualificandumness. This will have the effect of keeping the relation in the cognized structure completely independent of the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition.

Gadādhara, therefore, points out the following absurdities in this counter-argument. He chooses examples of cognition in such a way that different relations with different qualifiers or qualificanda get cognized in each of them. The first example that Gadādhara gives is a cognition which has two qualifiers in two relations. When one cognizes that a jar is on the ground by contact and colour in the ground by inherence, then there are two qualifiers of the same qualificandum, the ground, by two different relations. Now if it is enough for the cognition to cognize the relation to make it the relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum, then in the present case, one could easily say that colour is the qualifier of the ground by contact and jar by inherence.

The second example is of a cognition which has one qualifier of two different qualificanda by different relations. When one, for example, cognizes that the halves and also the ground are jar-possessing, the former by the relation of inherence and the latter by contact, one can very well say, that one has cognized the halves as jar-possessing by contact and the ground by inherence.

These absurd consequences are avoided, Gadādhara asserts, if one accepts the theory that the cognized relation is *cognitively* related to the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition. Thus a cognition will be of a relation between a qualificandum and a qualifier if and only if the relationness resident in the relation either determines, or is determined by, the qualifierness resident in whatever be the qualifier and so also with the qualificandumness. Thus a relation cognized as holding between a qualifier and a qualificandum of a cognition will have its relation-ness determining, or determined by, the qualifierness resident in the qualifier of that cognition as well as the qualificandum-ness resident in the qualificandum. If this is admitted, then, it is easy to see how the difficulties of the theory of the opponents are avoided. Thus a cognition that the ground possesses the jar by contact and colour by inherence, cannot now be construed as a cognition that the ground possesses the jar by inherence and colour by contact. For, the relationness resident in contact determines, or is determined by, the qualifierness resident in the jar, not in colour. So also with inherence.

13.1 *Criticism and Reply Continued*

Text

न च प्रकारतायाः संसर्गविशेषावच्छिन्नतया तत्संसर्गावच्छिन्नतदीयप्रकारतानिरूपिततदीयविशेष्यताकत्वमेव तेन सम्बन्धेन तदंशे तत्प्रकारकत्वमस्तु, किमुक्तनिरूप्यनिरूपकभावोपगमेनेति वाच्यम्; संसर्गनिष्ठावच्छेदकतानिरूपकत्वरूपसंसर्गावच्छिन्नत्वस्य प्रकारतायां स्वीकृतावेव संसर्गताप्रकारतयोर्निरूप्यनिरूपकभावसिद्धेः, संसर्गतायाः संसर्गनिष्ठावच्छेदकतारूपत्वात् । न चैवमपि प्रकारतयैव समं तस्या निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोऽस्तु, न तु विशेष्यतयापि सममुक्तबुद्धिनिरूपितायाः समवायनिष्ठसंसर्गतानिरूपितघटप्रकारताया भूतलविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वविरहात्, संयोगनिष्ठसंसर्गतानिरूपिततत्प्रकारतायाश्च कपालविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वविरहादुक्तातिप्रसङ्गवारणादिति वाच्यम्; विनिगमनाविरहेणैव विशेष्यतयापि समं तस्या निरूप्यनिरूपकभावसिद्धेर्निष्प्रत्यूहत्वात् । एवञ्च विशेष्यताप्रकारतयोः साक्षान्निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोऽप्रामाणिकः, किन्तु प्रकारतायां विशेष्यतानिरूपितसंसर्गतानिरूपितत्वमेव विशेष्यतानिरूपित-

त्वम्, विशेष्यतायां प्रकारतानिरूपितसंसर्गतानिरूपितत्वमेव च प्रकारता-निरूपितत्वम् । कार्यकारणभावावच्छेदककोटौ यत्र प्रकारताविशेष्यतयो-र्निवेशस्तत्र संसर्गस्याप्यवश्यं निवेशात्, तयोर्निरूप्यनिरूपकभावानभ्यु-पगमेऽपि गौरवानवकाशादिति तु ध्येयम् ।

Translation: It cannot also be said that as modeness is always limited by a specific relation, a cognition having that as its mode in that by that relation is simply its being the determiner of the qualificandum-ness of that determined by qualifierness of that, limited by that relation. Why, then is it necessary to postulate the determiner-determined relation? For to say 'modeness is limited by a relation' is to admit that modeness determines the limitorness resident in the relation. Hence the relation of determiner-determined-ness between relationness and modeness is proved; relationness being identical with limitorness resident in the relation.

It cannot also be said that—let the relation of determiner-determined have relationness with (to) modeness, but not also with (to) qualificandum-ness. The mode-ness of the jar determined by the relation-ness resident in inherence does not possess the property of being determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the ground; the modeness determined by the relation-ness resident in contact does not possess the property of being determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the halves; and hence the over-extension is avoided.

For, there being no reason for preference the relation of determiner-determined-ness of relationness with qualificandumness is established without difficulty. So also there is no reason to admit the determiner-determined relation directly between qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness; but being determined by the relationness determined by the qualificandumness is the mode-ness's being determined by the qualificandum-ness; and qualificandum-ness's being determined by mode-ness is merely its being determined by the relation-ness determined by the mode-ness.

Where in a part of the limitor of cause-ness and effectness, mode-ness and qualificandum-ness are to be introduced, there relation has to be necessarily introduced; hence even if one does not admit the relation of determiner-determined-ness between

them, one is not involved in heaviness. Hence this theory merits serious consideration.

Explanation: The opponents here argue that it is not necessary to postulate that relationness determines, or is determined by, mode-ness and qualificandum-ness. It is a well-established theory of Navya-Nyāya that the mode-ness in a qualified cognition is limited by the specific relation which is cognized in the qualified cognition. This ensures that the cognized relation is not epistemically unrelated to the mode and the qualificandum of the cognition. Hence in the cognition 'the ground possesses the jar by contact and colour by inherence' we cannot switch the relations, and render it necessarily false. For the modeness resident in the jar is limited by contact and that determines the qualificandumness resident in the ground, and the modeness resident in colour is limited by inherence, and that determines the qualificandumness resident in the ground. We cannot say that the modeness resident in the jar is limited by inherence or vice versa. Thus we can very well explain how the cognized relation is epistemically related to the mode and the qualificandum of the same cognition.

The reply to this theory of the opponent is to be found in the fact that the limitor is the correlative of the limited; i.e. limitorness determines, or is determined by, limitedness. Thus in order to explain the epistemic relation between the cognized relation and the modeness in terms of the limitor-limited relation we really use the determiner-determined relation between limitorness and limitedness.

Now it may be argued that even though it be admitted that relationness determines, or is determined by, mode-ness, there is no need to postulate further that it determines, or is determined by, the qualificandumness also. For example, the cognition 'the halves (of the jar) possess the jar by inherence and the ground by contact' can be adequately explained by the fact that the modeness resident in the jar and determined by relationness resident in inherence is not determined by the qualificandumness resident in the ground. Here although the modeness and the qualificandumness have been admitted to be related by the determiner-determined-ness relation, and relationness is so related to mode-

ness, still it is not so related to qualificandumness. Why, then, is it necessary to postulate such a relation?

The reply given here is that there is no reason for prefering the one alternative to the other. Just as one can hold that relationness is so related to modeness but not to qualificandumness, so one can equally hold that relationness is so related to qualificandumness alone. And there is no ground for choosing one alternative rather than the other. Hence it will be unreasonable to reject any one of the alternatives.

Now if it is admitted that relationness determines, or is determined by, both modeness and qualificandumness of a qualified cognition, then there will be no reason to hold the theory that modeness and qualificandumness are directly related by the determiner-determined-ness relation. Gadādhara expresses here the view that such a direct relation between modeness and qualificandumness is not justified at all. They are related to each other only indirectly through their relation to relationness.

XVII. TWO KINDS OF MODENESS

14. Arguments and Counterarguments

Text

प्रकारता च द्विविधा—निरवच्छिन्ना विशेषणान्तरावच्छिन्ना च। तत्र निरवच्छिन्ना घट इत्याद्याकारकज्ञानीयघटत्वादिप्रकारता, तत्र स्वरूपत एव घटत्वादेर्भानात्। तादृशी च प्रकारता जात्यखण्डोपाधिभिन्ने न स्वीक्रियते; साऽवच्छिन्ना च घटवदित्यादिज्ञानीयघटादिप्रकारता तत्र घटत्वादेरवच्छेदकत्वात्। न च तादृशप्रकारताया घटत्वादिना सममवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावो निर्युक्तिकः, द्रव्यवदित्यादिज्ञानात्तादृशज्ञानस्य घटांशे विभिन्नप्रकारकतयैव वैलक्षण्योपपत्तेरिति वाच्यम्; तादृशज्ञानीयघटादिप्रकारताया घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वानुपगमे द्रव्यवद्भूतलं घटश्चेत्याद्याकारकसमूहालम्बनात्मकज्ञानाद् घटवद् भूतलं द्रव्यञ्चेति समूहालम्बनज्ञानस्यैव वैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तेः, उभयोरेव घटांशे द्रव्यत्वघटत्वोभयप्रकारकत्वाद् भूतलांशे घटप्रकारकत्वाच्च। मन्मते पुनराद्ये द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्ना घटीया प्रकारता, अन्त्ये च घटत्वावच्छिन्ना सेति प्रकारतावैलक्षण्यात्तयोर्वैलक्षण्यम्।

Translation: Modeness is of two kinds—not limited, and limited by another qualifier. Of these, the not limited modeness is the modeness resident in jarness in the cognition 'the jar'. For here jar-ness is cognized in and through itself. Modeness of this kind is not admitted in anything different from universals (*jātī*) and unanalysable imposed properties (*akhaṇḍopādhi*).

The mode-ness of the jar in the cognition 'jar-possessing' is itself limited; jar-ness being the limitor of the modeness.

It cannot be said that there is no reason to postulate limitor-limited relation of that type of modeness with jarness. The difference of that cognition from the cognition 'substance-possessing' can be explained in terms of having different modes of the jar.

For, if the modeness resident in the jar in that cognition is not admitted as limited by jar-ness, then the difference between two conjunctive cognitions 'substance-possessing is the ground and the jar' and 'jar-possessing is the ground and the substance' cannot be explained, for in both the cognitions substance-ness and jar-ness are both modes of the jar and the jar is the mode of the ground. But, on my theory, in the first cognition the modeness of the jar is limited by substance-ness and in the second by jar-ness; and hence the two cognitions are different because of difference in the mode-ness.

Explanation: In this section Gadādhara distinguishes between different forms of degenerate cognitions. Ordinarily a cognition like 'jar-possessing is the ground' has the following objective elements:

A

(i) The qualificandum—the ground.
(ii) The limitor of the qualificandumness—ground-ness.
(iii) The qualifier—the jar.
(iv) The limitor of the qualifier-ness—jar-ness.
(v) The relation between the qualificandum and the qualifier—contact.

The examples of cognition which now Gadādhara examines do not have these normal five elements. The first example is of a cognition '(the) jar'. It has only three elements, thus:

B

(i) The qualificandum—the jar.
(ii) The limitor of qualificandumness—*nil.*
(iii) The qualifier—jarness.
(iv) The relation—inherence.

In this case there are no elements corresponding to (ii) and (iv) of A.

The second example which Gadādhara gives here, namely, the cognition 'jar-possessor' has the following elements:

C

(i) The qualificandum—the ground.
(ii) The limitor of qualificandum—*nil.*
(iii) The qualifier—the jar.
(iv) The limitor of the qualifier—jarness.
(v) The relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum —contact.

The difference between these two cognitions is to be found in the fact that in the second, there is a limitor of the qualifier. So Gadādhara distinguishes between two cognitions by saying that while the modeness in the first is not limited (by anything) that in the second is limited (by jarness). This is beause of the Navya-Nyāya theory that a universal and unanalysable imposed property, if not mentioned by any word referring to them, are cognized in and through themselves without any mode. In the first cognition, jar-ness being the qualifier and a universal, does not require any further mode to be cognized. In the second case, the mode is a jar which requires a further mode, jarness, in order to be cognized as a mode of the ground. Thus whether a cognition will have a mode with its modeness not limited by any other higher order mode depends upon the ontological status of the mode itself.

Thus to say that a mode has its *modeness limited by* some property, is to say that the mode is to be cognized under a higher order mode. Now a question is raised whether cognitions cannot be differentiated from each other in terms of their modes only, without introducing the concept of the limitor of modeness resident in modes which would then require further higher

order modes. It is argued in favour of the simple theory that the two cognitions, 'jar-possessor' and 'substance-possessor' can be distinguished merely in terms of their modes, namely, the jar in the first case, and substance in the second case. There is, therefore, no need for the concept of limitor of modeness at all.

In reply to this argument for the simpler theory of cognitions Gadādhara points out that this theory is inadequate for more complex cases. Gadādhara gives examples of two conjunctive cognitions, 'substance-possessing is the ground and the jar' and 'jar-possessing is the ground and substance'. Now, in both these examples, it is *the jar* which is cognized *once as a substance and again as a jar*. So in both these cognitions substance-ness and jar-ness are the two modes of the jar, and the jar is the mode of the ground in both the cognitions. So if cognitions are to be differentiated only in terms of the modes then these two different cognitions cannot be distinguished for the modes are really, factually, the same in both. It is, therefore, necessary to introduce two concept of limitor of modeness, or modes of modes, in order to exhibit the structure of the cognized complex. If the concept of limitor of modeness be introduced in exhibiting the structure of the cognized complex, then more structure will be revealed, and cognitions will be distinguished in all cases. Of the two examples under consideration, in the first cognition, though the mode is factually the jar still it is cognized as a substance, i.e. the modeness resident in the jar is limited by substance-ness, while in the second cognition, the modeness resident in the jar is limited by jarness. Hence the two cognitions are different, for their modenesses are different, being limited by different limitors, i.e. the modes being cognized differently under different higher order modes in the two cognitions.

14.1 *Conclusion*

Text

वस्तुतस्तु घटत्वादिनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितत्वमेव घटादिप्रकारतायां घट-त्वाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वम् । न च प्रकारताविशेष्यतयोरेव निरूप्यनिरूपकभावो न तु प्रकारतयोरपीति वाच्यम्; तत्र घटादिनिष्ठाया भूतलादिनिष्ठ-विशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारताया एव घटत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यता-त्मकत्वात् तादृशप्रकारतयोर्निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोपपत्तेः ।

Translation: Really the modeness of the jar, etc. being limited by jarness, etc. is simply being determined by the modeness resident in jarness, etc.

It cannot be said that the determiner-determined relation holds only between modeness and qualificandumness, but not between two modenesses.

For, in this case, only the modeness which is resident in the jar and is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the ground is identical with the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jarness. Hence the determiner-determined relation can hold between such modenesses.

Explanation: Gadādhara has distinguished between two kinds of modeness—modeness limited by a property (limitor) and modeness not so limited. Now the question arises: what is it for a modeness to be limited by a limitor? Gadādhara's reply here is that the limitor of a modeness is itself a higher order modeness determining the lower order modeness. This simply means that a limitor of a modeness is really a mode of the mode. For example, in the cognition, 'jar-possessing is the ground' the jar is the mode of the ground, and jarness which is the limitor of modeness resident in the jar, is simply the mode of the jar. The ground has been cognized as jar-possessing and the jar has been cognized as jarness possessing.

Now an objection to this theory of Gadādhara may be raised. It may be pointed out that the determiner-determined relation can hold only between a qualificandumness and a modeness; it does not make sense to say that one modeness determines, or is determined by, another modeness. This simply means that we can have a mode of a qualificandum but not a mode of a mode.

Gadādhara's reply to this objection amounts to pointing out that the modeness which is determined by a higher order modeness, is identical with the qualificandumness of this higher order modeness. Thus in the above example the jar is a mode relative to the ground which is its qualificandum, and is a qualificandum relative to its own mode, jarness. Thus the jar has modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in the ground, and also a qualificandumness determined by modeness resident in jarness. The modeness resident in the jar and the qualificandum-

ness resident in it, are, only in such cases, identical. This simply means that the jar which is a mode of the ground is the qualificandum of jarness. That is why, in such cases, one can talk of a mode of a mode.

14.2 *Some Alternative Theories*

Text

केचित्तु—घटत्वप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतावच्छेदेन भूतलांशे घटस्य प्रकारता घटवदित्येतादृशज्ञाने स्वीक्रियते, अतएवोक्तज्ञानयोर्भेदः—इत्याहुः। तच्चिन्त्यम्।

Translation: Some say that in the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' the modeness of the jar relative to the ground is limited by the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jarness; and hence two cognitions mentioned above are distinguished.

This theory deserves serious consideration.

Explanation: Gadādhara has identified the modeness resident in the jar relative to the ground with the qualificandumness resident in it relative to jarness. Now he mentions an alternative theory according to which the modeness resident in the jar relative to the ground is not identical with the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jarness, but is limited by it. This theory also can explain the difference between the two cognitions 'substance-possessing in the ground and the jar' and 'jar-possessing is the ground and the substance'. Gadādhara recommends that this theory, too, merits serious thought. He does not himself offer any criticism.

14.2 *Some Alternative Theories Continued*

Text

परे तु—घटवदित्याद्याकारकं विशिष्टविशेषणकज्ञानं द्विविधं—विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबोधात्मकम्, केवलं विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेणान्तरमिति रीत्या घटत्वाद्यवगाहि च। तत्र प्रथमे घटत्वादेः प्रकारतावच्छेदकत्वम्।

द्वितीये तु प्रकारतात्मकविशेष्यतानिरूपितं प्रकारत्वं न तु प्रकारतावच्छे-दकत्यमपि—इत्याहुः ।

स च विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यविचारे स्फुटीभविष्यति ।

Translation: Others say—the cognition of a qualified qualifier like 'jar-possessing is the ground' is of two types—(i) a cognition of a qualified qualification; or, (ii) cognizes etc. only as a qualifier in a qualificandum and again a qualifier in that qualifier. Of these, in the first type, jarness is the limitor of modeness. In the second the modeness (resident in jarness) is determined by qualificandumness which is identical with the modeness (resident in the jar), but not a limitor of this modeness.

This will become clear in the discussion of qualified qualification.

Explanation: Gadādhara mentions here another theory of limitor of modeness. According to this theory a complex cognition of the form 'jar-possessing is the ground', has a qualified qualifier. A cognition of this form can be analysed in two ways:

(i) The jar is the qualifier of the ground but itself is qualified by jarness.

Thus it is a cognition of '*(jarness-qualified-jar)-qualified-ground*'. Here one forms first the qualified cognition of jarness as qualifying the jar and next this whole becomes a qualifier of the ground. Here jarness becomes the limitor of the modeness resident in the jar relative to the ground.

(ii) The other way of analysing the same complex cognition is to have first the jar as a qualifier of the ground, and then to have jarness as the qualifier of the jar. So we have here first the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' and then jar-ness as the qualifier of the jar—jarness-possessing-jar-possessing is the ground, i.e. *jarness-qualified-jar-qualified-ground*. The difference between the first and the second analyses lies in this—in the first analysis the qualifier of the ground is itself a qualified entity; while in the second it is merely the jar, which, *then*, is qualified by jarness.

First Analysis: (i) jarness qualified jar
(ii) (jarness-qualified-jar)-qualified-ground

Second Analysis: (i) jar-qualified-ground
(ii) jarness-qualified-jar
≡jarness-qualified-jar-qualified ground.

Thus although the resulting cognitions are the same in both, still the complex cognitions are not the same, because they have been produced differently.

Now the advocates of this new theory hold that only in the first case, jarness is the limitor of the modeness resident in the jar. In the second case, however, jarness is not the limitor of the modeness resident in the jar, but has modeness determined by the qualificandumness which is identical with modeness resident in the jar.

In the Second Analysis, (i), the jar is the mode of the ground, hence, has modeness relative to the ground.

In (ii) jar is the qualificandum of jarness, has qualificandumness relative to jarness, i.e. jarness is the mode of the jar, has modeness relative to the jar.

Thus the jar has both modeness (relative to the ground) and qualificandum-ness (relative to jarness), and these two are identical.

This modeness resident in the jar is, therefore, *determined by* the qualificandumness which is identical with the modeness resident in the jar. So jarness is not *the limitor* of modeness. That is, in this analysis, jarness is simply a mode *of* the jar but is not a limitor of the modeness resident in the jar.

XVIII. KINDS OF QUALIFICANDUMNESS

15. DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIMITOR OF CHARACTERIZEDNESS AND MODENESS

Text

विशेष्यता च क्वचिन्निरवच्छिन्ना क्वचिच्च विशेषणान्तरावच्छिन्ना । तत्र निर्धर्मितावच्छेदके घट इत्याद्याकारकज्ञाने घटत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतानिरवच्छिन्ना । अयं घट इत्याद्याकारकसधर्मितावच्छेदकघटत्वादिविशिष्टबुद्धौ च घटत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यता इदन्त्वाद्यवच्छिन्ना । अत एव इदन्त्वादिकं तत्र धर्मितावच्छेदकमित्युच्यते,

विशेष्यतावच्छेदकताया एव धर्मितावच्छेदकतापदार्थत्वात् ॥ विशेष्यता-निरूपितमवच्छेदकत्वं च न तन्निरूपितप्रकारत्वम्, तथा सति घट इत्यादि-ज्ञानेऽयं घट इत्यादिज्ञाने च घटत्वस्य धर्मितावच्छेदकत्वापत्तेः निर्धर्मिता-वच्छेदकविशिष्टबुद्धिविलोपप्रसङ्गाच्च, किन्तु प्रतियोगित्वादिनिरूपि-तावच्छेदकत्ववत् स्वरूपविशेषः पदार्थान्तरमेव वा ।

Translation: Qualificandumness, too, is sometimes not limited (by any limitor), and sometimes limited by another qualifier. Of these, in the cognition of the form 'the jar' without any limitor of characterized-ness, the qualificandumness determined by modeness resident in jarness is not limited (by any limitor). In the cognition of the form 'this (is a) jar'—a qualified cognition having jarness with the limitor of characterizedness, the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jarness is limited by thisness. Hence thisness etc. in such a case, is called 'limitor of characterizedness', the limitor of the qualificandumness is the same reality as the limitor of characterizedness. Limitorness *determined by* (i.e. of) qualificandum-ness is not modeness determined by it; if this were the case, then in the cognition 'the jar' etc. and the cognition 'this is a jar', jarness would be limitor of characterizedness, and qualified cognitions without limitor of characterizedness would be impossible. But limitorness is of the nature of a term, or an independent reality like the limitorness *determined by* (i.e. of) counterpositiveness.

Explanation: Like two kinds of modeness, there are two kinds of qualificandumness—one not limited by any limitor, the other so limited. As an example of the first kind, Gadādhara analyses the cognition 'the jar'. The objective structure of this cognition is as follows:

A. (i) The qualificandum—the jar
(ii) The qualifier—jarness
(iii) The limitor of qualificandumness—nil
(iv) The limitor of qualifierness—nil
(v) The relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum—inherence.

Thus this is an example of a degenerate cognition without any limitor either to the qualificandum-ness or to the qualifierness.

This is why this was given earlier as an example of a cognition without any limitor of qualifierness.

A very important point about cognitions in Indian philosophy in general and Navya-Nyāya in particular has to be noted. In Western philosophy 'the jar' will not express any judgement at all. In a judgement something must be *asserted* of something. A declarative sentence expresses a judgment and hence contains a finite verb which expresses assertion. So a sentence is radically different from a list of names.

Now according to Navya-Nyāya a list of words like 'the jar, the ground, contact' expresses a (conjunctive) cognition as much as the single term 'the jar'. One wonders how this can express a cognition without an element for assertion. 'The jar' does not assert anything. This puzzlement over cognition in Indian philosophy in general and Navya-Nyāya in particular is due to an inadequate understanding of the nature of cognition in these philosophies. There are two fundamentally different types of analysis of cognition (knowledge)—one in terms of objects under modes of cognition, the other in terms of saying something about something.

(i) According to the first type of analysis, something is cognized *as* something—there is no assertion here; *a as b-possessing* expresses this sort of cognition without *asserting* b-ness of *a*. b-ness is, of course, attributed to *a*, but this attribution is not in the form of an assertion, but only in the form of a compound term. So 'the jar' expresses the cognition—something *as* jar-ness-possessing. Thus the fundamental difference made between two types of cognition in Indian philosophy is that between a cognition in which an object is not cognized under a mode and a cognition in which an object is cognized under a mode. Thus in the second type of cognition, called determinate or qualified cognition, an object as related to another is cognized. To be related, again, is not to pass from an object to a fact in the sense of the *Tractatus*. By being related to something, one object becomes a qualified object. The brown table and the table being brown are one and the same qualified object. Thus the Navya-Nyāya concept of determinate or qualified cognition corresponds roughly to that of proposition in the sense of Johnson, which contains only a characterising tie, but no asser-

tive tie. Analysis of the meaning of a sentence in Indian philosophy does not reveal any assertive element; for what the hearer understands by hearing a sentence is analysed into a complex object with a qualifier. To cognize something as related to something is not to assert anything, but to cognize something *as* characterised by something, not that something *is* characterised by something. According to Navya-Nyāya, no uncharacterized object, no object in isolation, can be denoted by any word or term. Hence even a single word denotes an object as characterized by some property which is therefore an object of qualified, i.e. determinate, cognition.

After this long digression, let us return to the topic under discussion. 'The jar', expresses a cognition of something as qualified by jarness, *as* jarness-possessing. 'This (is a) jar', on the other hand, expresses a more complex cognition—something as this-ness-possessing cognized as jar-ness-possessing. Here we have the following elements:

(i) The qualificandum—this
(ii) The limitor of qualificandumness—thisness
(iii) The qualifier—jar-ness
(iv) The limitor of qualifierness—nil
(v) The relation—identity.

Here, because of (ii), the qualificandumness is limited by thisness. The qualificandum here is characterized by the limitor of qualificandumness; hence this limitor is also called the limitor of characterizedness.

Now the question arises what should be the relation between the limitor of qualificandumness and the mode of the qualificandum. The limitorness is determined by the qualificandumness but this is not the same as the modeness determined by the qualificandumness. The reason for distinguishing between limitorness and qualifierness, although both are determined by the same qualificandumness is this. If they were identified then in the cognition 'the jar' in which jar-ness is the mode must be regarded as the limitor of qualificandumness, too. But as we have already seen this cognition does not have any limitor of qualificandumness. So also in the cognition 'this (is a) jar', jarness is the mode but cannot be regarded as the limitor of quali-

ficandumness. As there cannot be any qualified cognition without a mode, if the mode were identified with the limitor of qualificandumness, then there cannot be any qualified cognition without a limitor of its qualificandumness. But Navya-Nyāya admits such cognitions, hence the mode and the limitor of qualificandumness cannot be identified.

In a cognition of the form '*a* is *b*-possessing', *a* is qualified by *b*, i.e. *b* is the qualifier of *a*; *a-ness* is *the limitor of the qualificandum-ness* which is resident in *a*, and which is determined by the mode-ness (qualifier-ness) resident in *b*.

Now to say that *a* is qualified by *b*, is to say that *a* is characterized by *b*. Thus *a* is the qualificandum of *b*, and is characterized by *b*. Thus *a-ness* which is the limitor of qualificandumness resident in *a*, is the same as the limitor of characterizedness resident in *a*.

This limitor-ness resident in *a-ness* is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in *a*. But this limitor-ness cannot be regarded also as modeness resident in *a-ness*; i.e. the limitor of qualificandumness is not a mode. If the limitorness determined by the qualificandumness were identical with modeness so determined, then everything which has modeness would have limitorness. Thus in the cognitions of the forms 'the jar' and 'This is a jar', etc. the jarness which is a mode of the jar, would also be the limitor of the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar. Thus cognition with unlimited qualificandum-ness would be impossible, for every qualified cognition necessarily has a mode, and hence would have a limitor of qualificandum-ness. The limitorness determined by qualificandumness may be regarded either as reducible to the limitor, or as a separate ontological (abstract) entity, just as limitor-ness of counter-positiveness can be conceived in either way.

15.1 *Alternative Theories of Others*

Text

अथवा प्रकारताविशेष एव तत्, अन्यथा सधर्मितावच्छेदकज्ञानस्य धर्मितावच्छेदकप्रकारकत्वोपपत्तये तन्निष्ठतज्ज्ञानीयप्रकारतान्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । न च ज्ञानान्तरक्लृप्ततद्धर्मनिष्ठप्रकारतयैवोपपत्तेर्नातिरिक्त-

प्रकारताकल्पनमिति वाच्यम्; एवमपि तद्धर्मितावच्छेदकसमानविषयताकानन्तज्ञानेषु तादृशप्रकारताप्रतियोगित्वकल्पनापेक्षया तावत्साधारणैकधर्मितावच्छेकतायां प्रकारतात्वकल्पने लाघवात् । न चैवमयं घट इत्यादिज्ञाने इदन्त्वादेः स्वस्यापि धर्मितावच्छेदकत्वापत्तिरिति ततोऽयमयमित्याद्याकारकस्मरणप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम् । यतस्तदीयप्रकारतानिरूपिताया धर्मितावच्छेदकताया आश्रय एव तदीयधर्मितावच्छेदकः, उक्तस्थले चेदन्त्वनिष्ठधर्मितावच्छेदकतायाः स्वात्मकप्रकारतायां निरूप्यनिरूपकभावविरहान्नातिप्रसङ्गः । न चैवमपीदन्त्वादिकं घटत्वादेरपि धर्मितावच्छेदकं न स्यात्, तन्निष्ठधर्मितातावच्छेदकतया घटत्वादिप्रकारताया अपि निरूप्यनिरूपकभावे मानावात्, परम्परया निरूप्यनिरूपकभावस्य च प्रकृतेऽपि सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम् ; एतदनुरोधेनैव धर्मितावच्छेदकत्वविशेषणीयप्रकारत्वयोरपि निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोपगमात् । यत्प्रकाकारतानिरूपितत्वावच्छेदेन विशेष्यताया यदवच्छेद्यत्वं स एव तद्धर्मितावच्छेदकः । उक्तस्थले च स्वप्रकारतानिरूपितत्वावच्छेदेन न विशेष्यतायाः स्वावच्छेद्यत्वमतो न स्वांशे स्वस्य धर्मितावच्छेदकत्वापत्तिरित्यप्याहुः ॥

Translation: Or, that is indeed a kind of modeness; otherwise in order to explain how a cognition with a limitor of characterized-ness can have this limitor as its mode, one has to postulate a different modeness of that cognition resident in that. But this makes the theory heavy.

It cannot be also said that in order to explain how such a cognition can have a modeness of that, it is sufficient to postulate a modeness resident in that property necessarily implied by a different cognition, and hence there is no need to postulate an additional modeness.

For, even then in an infinite number of cognitions with similar objecthood to the limitor of characterizedness resident in that, to postulate modeness-ness in one limitor-ness of the characterized-ness common to all will be lighter than to postulate successorness to modeness of that kind.

It cannot also be said that in the cognition 'this is a jar' thisness would become its own limitor of characterized-ness and hence from that a memory-cognition of the form 'this(is) this', would follow.

For the limitor of the characterized-ness, resident in that, is really the locus of the limitorness of the characterized-ness, determined by the modeness resident in that. In the case mentioned above, between the limitor-ness of the characterized-ness resident in this-ness and the modeness which is identical with the characterized-ness, there is no relation of determiner-determined-ness. And hence there is no wider application.

It cannot be also said that—this-ness would not be the limitor of characterizedness even of jar-ness, as there is no justification for assuming the determiner-determinedness relation between the limitorness of characterized-ness, resident in that, and the modeness resident in jarness. If the relation of determiner-determined-ness be regarded as indirect then even in the present case this relation will hold.

For the sake of this, the determiner-determined-ness relation has to be assumed to hold between limitorness of characterized-ness and the modeness of the qualifier. The limitor of characterized-ness of that is only that which limits the qualificandum-ness covered by determinedness by modeness of that. In the above example, thisness cannot be regarded as the limitor of its own characterizedness, as it is not the case that the qualificandum-ness as covered by determinedness by modeness of itself, is limited by itself. This is also what they (the propounders of this alternative theory) say.

Explanation: Gadādhara has not accepted that the limitor of qualificandumness is a mode but is now granting that this theory, too, is tenable. In the cognition '*a* is characterized by *b*' *a-ness* is the limitor of characterized-ness resident in *a*. But this cognition is also a cognition in which this limitor is *also* a mode of *a*. To explain this aspect of the cognition, Gadādhara explains an alternative theory which we now explain.

As *a*-ness, the limitor of characterizedness resident in *a*, is also a mode of *a*, it will be simpler to postulate modeness in this limitor (i.e. to postulate that to be the limitor is the same as to be a mode); for, otherwise, one will have to postulate an additional modeness resident in the limitor which will make the theory heavier.

Now it may be argued in favour of a modeness in the limitor

that this modeness need not be an additional modeness. For, we may hold that *a-ness* has been cognized as a mode of *a* in a different cognition. For example, in the cognition of the form '*a*', *a-ness* is the mode of *a*, there being no limitor of qualificandum-ness or characterizedness in this cognition. It may be claimed that the modeness of *a*-ness when it has been cognized as the limitor of characterizedness as in the cognition '*a* is characterized by *b*' is really the modeness common to the other cognition in which *a-ness was cognized* as a mode of *a*. Therefore, no additional modeness in *a-ness* has to be postulated to explain how *a-ness* which is the limitor of characterizedness resident in *a* is also a mode of *a*, for this modeness is really the modeness of the other cognition.

The reply to this argument is that it makes the theory heavy. Take, for example, the case of an infinite number of cognitions having objecthood similar to the limitor of characterizedness of a cognition. We may, for example, cognize 'this is a jar' any number of times, and hence have any number of cognitions having so many this-nesses as limitors of characterisedness. But all these cognitions will have this-ness as their modes. Now if we accept the proposed theory, then we shall have to postulate *having* this-ness as the mode by all these infinite cognitions. That is, an infinite number of cognitions will have to be related to the mode-ness resident in *a-ness*. It will be much simpler to suppose that in all these cognitions, there is one common this-ness as the limitor of characterizedness and this one limitor is the mode in all of them; one has to postulate modeness-ness in one limitor-ness of characterized-ness common to all such cognitions.

It may be objected to this identification of the limitor of characterised-ness with modeness that this-ness would become its own limitor of characterized-ness, in the cognition 'this is a jar'; for this-ness is the limitor of characterizedness resident in this. The objection is that this-ness would become its own limitor of characterizedness; hence the cognition 'this is a jar' would produce the memory cognition of 'this is this'.

The reply to this objection requires an analysis of the concept of the limitor of characterizedness *belonging to, being of,* something. The limitor of characterized-ness is the locus of this limitorness. The limitor of characterized-ness is *of* that, the mode-

ness of which determines the limitorness of the limitor. In the cognition, 'this is a jar', this-ness is the limitor of characterizedness *of this*, for the limitorness resident in this limitor is determined by the modeness (resident in thisness) *of this*. This-ness is *not* the limitor of characterizedness *of* this-ness, because the limitorness resident in the limitor, i.e. this-ness, is not determined by the modeness *of* this-ness—the modeness of this-ness is ontologically the same reality as the limitorness. This simply means that this-ness is *a mode* of this only as *a limitor of characterizedness* resident in this. So this-ness is not the limitor of characterizedness of itself.

In the cognition of the form '*a* is characterized by *b*', *a*-ness is the limitor of characterizedness not merely of *a*, but also of *b*. For *a* is characterized not merely by *a*-ness, but also by *b*. So *a* has characterizedness by *b*, too. Hence the limitor of characterizedness resident in *a* is that *of b*. To explain this admitted fact, the definition of 'the limitor of characterizedness of *a*' has to be modified. Let the *qualificandum-ness* resident in *a be limited* by *a*-ness. Now *a*-ness will be *the limitor of characterizedness of* that which has the property of being determined by the *modeness of that*. As *b* also is a mode of *a*, *a-ness* which is the limitor of characterizedness resident in *a*, has its limitorness determined by the modeness resident in *b*, because *b* is a mode of *a*. Being determined by $mode_1$ is different from being determined by $mode_2$. In deciding *of* which the limitor of characterizedness is the limitor, we have to take into account *all* these different determinednesses by different modes. Hence the limitor of characterized-ness resident in *a* will be *of every characteristic*, of every mode of *a*. Thus *a*-ness is the limitor of characterized-ness resident in *a of b*, i.e. *a*-ness is the limitor of characterized-ness resident in what is characterized by *b*.

XIX. VARIATION OF QUALIFICANDUMNESS

16. Conjunctive Cognition and Other Types of Cognition

Text

विशेष्यता च समूहालम्बने प्रकारभेदाद्भिद्यते समूहालम्बनस्य प्रत्येक-

प्रकारकज्ञानसामग्रीसमाजनियततया प्रत्येकप्रकारकज्ञानीयनानाविशेष्यताप्रतियोगित्वस्यैव तत्र सत्त्वात् । अयं घटो दण्डी कुण्डलीत्याद्याकारकैकधर्मितावच्छेदकापरधर्मप्रकारकज्ञाने धर्मितावच्छेदकतायाः प्रकारताविशेषत्वमते उभयप्रकारतानिरूपिता एकैव विशेष्यता । धर्मितावच्छेदके ज्ञानान्तरसाधारणप्रकारतास्वीकारकल्पे तु प्रकारभेदेन विशेष्यताभेदः । यदि च समूहालम्बनविलक्षणो विशेषणविशेष्यतावच्छेदकभावानापन्नखड्गकुण्डलाद्युभयविशिष्टविषयकः खड्गी कुण्डली चैत्र इत्याद्याकारकबोधोऽनुभवसिद्धस्तदा तत्राप्युभयप्रकारतानिरूपितैकविशेष्यता, अन्यथा समूहालम्बनात्तद्वैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तेः । एवं मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यतावच्छेदकभावानापन्नखड्गकुण्डलोभयादिकं यत्र शौर्यादिधर्मितावच्छेदकतया भासते, खड्गी कुण्डली चैत्रः शुर इत्याद्याकारके तादृशबोधे च खड्गकुण्डलोभयादिप्रकारतानिरूपितैकविशेष्यता, तादृशविशेष्यता च तादृशोभयाद्यवच्छिन्नशौर्यादिप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतातो भिन्नाऽभिन्ना वेति तु पूर्वोक्तवदूहनीयम् । एवं खड्गाद्येकतरधर्मितावच्छेदकतापन्नस्यैवापरस्य कुण्डलादेर्विधेयधर्मितातावच्छेदकत्वं यत्र तत्र खड्गादिप्रकारतानिरूपितकुण्डलाद्यवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताविधेयप्रकारतानिरूपितोभयधर्मावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतयोरभेदः, अन्यथा मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यतावच्छेदकभावानापन्नखड्गकुण्डलोभयधर्मावच्छिन्नविशेष्यकशौर्यादिविधेयकबोध एव यत्र स्वातन्त्र्येण कुण्डलस्य खड्गधर्मितावच्छेदकतया भानं तादृशसमूहालम्बनात्तस्य वैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तेः । एवञ्च सति खड्गादेः खड्गादिप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यताया अवच्छेदकत्वेऽपि यथा न तस्य स्वधर्मितावच्छेदकत्वं तथोपपादितं प्रागेव ।। तत्रोक्तविशेष्यते भिन्ने एव, किन्त्वेकविशेष्यताऽपरविशेष्यतावच्छेदकभावापन्नेति समूहालम्बनाद्विशेषः—इत्यप्याहुः ।।

Translation: In conjunctive cognition the qualificandumness varies with the modes. A conjunctive cognition is regularly produced by the collection of the totality of causal factors of cognition having each as its qualifier; and hence there are different successor-nesses to qualificandumnesses of each of the cognition having mode in that (conjunctive) cognition. In the cognition of the form 'this is a jar', 'stick-possessing (is) ear-ring-possessing', etc. where the limitor of characterizedness is one property and the mode is another, there will be one qualificandum-ness determined by both modeness according to those who admit a kind of modeness in the limitor of characterizedness.

Those who hold that the modeness in the limitor of characterizedness is that which is common to a different cognition, are of the view that the qualificandum differs with different modes.

If, however, a cognition of the form 'sword-possessing, ear-ring possessing (is) Caitra' which is different from conjunctive cognition, not having the mode related as limitors of qualificandumness and qualifiers, but having as its object qualified by both sword and ear-ring, is really evidenced by introspection, then, even there will be one qualificandumness determined by two qualifiernesses. Otherwise there will be no difference of this type of cognition from conjunctive cognition.

So also in a cognition of the form 'sword-possessing, ear-ring-possessing (is) brave Caitra' in which both the sword and the ear-ring, not mutually related as qualifier and limitor of qualificandumness, are yet cognized as the limitor of characterizedness of bravery, there, too, there will be one qualificandumness determined by the modeness of both sword and ear-ring. Whether this qualificandum-ness is, or is not, different from the qualificandum-ness determined by modeness of bravery limited by those two, is to be decided as stated earlier.

Thus where the sword, etc. acquires limitorness of characterizedness of the other, and ear-rings, etc. acquire the limitorness of the predicative characterizedness, there the qualificandumness determined by the modeness of the sword and limited by ear-ring, and the qualificandumness limited by both properties and determined by predicative modeness are the same. Otherwise this cognition cannot be distinguished from the following conjunctive cognition which, (i) has its qualificandumness limited by both the sword and the ear-rings which are not mutually related as qualifier and limitor of a qualificandumness, and (ii) has bravery as its predicate, and (iii) in which the ear-rings are cognized independently as the limitor of the characterizedness of the sword.

So also the sword etc. has limitorness of qualificandumness determined by modeness resident in the sword etc. Why, then, does it not have limitorness of characterizedness resident in itself has been explained earlier. It may also be said that the two qualificandumness mentioned there, are, indeed, different; but one qualificandumness is the limitor of the other qualificandum-

ness, hence that cognition is different from a conjunctive cognition.

Explanation. In this paragraph, very important distinctions between different types of qualified cognition admitted in Navya-Nyāya are explained. We first note these different types of cognitions and then their differences in terms of limitors of qualificandum-ness, characterized-ness, predicative modeness, etc.

(1) The *usual type* of qualified cognition is of the form '*b*-possessing (is) *a*', where *a* is the qualificandum, *a-ness* the limitor of characterizedness and *b* is the mode. (a) Those who hold that the limitor of characterizedness, i.e. *a*-ness, is also a mode admit two modes of the qualificandum i.e. of *a*; according to them, this cognition is the cognition of *a* cognized under the mode of *a*-ness is cognized under the second mode, *b*. Thus *a* has *one* qualificandumness determined by both the modenesses—one resident in *a-ness* and the other resident in *b*. (b) Those who hold that the limitor of characterized-ness has modeness common to a different cognition, hold that the analysis of the cognition '*b*-possessing (is) *a*' is different; *a-ness* is, of course, a mode of *a*, but the modeness resident in *a-ness*, the limitor of characterizedness resident in *a*, is due to a different cognition. Thus the qualificandum-ness determined by *a-ness* and that determined by *b* are *different* qualificandum-nesses. In this cognition, *a* has *two qualificandum-nesses*, although *a* is *the qualificandum* of both *a-ness* and *b*.

(2) There is, however, an altogether different type of qualified cognition, namely, *conjunctive* cognition. A conjunctive cognition is of the form '(the) jar and (the) ground'. We have already explained that a cognition of '(the) jar' is a qualified cognition without limitor of qualificandum-ness or characterized-ness; but it does have a mode, namely, jar-ness. So also with the cognition of '(the) ground'. Thus, a conjunctive cognition is a cognition in which qualificandum-ness resident in the jar (which is determined by jarness, the mode of the first conjunct), is different from the qualificandum-ness resident in the ground, determined by ground-ness. Thus in a conjunctive cognition of this type there will be as many qualificanda as there are conjuncts.

(3) A different type of cognition is that in which there are two or more *unrelated* modes of the same qualificandum. The example of such a type of cognition is 'Caitra (is) sword-possessing and ear-ring-possessing'. Navya-Nyāya philosophers usually interpret a cognition of this type as an instance of conjunctive cognition. For it is naturally analysable into 'Caitra (is) sword-possessing and (is) ear-ring-possessing'. But there are some Navya-Nyāya philosophers who hold that a cognition of this type is not a conjunctive cognition. Whether this cognition is of a different type can be ascertained only in introspection. If some one claims that in his introspection, he finds that this type of cognition is different from conjunctive cognition, then an explanation of this difference will be necessary. Gadādhara gives this explanation here without deciding the issue whether this type of cognition is, or is not, a conjunctive cognition. He merely says that if this is introspectively cognized as a cognition different from a conjunctive cognition, then the following analysis will be valid. We first note the exact nature of this type of cognition.

(i) This cognition has two modes, sword and ear-rings which are not related to each other as a qualifier and the limitor of qualificandum-ness. In the ordinary type of qualified cognition of type (1) like '(the) sword-possessing (person) is ear-ring-possessing', the sword is the limitor of qualificandum-ness and ear-ring is the qualifier, and both of them are modes of the same person. Here the two modes are related in the way stated. But in the present case the two modes, sword and ear-ring are *not* thus *related*, and both are qualifiers of Caitra. Then both are modes of Caitra, their common qualificandum. The qualificandum-ness resident in Caitra, and determined by the modeness resident in sword, and that determined by the modeness resident in ear-rings, are one. For if these qualificandumnesses are regarded as different, then the cognition would become the conjunctive cognition, 'Caitra is sword-possessing and Caitra is ear-ring-possessing', where two qualificandum-nesses are resident in Caitra. So to differentiate this type of cognition from the corresponding conjunctive cognition, the qualificandum-ness in the former has to be regarded as one qualificandum-ness relative to two modes.

Now Gadādhara gives a more complex example, 'sword-possessing, ear-ring-possessing (is) brave Caitra'. In this cognition sword and ear-ring are not related to each other as qualifier and limitor of qualificandumness. This means Caitra is not cognized as the sword-possessor having the ear-rings. But both sword and ear-rings are cognized as the limitor of characterizedness of bravery, i.e. of characterizedness resident in the brave, namely, Caitra.


Diagrammatic Presentation of Different Forms of Cognition:

There are two interpretations of how many qualificandum-nesses are in the ground.

A. Cognition without modes

(i) Jarness
(ii) Jar-Jarness (one amorphous unanalysed whole)
(iii) Jar, Jarness (two unrelated objects)


B. Cognition with modes



(4) Conjunctive Cognition

Form 1


'(the) jar and
(the) ground'



Two independent qualificanda, with two unrelated qualificandumnesses, resident in two different objects, determined by two independent modenesses resident in two unrelated modes.

Form 2

'stick-possessing,
ear-rings-possessing
(is) Caitra'



Symbolised as
'Sc & Ec'

Caitra has two different qualificandumnesses, one determined by the modeness resident in stick the other determined by the modeness resident in ear-rings.


where

x possesses a stick = Sx
x possesses ear-rings = Ex
Caitra = c.

Form 3 (a)

'stick-possessing,
ear-rings-possessing
(is) Caitra'

'(stick and ear-rings)-
possessing Caitra
Symbolised as
$(S \& E)_c$




Here, too, Caitra has the same two qualificandumnesses as in Form 2.

Form 2 and Form 3(a) are the same conjunctive cognition.

Non-conjunctive Cognition

Form 3 (b)



where Caitra has one qualificandum-ness limited by both stick and ear-rings. Thus 'Sc & Ec' is different from '(S & E) c' where there is only one qualification (predication) while in 'Sc & Ec' there are two qualifications (predications). The difference between 3(a) and 3(b) is admitted only by some Navya-Nyāya philosophers.


In Western logic the example:

(S 1) sword-possessing, ear-ring-possessing Caitra (is) brave will be symbolised as a conjunction with one more conjunct than in 3(a), thus:

Sc & Ec & Bc.

Yet Navya-Nyāya dealing with *cognitions*, has a different interpretation of a cognition of the Form (S 1).

Form 4




Although there are three modes of Caitra, still these modes are not unrelated in the cognition. Sword and ear-ring are the limitors of characterizedness of bravery, i.e. of characterizedness

resident in the brave, i.e. Caitra. This merely means that the sword and ear-rings are modes of Caitra as indicative of bravery which, too, characterizes him. Here, there are two qualificandum-nesses in Caitra, instead of three—having a sword, having ear-rings and bravery,—for the sword and the ear-rings are taken together as one mode. The two qualificandumnesses resident in Caitra are:

(a) the qualificandum-ness determined by the modeness of both the sword and the ear-rings.
(b) the qualificandum-ness determined by the modeness of bravery which is resident in and is limited by both the sword and the ear-rings.

Explanation: The same example is interpreted differently from Form 4.

Form 5




Here, (i) the sword has become the limitor of characterizedness of ear-rings, i.e. the characterized-ness which resides in Caitra as ear-ring-possessor. (ii) Ear-rings, again, have become the limitor of predicative characterizedness of bravery, i.e. the characterized-ness resident in Caitra of whom bravery is predicated. Thus here there are two qualificandum-nesses:

(i) The qualificandum-ness, resident in Caitra, determined by the modeness resident in sword and limited by ear-rings.

This is because ear-rings have become here the limitor of qualificandumness resident in Caitra, and the sword has become his (i.e. the ear-ring-possessor's) mode. Caitra, the ear-ring-possessor, has the sword.

(ii) The qualificandum-ness, resident in Caitra, determined by the modeness of the predicate (bravery), and limited by both the sword and the ear-rings.
This is because both the ear-rings, and the sword have become limitors of characterizedness resident in Caitra as brave, i.e. are the limitor of the characterizedness of bravery which is the predicate of Caitra.
These two qualificandum-nesses are to be identified, for, it is argued by some that, otherwise, this cognition cannot be distinguished from the following *conjunctive* cognition.

Form 5A



Here there are two cognitions (a) and (b) which are conjoined giving rise to the conjuctive cognition.

Cognition (a): (i) Sword and ear-rings *both* are limitors of qualificandum-ness resident in Caitra, i.e. the qualificandum-ness resident in Caitra is determined by modeness resident in both.

(ii) Bravery is the predicate of Caitra. Caitra the brave possesses both the sword and the ear-rings.

Cognition (b) which is independent of cognition (a):

> Here the sword is the limitor of characterizedness of ear-rings, i.e. of characterized-ness resident in Caitra as ear-ring possessor.
> Caitra the ear-ring-possessor possesses the sword.

By comparing From 5 with Form 5A, we find that (i) of 5 is the same as cognition (b) of 5*A*, where both the sword and the ear-rings are the modes of Caitra.

(ii) of 5 is a conjunction of (i) and (ii) of cognition (a) of 5A. Hence the problem is how to distinguish between these two different cognitions.

One answer suggested here is to hold that the two qualificandum-nesses in Form 5 are identical, but the corresponding two qualificandum-nesses of cognition (a) and cognition (b) of Form 5A are different. Hence the two cognitions are different.

The other answer is that we may admit that the two qualificandum-nesses in Form 5 are also different, but they are related by limitor-limitedness relation with each other, while those of Form 5A are unrelated and independent.

XX. PREDICATEHOOD AND QUALIFIERNESS

17. Gadādhara's Theory

Text

> इत्थं प्रकारतादिवत् विधेयत्वमपि विषयतान्तरं न तूक्तप्रकारत्वमेव तत्, धर्मितावच्छेदकस्यापि तथात्वापत्तेः ।

Translation: Thus predicatehood like qualifierness, is different object-hood but not identical with qualifier-ness; for, then, even a limitor of characterized-ness will have predicatehood.

Explanation: Gadādhara has used in the previous paragraph a new concept, namely that of predicate-hood. The analysis of cognition so far has been in terms of a qualifier, a qualificandum and a relation between them. This means that every cognition has been conceived so far of something as something, some object cognized under some mode. But the concept of a predicate of a cognition, introduces an entirely new perspective for

studying cognition. A predicate is usually that which is cognized about something which is the subject. In Western philosophy a judgment, a proposition, a statement or a sentence is analysed into subject and a predicate. To know, to say, to state something of something is to *assert* something about something. In Indian philosophy in general, and Navya-Nyāya in particular, the assertive element in cognition is just certainty, a subjective state opposed to doubt or vacillation. There is no concept of logical assertion corresponding to, say, Frege's assertion sign. This is because the structure cognized, although relational, is still a complex object, never a fact in the sense of *Tractatus*. Thus even if the concepts of subject and predicate be introduced in the analysis of cognized structure, over and above the usual concepts of qualifier, qualificandum, etc. no element of assertion is introduced into cognition.

This follows from a theory of predicatehood which Gadādhara criticizes, which identifies predicatehood with qualifierness. Gadādhara's own theory is that the predicate of a cognition cannot be identified with its qualifier, i.e. predicatehood cannot be just a kind of qualifierness.

The only reason that Gadādhara adduces here in support of his theory is based on the theory that the limitor of characterizedness is also a qualifier, but cannot be regarded as a predicate. For example, in the cognition 'pot-possessing (is the) ground' ground is the qualificandum and groundness is the mode under which the ground is cognized as the qualificandum. Groundness, therefore, is the limitor of the qualificandumness or characterizedness resident in the ground. This means that unless the thing which *is* the ground is cognized *as* the ground, it cannot be said about it that it is pot-possessing. Thus any property which functions as limitor of characterizedness, even though it is a qualifier, cannot be a predicate. It is the presupposition of any predicate being predicated of the subject.

17.1 *Different Theories of Predicatehood Examined*

Text:

अथ विशेष्यतावच्छेदकताभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतैव विधेय-
ता, पर्वतो वह्निमानित्यादौ च पर्वतत्वादिरूपधर्मितावच्छेदकनिष्ठप्र-

कारता धर्मितावच्छेदकतात्मिकैव, धर्मितावच्छेदकतायाः प्रकारतात्वस्य व्यवस्थापितत्वादतो न तत्र पर्वतत्वादेर्विधेयतापत्तिः । तादृशज्ञाने वह्न्यादेरिव वह्नित्वादेर्वह्निमत्पर्वतवान् देश इत्यादौ च वह्नेर्विधेयता-वारणाय मुख्यविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वं विशेषणम् । मुख्यत्वञ्च विशेष्यतायां प्रकारतानवच्छिन्नत्वं प्रकारताभिन्नत्वं वा । न च विशेष्यतावच्छेदकता-भिन्नत्वाद्युपस्थितिं विनापि पर्वतो वह्निमानित्याद्यनुमित्यनन्तरं पर्वते वह्निमनुमिनोमीत्याद्याकारकस्य वह्न्यादिविधेयकत्वावगाहिनोऽनुव्यव-सायस्योत्पत्त्या निरुक्तप्रकारताया विधेयतात्मकत्वं नोपपद्यत इति वा-वाच्यम्; वह्निप्रकारकानुमितित्वस्यैव तादृशानुव्यवसायविषयत्वोप-गमात् । न चैवं वह्निमान् पर्वतो घटवानित्यनुमित्यनन्तरमपि तादृशानु-व्यवसायापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्; निरुक्ततन्निष्ठप्रकारताकत्वस्य तत्प्रकार-कानुमितित्वव्यञ्जकतया तादृशापत्त्यसम्भवात् ।

Translation: *Objection.* Predicatehood is just qualifier-ness which is determined by the principal qualificandum-ness and which is different from limitor-ness of qualificandum-ness. In 'fire-possessing (is the) hill' the qualifier-ness resident in hill-ness which is the limitor of the characterized-ness is identical with the limitorness of characterized-ness; for it has been established that the limitorness of characterized-ness has qualifier-ness-ness, and hence hill-ness cannot be said to have predicate-ness here. To prevent predicate-ness of fire-ness in the cognition, and of fire in 'the country possessing the hill possessing fire' the adjective 'being determined by the principal qualificandum-ness' is given. Principal-ness of qualificandum-ness is: not being limited by qualifier-ness or being different from qualifier-ness.

It cannot be objected that even without the recollection of difference from limitorness of qualificandumness, etc. immediately after the inference 'fire-possessing (is the) hill' the secondary cognition of the form 'I am inferring fire on the hill' cognising predicatehood of fire etc. arises; and hence predicatehood of that qualifierness is not proved.

For the objecthood of such secondary cognition is admitted only of inference-ness with fire as its qualifier.


It cannot be said that immediately after the inference of the form 'fire-possessing hill (is) jar-possessing'. There will be a secondary cognition of that form.

For the secondary cognition having modeneṣs resident in that merely reveals inferences having that as its qualifier, hence no such objection is possible.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains a theory of predicate-hood which reduces it to a form of modeneness. Gadādhara has already stated his opposition to this theory, still he explains the theory and its justification. The theory is this.

A predicate is a mode of the principal qualificandum and is different from the limitor of qualificandum-ness. For example, in the inference, 'fire-possessing is the hill' the hill is the qualificandum and hill-ness is a mode of the hill. But this modeness resident in the hill-ness which is the limitor of characterized-ness resident in the hill is identical with the limitor-ness of the characterized-ness. In simple language, hill-ness is the mode of the hill only as the limitor of characterized-ness resident in the hill. Hence hill-ness is not a predicate in this inferential cognition. Fire is the predicate here for it is a mode of the only qualificandum, the hill, and is different from hill-ness which is the limitor of the qualificandum-ness.


But fire-ness is not a predicate of the hill, for fire-ness is not a mode of the hill; the modeness resident in fire-ness is not determined by the qualificandumness resident in the hill. Fire-ness is a mode of the fire which is a mode of the hill. As being the mode of is not a transitive relation, the mode of a mode of something is not necessarily a mode of that thing. This may be explained by the following diagram:



This shows that fire is both a mode and a qualificandum—a mode relative to the hill, and a qualificandum relative to fire-ness. The mode-ness resident in fireness is, therefore, determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in fire. The qualificandum-

ness resident in fire is not the principal qualificandum-ness. Hence fireness is not a predicate in the inferential cognition.

Similarly, in the cognition 'the country possessing the hill possessing fire', fire is not a predicate for the same reason. Thus:



The modeness resident in fire is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the hill; but this qualificandum-ness is not the principal qualificandum-ness in this cognition.

The term 'principal qualificandum-ness' has been used above in the definition of a predicate of a cognition. Now what is this principal qualificandum-ness? Two answers are given corresponding to two theories of *intermediate* qualificandum-ness. The hill possesses a qualificandum-ness, relative to the fire, i.e. determined by the modeness resident in fire; but it is *also* a mode of the country, i.e. possesses modeness determined by the qualificandum-ness a resident in the country. The modeness and the qualificandum-ness resident in the hill may be regarded as identical. Being a mode of the country, and being a qualificandum of fire are one and the same abstract property *ontologically*. Or, it may be held that the modeness and the qualificandum-ness (of course, relative to different things) resident in the same reality, are not identical but are mutually related as limitor-limited. The definition of principal qualificandum-ness of a cognition, has, therefore, the correspondingly different definitions:

D 1. *a* is the principal qualificandum-ness if and only if it is not identical with any modeness that may reside in it.

D 2. *a* is the principal qualificandum-ness if and only if it is not limited by modeness that may be resident in it.

Thus the qualificandum-ness resident in the country is the principal qualificandum-ness because there is no modeness resi-

dent in it at all. The qualificandum-ness resident in the hill, however, is not the principal qualificandumness of this cognition because it has modeness relative to the country resident in it, and the qualificandum-ness and the modeness resident in the hill are identical or related by the limitor-limited-ness relation.

Now it may be objected that a predicate cannot be identified with a mode of the cognition, for in some cases even the qualificandum becomes the predicate. The mode in a cognition is the successor of the relation cognized in that cognition. So if the converse of that relation is cognized then in this new cognition, the mode of the previous cognition becomes the qualificandum and vice versa. Yet the predicate is not affected by this interchange of the mode and the qualificandum. Thus in the inference 'fire-possessing is the hill', the hill is the qualificandum and fire the mode. But in the cognition 'fire is on the hill' it is fire which is the qualificandum and the hill the qualifier. The difference between 'a fiery-hill' and 'a hilly-fire' brings out clearly the interchange of the mode and the qualificandum. Yet in the inference of a fiery-hill fire is the predicate just as in the inference of the hill-fire. The objector points out that the inference of the form 'fire-possessing is the hill' may be introspectively cognized as 'I am inferring fire on the hill' (i.e. hilly-fire) where the fire is no longer a mode, but the principal qualificandum. Thus there is no cognition of modeness and still fire is the predicate in the introspective cognition.

The reply to this objection is that in introspective cognition the inference with fire as its mode is cognized as such. Hence the inference 'fire-possessing is the hill' is to be introspectively cognized as 'I am inferring the hill as fiery' where the fire remains the mode of the hill even in the introspective cognition. Hence there is no difficulty in defining the predicate of the cognition as above.

A further objection to this theory is that the inference 'jar-possessing is the fiery-hill' may be cognized in introspection as a cognition with fire as the mode of the hill. Hence fire would have to be regarded as the predicate of the hill, though it is not so in this inferential cognition.

The reply to this objection is that an introspective cognition has that as its mode which is the mode of the primary cognition; for, introspective awareness merely reveals the structure of the

primary cognition. Hence what is not a mode in the primary cognition cannot be so revealed in introspection.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

भवन्मतेऽपि तदविधेयकानुमितौ यथाकथञ्चिदुपस्थिततद्विधेयकत्वग्रह-
वारणाय तत्र तद्विधेयकत्वस्य हेतुताया आवश्यकत्वात् । न च तादृशानु-
व्यवसाये तन्निष्ठविलक्षणविषयतारूपविधेयतायाः प्रतियोगितासम्बन्धेन
हेतुकत्वकल्पनापेक्षया निरुक्ततन्निष्ठप्रकारताया गुरुशरीरायास्तत्संबन्धेन
हेतुताकल्पने गौरवाद्विलक्षणविषयतासिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्; कार्यकारण-
भावलाघवानुरोधेन जात्यतिरिक्तपदार्थसिद्धेः सिद्धान्तविरुद्धत्वादन्यथा
धूमादिपरामर्शजन्यतावच्छेदकतयाऽप्यालोकादिलिङ्गकानुमितिव्यावृत्ते-
र्विलक्षणविषयतासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न च निरुक्तप्रकारतातोऽतिरिक्तैव
विधेयताख्यविषयता, अन्यथा धर्मितावच्छेदकताभिन्नत्वाद्यनुपस्थितिद-
शायां वह्निमान् पर्वतो घटवानित्याद्यनुमित्यनन्तरं पर्वते घटमनुमिनोमि
न वह्निमित्याद्याकारकस्य वह्निविधेयकत्वाभावावगाहिनोऽनुव्यवसाय-
स्यापलापप्रसङ्गात्, वह्न्यादिप्रकारकानुमितिविषयकस्य तस्य वह्निप्रकार-
कत्वसामान्याभावावलम्बनत्वासम्भवादिति वाच्यम्; धर्मितावच्छे-
दकताभिन्नत्वाद्यनुपस्थितिदशायां तादृशप्रीतीतेः प्रामाणिकत्वे निरुक्त-
प्रकारतायामेव विधेयतात्वाख्यधर्मविशेषं स्वीकृत्य तेन रूपेण निरुक्त-
प्रकारतायाः प्रतियोगितासम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाभावस्यैव तादृशप्रतीतिविषय-
तायाः स्वीकरणीयत्वात्, भवन्मतेऽपि संबन्धादिभेदभिन्नविधेयतानामनु-
गमाय तादृशातिरिक्तधर्मस्वीकरस्यावश्यकत्वात् । अन्यथा विधेयता-
नामनतिप्रसक्तसामान्यधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावासम्भवेन तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छि-
न्नभावकूटस्यैव तादृशप्रतीतिविषयतायाः स्वीकारणीयतयाऽभावकूटस्य
विशिष्य युगसहस्रेणापि ग्रहीतुमशक्यतया तादृशप्रतीतेरेवानुपपत्तेः ।
विधेयताप्रतियोगिकाभावत्वेन तावदभावानां तद्विषयत्वोपगमे तादृश-
प्रतीतेः प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतानवगाहितया वह्निमनुमिनोमीत्यादिप्रती-
तेर्विरोधित्वानुपपत्तेरिति चेत् ? न;

Translation: On your theory, too, to prevent (introspective) cognition of predicatehood somehow represented in an inference not having that as the predicate, it is necessary to postulate as the cause a cognition having that as predicate.

It cannot also be said that it is heavier to postulate that the

modeness which is resident in that as stated above and which has a richer structure is the cause in that relation than to postulate that predicatehood as a separate reality, resident in that, is the cause, in the relation of successorness, of the introspective cognition of that form.

For it is against Navya-Nyāya theory to postulate an additional reality other than a universal for the sake of light-ness of the causal relation. Otherwise an additional objecthood can be regarded as established in order to distinguish inference with light as its probans from limitorness of the effectness of consideration of smoke.

It cannot also be said that the objecthood called predicatehood is indeed different from the said modeness, for otherwise, in the absence of memory-cognition of difference from limitorness of characterized-ness, the introspective cognition of negation of having fire as the predicate in 'I am inferring a jar on the hill, not fire' immediately succeeding the inference 'jar-possessing is the fiery-hill' would be impossible. For, the introspective cognition which has, as its object, inference with fire as its mode, will be impossible, if its object be the general negation of *having fire as a mode.*

In the absence of memory-cognition of difference from limitorness of characterized-ness, if that type of introspective cognition be accepted as genuine then only by ascribing predicatehoodness to the modeness as described it can be explained how the negation limited by the relation of counterpositiveness of modeness, as that, (i.e. as possessing predicatehoodness) can the object of that kind of cognition. And this explanation is inevitable.

On your theory, too, it is necessary to postulate such an additional property in order to explain what is common to the predicatehoods which are different *not* due to difference in relations.

Otherwise, it would be impossible to have a negation limited by a common property not wider than the predicatehoods. Hence it has to be admitted that the object of that cognition is the totality of all negations limited by the particularities of the particulars; but the totality of negations as particulars cannot be cognized even in thousands of years, and hence such a cognition would be impossible.

Hence it would follow that the object of that cognition is all the negations as negations having predicatehood as their counterpositive, hence that cognition would not cognize the limitorness of the counterpositiveness. This would fail to explain how it can contradict the cognition 'I am inferring fire'.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains various arguments and counter-arguments about the theory that the predicate of a cognition is the mode of the principal qualificandum and different from the limitor of qualificandum-ness. The present argument was about the possibility of having an introspective cognition in which an object is cognized as predicate of the primary cognition although it was not so cognized in the primary cognition. The argument given here is that even on Gadādhara's theory it has to be admitted that predicatehood of the primary cognition is the cause of its cognition as having predicatehood in the introspective cognition. The reason for admitting such a causal connection between the predicatehood of the primary cognition and the predicatehood of the primary cognition as cognized in introspection is this. Without such a causal connection a predicatehood presented somehow in the primary cognition would be cognized as predicatehood *of* the primary cognition as cognized in introspection.

Next a counter-argument against this theory is given. There are two alternatives here. (a) One is to suppose that the predicatehood postulated as an additional objecthood resident in some object will be a cause of its introspective cognition by being related to it by the successor relation. A cognition is the successor of the relation between the object and the cognition. Thus the introspective cognition will be the successor of the primary cognition which is its object. (b) The other alternative is to conceive of predicatehood as modeness determined by the principal qualificandum-ness and different from the limitor of qualificandum-ness. To regard this very complex predicatehood as causally related with its introspective cognition as its successor, is to accept a very heavy theory. For according to Navya-Nyāya a cause has to be under a specific mode in order to be a cause. Now if predicatehood be conceived as a very complex property then this very complex property becomes the limitor of cause-ness resident in

the predicatehood. Thus this theory involves a very heavy property as the limitor of cause-ness of the introspective cognition.

The reply to it is that heaviness or light-ness of the limitor of causeness is a consideration relevant for determining whether a real entity is a universal or not. But this consideration is irrelevant for other purposes. This is the accepted Navya-Nyāya position.

If someone rejects this Navya-Nyāya position, then he might argue for a different objectivity in the following case. We may infer fire on the hill on the basis of smoke. Here the consideration will have smoke as its object. This consideration will also be the cause of inference. The limitor of causeness resident in this consideration will be different from the limitor of causeness resident in another consideration in which light is the probans for fire. But this postulation of a different objecthood as an independent reality will not be justified. Thus no independent reality other than universals can be postulated on the basis of limitor of cause-ness, or light-ness or heavi-ness of this limitor.

Another counter-argument is based upon the introspective cognition of fire not being the probandum, 'I am inferring a jar on the hill not fire' which immediately succeeds the primary inferential cognition 'jar-possessing is the fiery-hill'. Now at the time of the introspective cognition there is no memory-cognition of the so-called defining properties of predicatehood. Now in this introspective cognition the object is the negation of predicatehood of fire. But fire is a qualifier in the introspective cognition. This would be impossible if predicate-hood were identified with qualifier-ness (modeness). Hence predicatehood cannot be identified with a certain kind of modeness.

Reply: It is doubtful if such introspective cognition is genuine. If it is genuine and occurs in the absence of the memory of the defining properties of predicatehood, even then there would be no difficulty in explaining the cognition of negation of predicatehood. For only by admitting predicatehood of the modeness that we can explain the negation of this modeness as cognized under the mode of predicatehood, as the object of the introspective cognition. It is important to note here that when we cognize a negation of something it is necessary to cognize that something under a specific mode. Otherwise, cogni-

tion of negation of a thing would not contradict that of its presence. Thus it will be necessary even for the other theory to postulate such a limiting property of counter-positiveness resident in fire as predicate of the introspective cognition. Otherwise if such limiting property of counter-positiveness of a negation be not admitted then to explain the cognition of the negation of a jar, for example, it will be necessary to postulate a collection of particular negations which may be infinite in number. For when we say that there is no jar on the ground, we cognize the counter-positiveness resident in the jar as limited by jar-ness. This is known as general negation. If we do not rise to the level of counter-positiveness and its limitor then we shall have to say that there is the negation of this jar on the ground and the negation of that jar and so on and so forth. But in this way we can never enumerate exhaustively all the negations of particular jars, for the negations are infinite in number. So everyone has to postulate a property. As we have explained above, the cognition of the limitor of counter-positiveness, as opposed to the cognition of the simple counterpositive in the cognition of a negation of something, will fail to explain how the cognition of negation of something prevents or blocks the cognition of that thing.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

निरुक्तप्रकारताया एव विधेयतात्वे पृथिव्यां जलादिभेदो, ह्रदे धूमाभाव इत्याद्याकारकसाध्यविशेष्यकानुमितीनां तद्विधेयकत्वानुपपत्तेः । तथा-विधानुमितिविशेष्यतायां विधयतात्वोपगमान्नेयमनुपपत्तिरिति चेत् ? तर्हि तादृशानुमितिविशेष्यतायास्तत्समानप्रकारकसमानविशेष्यकपृथि-व्यादिसाध्यकानुमितावपि सत्त्वेन तस्य अपीतरभेदादिविधेयकत्वापत्तेः ।

Translation: If modeness as described above be identified with predicatehood, then in inferences having the probandum as qualificandum as in 'difference from water in earth', 'absence of smoke on a lake' etc. how the probanda can be predicates becomes inexplicable.

If it is said that in such inference the qualificandumness should be regarded as predicatehood, then in inferences, with earth etc.

as probanda, having the same mode and the same qualificandum, such qualificandum-ness would be regarded as having difference from non-earth as its predicate.

Explanation: Gadādhara explains here an objection to the theory that modeness of a cognition, as stated above, should be identified with its predicatehood. The objection is based on a type of inference in which, the probanda instead of being the predicate, become the subject. Examples of such inferences are: difference from water (is) in earth, absence of smoke (is) on a lake, etc. These inferences are different from the other type which is of the form: 'earth is different from water', 'the lake possesses absence of smoke', where the probanda are modes. According to Navya-Nyāya, whether the probanda are modes or qualificanda in the conclusion, they remain the predicates. This is because the distinction between subject and predicate of a cognition is independent of the distinction between qualifier and qualificandum. Thus even if a probandum be a qualificandum in the conclusion of an inference, it still remains a predicate in the conclusion. Thus it appears that in *such* inferences the predicatehood has to be identified with qualificandumness, instead of with modeness.

But thus identifying the predicate with the qualificandum in the conclusion of such inferences leads to difficulties in the case of inferences where both the qualificandum and the mode are the same. For example in the inference, where the conclusion is '(there is) difference from non-earth in earth', where earth, being the mode of the right type, is the predicate.

Now the conclusion '(there is) difference from non-earth in earth' can be interpreted in two ways,

(i) as having difference from non-earth as the probandum;

or,

(ii) as having earth as the probandum,
difference from non-earth which is the qualificandum and also the probandum in (i) would become the predicate even in (ii), which is absurd; for the predicate in the conclusion is the probandum, here in (ii) earth is the probandum.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

अथ पृथिव्यादिपक्षकतादृशानुमितितत्साध्यकतादृशानुमित्योर्भिन्न-भिन्नैव तादृशी विशेष्यता, एवञ्च साध्यविशेष्यकानुमितिविशेष्यतायामेव विधयतात्वमभ्युपेयत इति नोक्तातिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् ? न;

Translation: Now, the qualificandumness in an inference with earth as its locus and the qualificandumness in an inference with earth as probandum are different; hence predicatehood-ness has to be ascribed to the qualificandum-ness only in inferences having the probandum as the qualificandum. So there is no too-wide-ness of the definition.

Explanation: The difficulty of the theory that the predicate be identified with the qualificandum of the conclusion if it is the probandum was that in inferences where the qualificandum and the mode are the same *thing* interchanged, but the probanda differ, it will not be clear with which to identify the predicate. Now the answer is that inferences with earth as the locus and inferences with earth as the probandum do not have the same qualificandumness. Hence in (ii) of the above, difference from non-earth will not have the same qualificandumness as in (i). Hence the above difficulty will not arise.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

साध्यविशेष्यकानुमितावतिरिक्तविधेयतात्मकविशेष्यतोपगमे इतरभेदः पृथिव्यामित्याद्याकारकपृथिवीसाध्यकानुमितौ विधेयतानात्मकं विशेष्य-तान्तरम्, तथाविधप्रत्यक्षे चान्यद्विशष्यत्वमिति तिसृणां विशेष्यतानां कल्पनापेक्षया प्रत्यक्षानुमितिसाधारण्या एकविशेष्यतायाः साध्यविशेष्यक-साध्यविशेषणकानुमितिसाधारण्या एकस्या विधेयतायाश्च कल्पनस्यैवो-चितत्वात् । न चास्मन्मतेऽनुमितौ या विधेयतानात्मिका विशेष्यता सैव प्रत्यक्षेऽपीति न विशेष्यतात्रयकल्पनमिति वाच्यम्; प्रत्यक्षे विधेयतात्मि-का तदनात्मिका वा विशेष्यता कल्प्यत इत्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहात् ॥

Translation: If an additional qualificandumness of the nature of predicatehood be admitted in inferences with the probandum as

qualificandum, then a different qualificandumness not of the nature of predicatehood has to be admitted in the inference with earth as its probandum, of the form '(there is) difference from non-earth in earth'; similarly in the perception of that form a different qualificandum-ness has to be postulated. Thus it will be logical to postulate one qualificandum-ness common to perception and inference and of one predicatehood common to inferences with the probandum as qualificandum or as qualifier, rather to postulate three different qualificandum-nesses.

It cannot be said that on our view the qualificandum-ness not of the nature of predicatehood postulated in inference is the same qualificandum-ness in perception of that form; and hence three different qualificandumnesses need not be postulated.

For there is no reason for deciding whether the qualificandum-ness in perception is of the nature of predicatehood or not.

Explanation: Gadādhara shows here that identification of predicatehood with the qualificandumness in the conclusion of inferences having the probandum as qualificandum, leads to the postulation of three different types of qualificandumness is different types of cognitions.

(i) There is first the qualificandum-ness identical with predicatehood in inferences where the probandum is the qualificandum.

(ii) Then there is qualificandum-ness which is not to be identified with predicatehood where the probandum is the qualifier and the locus is the qualificandum. This is so because the conclusion of the same form may be interpreted in two different ways, as explained above. For example, in the inference 'there is difference from non-earth in earth' the probandum may be: difference from non-earth, or also, earth. Because of this ambiguity in the conclusion the qualificandumness resident in difference from non-earth has once to be identified with predicatehood and again not to be identified with it. Thus difference from non-earth must have two different qualificandumnesses.

(iii) Moreover one can perceive that there is difference from non-earth in earth; and there is a perceptual qualificandum-ness in difference from non-earth.

Gadādhara argues that instead of postulating three different qualificandum-nesses in difference from non-earth, in order to explain the three different types of cases, it will be lighter to postulate that there is one qualificandum-ness common to both inference and perception, and one additional predicatehood, not identical with either modeness or qualificandum-ness, which will be common to two types of inferences, namely where the probandum is the qualificandum and where it is not.

In support of the identification of predicatehood with qualificandum-ness in inferences of one type, it may be argued that there will be one qualificandum-ness not identical with predicatehood in inferences of the other type and also in perception; and hence there is no need to postulate three different qualificandum-nesses; postulation of two qualificandum-nesses is sufficient.

But Gadādhara points out the inadequacy of this reply. He argues that there is no way of deciding whether the qualificandum-ness in perceptual cognition is or is not to be identified with predicatehood.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

> यत्तु साध्यविशेषणकानुमितौ क्लृप्तनिरुक्तप्रकारतैव विधेयता, अतिरिक्तविधेयता तु साध्यविशेष्यकानुमितावेव, अनन्तसाध्यविशेषकानुमितिव्यक्तिषु अतिरिक्तविधेयतासम्बन्धकल्पनापेक्षया तन्निरूपितस्वल्पतरनिरुक्तप्रकारतासु विधेयतात्वकल्पने लाघवादिति ।

Translation: The theory that the predicatehood in inference with their probanda as qualifiers is indeed identical with the modeness as described above which is to be postulated; additional predicatehood is to be postulated only in the case of inferences where the probanda are qualificanda. It will be lighter to postulate predicatehood-ness in the modeness as described above which are fewer in number than to postulate relations of the additional predicatehood to the infinite number of inferences individually with the probandum as qualificandum.

Explanation: Here an objection is raised against postulating predicatehood as an additional reality. If such a predicatehood

be postulated then it has to be related to all particular inferential cognitions which have their probanda which in a type of cases, will be infinite in number, as their qualificanda. This will make the theory very heavy. For example, in one interpretation, the inference 'there is difference from non-earth in earth', difference from non-earth is the probandum and is also the qualificandum. Yet as there are infinite instances of difference from non-earth in all earth-particulars, if predicatehood of the inference be postulated as an additional entity then it has to be related to all the different inferences by an infinite number of relations. It will be lighter to postulate predicatehoodness in the modenesses determined by those infinite qualificandum-nesses; for the number of such modenesses will be fewer than the number of qualificandum-nesses.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text:

तदपि न चारु; तादृशप्रकारताया विधेयतात्वोपगमे पर्वतो वह्निमान् पर्वतो निर्धूमः स्यादित्याकारकसमूहालम्बनापत्त्यात्मकज्ञानस्य वह्न्यादिविधेयकत्वापत्तेः। न चेष्टापत्तिः। तथा सति तादृशपात्त्यनन्तरं पर्वते धूमाभावमापादयामि न तु वह्निमित्याकारकवह्निविधेयकत्वाभावप्रतीतेरनुपपत्तेः । एतेन साध्यविशेष्यकानुमितिरेवाप्रामाणिकी, अप्रसिद्धसाध्यकस्थले विशेष्ये विशेषणमिति रीत्या । साध्य विशेषणकानुमितिरेवोत्पद्यते विशिष्टबुद्धिसामान्ये विशेषणज्ञानहेतुताया निर्युक्तिकत्वात्, तथा च निरुक्तप्रकारतैव विधेयता, भावसाध्यकस्थले तु साध्यविशेष्यकानुमितेत्यन्ताप्रामाणिकतया तन्न सुतरामेवेत्यपि निरस्तम् ॥

Translation: But this theory is not good. For if predicatehoodness in modeness of that form is postulated then in the conjunctive reductio ad absurdum of the form 'fire-possessing is the hill and the hill would be smokeless', fire would become the predicate.

This cannot be treated as a desirable consequence.

For in that case there would not be introspective cognition of the form 'I am counterfactually assuming absence of smoke, but not fire, on the hill' in which there is cognition of absence of predicatehood of fire.

By this, is refuted the theory—there is no reason to admit inferences with their probanda as their qualificanda at all. In the case of inferences where the probandum is not previously cognized, there, too inference with probanda as qualifier results by the rule: qualifier in the qualificandum; for it is unjustified to postulate causeness of cognition of qualifiers for qualified cognition in general. Hence predicatehood is identical with modeness of that form; in the case of positive probanda it is totally unjustifiable to postulate inferences with probanda as qualificanda; hence in such cases, *a forteori*, the predicatehood is identical with modeness.

Explanation: Gadādhara shows the inadequacy of the suggested theory to explain a case of the following type: a conjunctive cognition where one conjunct is an inference of the form 'the hill is fiery' and the other conjunct a reductio of the form 'the hill is smokeless'. Thus the conjunction will have the form 'the hill is fiery and the hill is smokeless'. Now in this conjunctive cognition fire becomes the predicate on the suggested theory. This cannot be regarded as a desirable consequence for it cannot be asserted that fire is the predicate of the conjunctive cognition which is of the nature of a reductio. In a reductio ad absurdum argument there is one counterfactual assumption, i.e. an assumption which is known to be false. This assumption leads to a consequence which is also known to be false. This type of raductio argument is used primarily to remove a doubt about a pervasion. Suppose one doubts if smoke is really pervaded by fire, this doubt is removed by showing that the consequence of supposing the opposite would contradict a well-established fact. For example, the reductio argument in this case will take the form:

(1) If smoke deviated fire, it would not be caused by fire
(2) But it is an accepted fact that smoke is caused by fire
(3) Therefore smoke cannot deviate fire, i.e. smoke is pervaded by fire.

Here (1) shows the nature of a counterfactual assumption leading to an absurd consequence. This is a universal relation between deviation of fire by smoke and smoke not being caused by fire. As this argument is given by some one who already knows that smoke is pervaded by fire, the assumption that smoke deviates

fire, is counterfactual assumption for in this the counterfactual assumption is called an imposed ground (*āpādaka*).

Now in the present case the conjunctive cognition as a whole is of the nature of a counter-factual assumption. Hence in this cognition fire cannot be the predicate. As the introspective cognition of this conjunctive cognition is of the form 'I am counterfactually assuming absence of smoke on the hill and not fire' in which fire is not the predicate. Yet according to the theory suggested in the preceding paragraph, it is fire, which is the probandum of the inference which is the first conjunct of the conjunctive cognition and is also its mode. Therefore according to this theory fire ought to be the predicate in this conjunctive cognition. But this contradicts the introspective evidence.

The logical point is that the suggested theory has failed to distinguish between cases where an inference is the whole of a cognition and where the inference is a part of a cognition where the whole cognition is not of the nature of an inferential conclusion.

Gadādhara's argument with the help of a more complex cognition in which the conclusion of an inference is only an element also disposes of the following theory.

This theory is that inferential conclusions with the probanda as qualificanda are not to be admitted at all, for there is no justification for admitting such inferences. In all inferences the probanda are necessarily the modes of the conclusions; and as modeness of this type is identical with predicatehood, there is no difficulty in explaining how the probanda are predicates in inferential conclusions.

The supporters of this theory do not admit the radical difference between two types of inference where the probandum is already cognized and where it is not. The difference between these two types of inferences may be explained with two examples. The first example is of an affirmative conclusion and the second example is of an inference with a negative conclusion.

First Example:

(i) Smoke is pervaded by fire
(ii) The hill has smoke
(iii) The hill has smoke pervaded by fire
(iv) Hence the hill possesses fire.

In this example the probandum fire is already cognized in (i) and (iii). Hence an inference of this type is called an inference with the probandum already cognized.

In this type of inference the probandum is necessarily the mode in the conclusion. To assume that there can be an inference of this type in which the probandum is the qualificandum of the conclusion is wholly unjustified.

Second example:

(i) Smoke is pervaded by fire
(ii) The lake has absence of fire
(iii) The lake has absence of fire which pervades-smoke
(iv) ∴ The lake has absence of smoke.

In this inference the *s* is absence of smoke which does not occur in any of the premises. This type of inference is called inference where the *s* is not cognized in the premises. The problem here is that the conclusion has a relational structure which is cognized in a qualificative cognition. Now, according to Navya-Nyāya philosophers, a qualificative cognition is produced by a prior cognition of the qualifier. Yet in this case the cognition of the conclusion is a qualificative cognition the qualifier of which is absence of smoke. As this qualifier is not cognized in the premises there is no prior cognion of the qualifier. Hence the propounders of this theory of predicatehood reject the Navya-Nyāya rule that a prior cognition of the qualifier is necessary for a qualified cognition. Thus there will be no type of inference, based on affirmative or negative pervasion, in which the probandum is the qualificandum. As the probandum which is the predicate in the conclusion is necessarily a mode, predicatehood can be identified with modeness.

This theory has been refuted by the instance of the conjunctive cognition already discussed.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

यत्तु अनुमितावापत्तौ च तद्व्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानजन्यत्वमेव तद्विधेयकत्वमिति

Translation: In inference and also in counterfactual assumption

being a predicate of that is being produced by the cognition of having pervadedness by that.

Explanation: A new theory of predicatehood is here suggested. To be a predicate of a term is the result of knowing that the term is pervaded by it. For example in the inferential cognition that all men are mortal, mortality is the predicate of humanity because humanity is pervaded by mortality. So also in the inferential cognition 'the hill is fire-possessing' fire is the predicate of the hill because this hill-ness is pervaded by fire—whatever is this hill has fire. This may be explained in terms of modern Western logic thus. For example, the singular sentence, 'Socrates is wise' symbolised as 'Ws' is equivalent to '(x)(x = s ⊃ Wx)', which shows, in Navya-Nyāya terminology, that being (identical with) Socrates is pervaded by wisdom. Hence wisdom is the predicate of Socrates.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

तदसत्; यतोऽतिरिक्तविधेयतानभ्युपगमे तद्व्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानस्य स्वानन्तरोत्पन्नतत्प्रकारकानुमितित्वादिकमेव जन्यतावच्छेदकं वाच्यम्, न तु तत्र तद्विधेयतानिवेशसंभवः, आत्माश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च सिद्ध्यभावाऽऽपाद्यव्यतिरेकनिश्चयरूपकारणासमवहितवह्निव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानानन्तरोत्पन्नयोर्वह्निमत्पर्वतत्वावच्छिन्नपक्षकघटादिविधेयकानुमित्यापत्त्योरपि तादृशज्ञानजन्यतया वह्निविधेयकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति पक्षताविशेषादिजन्यत्वस्य विधेयताशरीरघटकत्वे पक्षताद्युपस्थितिविरहकालेऽपि सर्वानुभवसिद्धाया वह्निं नानुमिनोमीत्याद्याकारकप्रतीतेरपलापप्रसङ्गात् ।

Translation: This theory is wrong. If predicatehood be not admitted as an additional reality, then *being the inferential conclusion* which has that as its mode, and which arises immediately after the cognition of being pervaded by that, will have to be admitted as the limitor of effectness; it is not possible to introduce 'predicatehood of that' in it (the limitor), because of self-dependence (circularity of a sort). Then, too, if causal factors like (i) absence of certain knowledge of the probandum, and (ii) certainty of absence of the imposed ground, are absent, then it may be that the cognition of being pervaded by fire, immedia-

tely succeeded by the origination of the inferential conclusion and also of the counterfactual assumption, having the jar as its predicate and the locus as limited by the fiery mountain. Now both these cognitions being produced by the cognition of fire being pervaded by this hill-ness, would have fire as the predicate in both these types of cognition. To avoid this, if in the structure of predicatehood, being produced by particular locus-ness be introduced, then, too, in the absence of memory-cognition of locus-ness, etc. the universally accepted introspective evidence 'I am not inferring fire' would have to be contradicted.

Explanation: Gadādhara shows the inadequacy of this new theory by citing complex examples. He first shows that the effect of a cognition of being pervaded by fire, for example, is the inferential conclusion having fire as its mode. Now the limitor of the effect-ness in this case will be being the inference having fire as its mode. It cannot be said that the limitor of effect-ness is being the inference having that as its predicate. For this would mean that predicatehood is being defined in terms of itself. Now an inference requires that the conclusion is not already known, i.e. that in the conclusion it is not cognized, with certainty, that the probandum is in the locus by the relevant relation. This absence of certainty about the presence of the probanda in the locus is what makes the locus the locus. For anything which is cognized with certainty to possess the probanda cannot be the locus of the probandum again.

In the case of counterfactual assumption it is necessary to be certain that the object concerned is not present there. Thus one can counterfactually assume that the hill is smokeless only if one is certain that the hill is not smokeless. Thus absence of smoke-which-is-counterfactually-assumed has to be cognized with certainty.

Now Gadādhara assumes a case where neither the necessary condition of locus-ness (absence of certainty of the presence of the probanda in the locus) nor that of counterfactual assumption (certainty that the assumed object is not there) is present and yet the cognition of being pervaded by fire is present. Now from the presence of this cognition alone, even though the above mentioned necessary factors are absent, the inferential cognition having the jar as its predicate and the locus as being limited by

being the fiery hill will follow, as also the reductio of the same form. In these two cognitions which are produced by the cognition of pervasion by fire, fire becomes the predicate. But it is clear that fire is not the predicate in these cognitions.

This undesirable consequence of the theory may be sought to be avoided by defining predicatehood in such a way as to include reference to locus-ness within it. If this is done then in the above two cases fire would not be a predicate as there was no locus-ness in them (for locus-ness is defined in terms of absence of certainty of the occurrence of the probandum. In the above inference however there was no such locus-ness). This introduction of locus-ness into the structure of predicatehood, however, cannot save the theory. For everybody has the introspective cognition 'I am not inferring fire' which does not involve any reference to a locus where I am not inferring fire. Yet in this inference the jar is the predicate, and if reference to locus-ness is necessary for predicatehood then such introspective evidence will have to be denied.

17.1 *Examination Continued*

Text

न च पक्षताविशेषादिजन्यत्वविशिष्टस्वव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानजन्यत्वसम्बन्धेन वह्न्यादिमदन्यत्वमेव तादृशप्रतीतिविषयोऽस्तु, तत्र च न पक्षताद्युपस्थितेरपेक्षा सम्बन्धज्ञानस्य विशिष्टबुद्धावहेतुत्वादिति वाच्यम्; अनन्तपदार्थघटिततादृशधर्मस्य सम्बन्धत्वे मानाभावात् ।

Translation: It cannot be said that the object of that type of cognition be different from fire in the relation *being produced by a cognition of pervasion by itself*, qualified by the effectness of particular locusness. In this case, there is no dependence on the memory-cognition of locus-ness, etc. for cognition of relations is not a cause of qualified cognition.

For there is no justification for postulating such a relation constituted by an infinite number of reals.

Explanation: An attempt may be made to salvage the theory by introducing locus-ness into the structure of the predicate, but only indirectly, and hence avoiding the necessity of a cognition of this locus-ness as causally necessary for the production of

inferential cognition. The technical device is not to introduce a reference to locus-ness in the structure of predicatehood, but to have it all the same by including it in the relation in which the predicate is to be the predicate. This stipulated relation is indeed a complex relation formed from the following sentences, having the following constituent parts.

(i) The inference is produced by the cognition of (smoke) being pervaded by fire.
(ii) The inference is also produced by a particular locus-ness.

So the inference is a cognition produced by a particular locus-ness *and* also by the cognition of being pervaded by *fire*.

So *fire* (as the successor) is related to the inference (as the predecessor) by the relation—*being produced by the cognition of being pervaded by itself, qualified by being produced by a particular locus-ness.*

inference←————fire

being produced by the cognition of being pervaded by itself, qualified by being produced by a particular locus-ness.	The tip of the arrow indicates the predecessor of the relation.

But Gadādhara's reply to this attempt is that the postulation of such a complex chain relation constituted by so-many different types of reality is totally unjustified. One cannot construct a relation of arbitrary complexity in order to explain the possibility of cognitions.

17.2 *Sentence Meaning and Predicatehood*

Text

एवमेतन्मते शाब्दबोधस्य सविधेयकत्वानुपपत्तिः, तस्य व्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानाजन्यत्वात् । न च तत्र निरुक्तप्रकारतैव विधेयतेति वाच्यम्; पर्वते वह्निरित्यादिवाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधे वह्न्यादेर्विधेयत्वानुपपत्तेः। न च तत्र वह्न्यंशे पर्वताधेयत्वमेव विधेयम्, न तु पर्वतांशे वह्निरिति वाच्यम्; शाब्दबोधे चरमनिर्द्दिष्टपदार्थस्यैव विधेयत्वात् । अत एव "न्यक्कारो ह्ययमेव मे यदरयः" इत्यादौ विधेयत्वेन तात्पर्यविषयस्य न्यक्कारादेः प्राङ्निर्दिष्टपदोपस्थाप्यतया तद्विधेयकान्वयबोधासम्भवादालङ्कारिका

विधेयाविमर्शदोषमुदाहरन्ति । अत एव "गुणानां गुणत्वमि"त्यादौ गुणत्वस्यैवोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकतया विधेयतया चान्वयबोधानुपपत्तिराशङ्किता वर्धमानोपाध्यायैः । विशेष्यस्य विधेयत्वे तत्र गुणात्वस्य तदनुपपत्त्या तादृशाशङ्कनासङ्गतेः । न च परार्थानुमाने गुणत्वरूपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकधर्मावच्छिन्ने इतरभेदसाधनाय प्रयुक्तादितरव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगिगुणत्ववानयमित्येतादृशोपनयावयवादन्वयबोधानुपपत्तिरेव तैराशङ्कितेति वाच्यम्; तत्र दण्डवान् रक्तदण्डवानित्यादाविव विधेयांशे व्याप्तिमानाधिक्येन गुणत्वसम्बन्धित एवाभेदसम्बन्धेन विधेयतया चान्वयबोधानुपपत्तिविरहात् । न च नामार्थयोः साक्षादन्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नतया पर्वते वह्निरित्यादौ पर्वताद्यंश कथं विधेयतयाऽन्वय इति वाच्यम्; साक्षाद्विशेषणविशष्यभावनान्वयस्यैव नामार्थयोरनभ्युपगमात्, अत्र परम्परयैव विशेष्यविशेषणभावोपगमात् ।

Translation: Moreover on this theory it cannot be explained how cognition of sentence meaning can have a predicate, for this cognition is not produced by a cognition of any pervasion.

It cannot be said that here the modeness as characterized above is the predicatehood.

For it cannot explain how in the cognition of the meaning produced by the sentence 'on the hill (there is) fire', fire has the predicatehood.

It cannot be said that in this cognition being a superstratum of the hill is the predicate of fire, and not fire the predicate of the hill.

For in the cognition of meaning of a sentence it is the referent of the last word which is the predicate. Hence in the sentence 'Shame, indeed, on me verily this—that there are foes', self-condemnation being presented by a word coming first in the word order has yet been intended by this speaker as the predicate; still it being impossible to cognize a connection among the reference with that as its predicate has been regarded as a defect of unconstructed predicate by the rhetoricians.

Hence Vardhamāna Upādhyāya has feared the impossibility of having a connected meaning from the sentence 'of the attributes attribute-ness' as here attribute-ness being the limitor of subject-ness cannot be regarded as the predicate.

If the qualificandum be regarded as the predicate then in that

cognition inexplicability of attribute-ness as the predicate cannot have been feared.

It cannot be said that in inference for the sake of others proving exclusion from others in what is limited by attribute-ness which is the limitor of objects to be defined, there cannot be any cognition of sentence meaning from Upanaya which is of the form 'this possesses attributeness which is the counterpositive of the negation which is the pervader of exclusion by others'. This is what he feared.

For, as in 'the stick-possessor is the red stick-possessor' where in the predicate there is something more which is cognized in the pervasion, so also there would have been no difficulty in explaining the cognition of related objects by understanding the meaning of the sentence as the relata of attribute-ness have predicatehood by the relation of identity.

It cannot be said that the referents of two nouns cannot be directly related; hence in 'on the hill fire' how can predicatehood be related to the hill?

For, the rule is that the referents of two nouns cannot be directly related as the qualifier and the qualificandum; hence here the relation of qualificandum-qualifier-ness can be explained only indirectly.

Explanation: Gadādhara now shows the inapplicability of the concept of predicatehood as formulated in the theory in terms of being produced by a cognition of pervasion, to cognition which a person has by hearing a sentence. According to Navya-Nyāya to understand the meaning of a sentence is to cognize a related structure. This cognition is radically different from inference. To know something second-hand from others is not to know *that thing* by an inference, and hence there is no need for a cognition of something being pervaded by something. So if predicatehood is defined as what is produced by a cognition of pervasion then there can be no predicates in the cognition of sentence meaning.

It is not possible to revert to the older theory according to which predicatehood is identical with a certain type of modeness. From hearing the sentence 'on the hill (there is) fire' one gets the cognition in which fire is the predicate. Yet in this cognition fire is not a mode at all, it is the qualificandum and yet a predi-

cate; this cannot be explained if a predicate is necessarily a mode.

In support of this theory it may be pointed out that in the cognition of that sentence-meaning fire is not the predicate of the hill but being the superstratum of the hill is the predicate of fire. To say that 'on the hill there is fire' is to say about the fire that it is on the hill, i.e. that being the superstratum of the hill is predicated of fire.

Now this interpretation of fire as the subject and being on the hill as its predicate is not acceptable to Navya-Nyāya philosophers. For according to them there is a semantical rule of word-order in a sentence. Sanskrit, being an inflectional language, permits inversions of various sorts without affecting the terms of the relations and the relations themselves meant by the sentence. If in a sentence a word is to refer to what is to be the predicate in relation to something which is the referrent of another word, then the predicate word has to succeed the subject word. Hence the rule is that in the understanding of a sentence-meaning the referrent of the last word is the predicate. Gadādhara then justifies this rule by showing that authors like Vardhamāna have adhered to this rule.

17.2 *Sentence Meaning and Predicatehood Discussion Continued*

Text

अथ शाब्दबोधे चरमनिर्दिष्टपदार्थस्य विधेयत्वे "वपुर्विरूपाक्षमि" त्यादा वक्षणो वैरूप्यस्य विधेयत्वानुपपत्तिः । वैरूप्यविशिष्टस्याक्षण एव तत्र-वपुरंशे विधेयत्वे "अलक्ष्यजन्मते"त्यत्रापि अलक्ष्यजन्मताया एव विधेय-तया तात्पर्यविषयत्वमित्यस्य वक्तुं शक्यतया अलक्ष्यताया यद्विधेयत्वे-नाविमृष्टविधेयांशोदाहरणताया अनुपपत्तेः । यदि च तत्र शुद्धस्य जन्मनो विवक्षितमहादेवापकर्षासंपादकतया न विधेयत्वेन विवक्षितत्वमपि तु जन्मनोऽलक्ष्यताया एवेति मन्यते, तदा तुल्यं प्रकृतेऽपि इति चेत् ? न;

Translation: Now if in cognizing sentence-meaning, the referent of the last word be the predicate, then in 'body with malformed-eyes', etc. malformed-ness cannot be the predicate of eyes. If, here, malformedness-qualified eyes be the predicate of body, then in 'of unknown origin', too, it can be said that the whole of

unknown-origin is the predicate as the object of intention (i.e. as intended by the speaker); then it cannot be explained how this is cited as an example of unestablished predicate because unknown-ness cannot be regarded as predicate.

If, however, it is held that, here, pure birth is conceived as not imputing lack of excellence to Mahadeva and hence not intended as a predicate, but unknown-ness is intended as predicate of birth, then, the situation is the same even in the present instance.

17.2 *Sentence Meaning and Predicatehood Discussion Continued*

Text

समासातिरिक्तस्थले चरमनिर्देशस्य विधेयतानियामकत्वात् ।

Translation: This is not correct, for, the rule is that the referent of the last word is the predicate only in non-compound words.

Explanation: Gadādhara has explained the Navya-Nyāya rule that the referent of the last word in the sentence is the predicate. Now the objection is that in various compound words, the referent of the last word cannot be regarded as the predicate. Gadādhara agrees with this objection, but, then, states the Navya-Nyāya rule of interpretation of sentence-meaning more fully. The rule is that the referent of the last word will be the predicate except in compound words. In compound words the referent of the last word in the compound is not the predicate. Hence the objections raised here are not really relevant.

17.2 *Discussion Continued*

Text

एवं निरुक्तप्रकारताया विधेयतात्वे "द्वितीयमौर्वीमिवे"त्यादौ विधेयत्वेन विवक्षितस्य समासघटकपूर्वपदेन प्रतिपादने विधेयाविमर्शः, "मौर्वीं द्वितीयामिवे" त्यसमस्तपदेन प्रतिपादने दोषोद्धार इत्यालङ्कारिकप्रवाद-विरोधश्चेति । विधेयतावत् तन्निरूपितोद्देश्यतापि प्रकारतादिभिन्न-विषयताविशेष एव । न चैवं विशेष्यतैवोद्देश्यता पर्वते वह्निरित्यादिवाक्य-जन्यशाब्दबोधे साध्यविशेष्यकानुमितेः प्रामाणिकत्वेन तत्र च पर्वतस्यो-द्देश्यतानुपपत्तेः । न च विधेयतानिरूपकत्वमुद्देश्यत्वम्, तच्च तदंशे

विधेयत्वं तस्य विशेष्यत्वे प्रकारत्वे चाक्षतमेवेति किमुद्देश्यताख्यातिरि-
क्तविषयत्वोपगमेनेति वाच्यम्; उद्देश्यत्वमेवातिरिक्तं तन्निरूपकत्व-
मेव विधेयत्वमित्यस्यापि वक्तुं शक्यता विनिगमनाविरहेणोभयस्यैवाति-
रिक्तासिद्धेः ।।

Translation: Thus if predicatehood be identified with modeness of a particular kind, then in 'like a second-chord', etc., if the reference of the first word in the compound be intended as predicate, then there is no difficulty, whereas in treating it as non-compound 'a chord second' and thereby resolving the difficulty, one goes against the position of the rhetoricians.

Like predicatehood, subjecthood, too, is independent objecthood different from modeness, etc. It cannot be said that qualificandumness *is* subjecthood. For, then, in the cognition of meaning of the sentence 'on the hill, fire', as a conclusion with the probandum as the qualificandum has been justified, the subjecthood of the hill cannot be explained.

It cannot also be said that—subjecthood is determinerness of predicatehood, and that is predicate of that; in this way, their qualifierness and qualificandumness, too, remain unharmed. What, then, is it necessary to postulate subjecthood as an additional objecthood?

For, one can equally say that subjecthood is independent, and predicatehood is its determiner; and in the absence of any reason for preference, independence of both is established.

Explanation: Gadādhara now explains the new distinction between subject and predicate. An object cognized in a qualified cognition has been analysed so far into a qualifier, a qualificandum and a relation between them. Gadādhara has propounded the theory that all these three have different objecthood and these are all additional, ontologically real, abstract properties. Now he introduces this new distinction in the structure cognized, and also holds that subjecthood and predicatehood, like qualifierness, etc. are ontologically real abstract properties. They cannot be reduced to the first pair.

17.21 *Gadādhara's Final Position*

Text

इदन्त्ववधेयम् । अस्तु विधेयत्वमुद्देश्यत्वञ्चातिरिक्तम्, तयोर्विषयता-

त्वे मानाभावः । पर्वतो वह्निमानित्यनुमितौ पर्वतवह्न्यादिषु तथाविध-प्रत्यक्षसाधारणविशेष्यताप्रकारतास्वीकारस्यावश्यकतया तत एव तादृशज्ञानस्य तद्विषयकत्वोपपत्तेः । प्रकारतादीनां तत्रानुपगमे तादृशानुमित्यादीनां बाधाद्यप्रतिबध्यत्वप्रसङ्गः, विरोधिज्ञानाप्रतिबन्धकत्वप्रसङ्गश्च, प्रकारतादीनामेव तादृशप्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावावच्छेदकत्वादिति दिक् ॥

Translation: One ought to ponder over this. Let predicatehood and subjecthood be independent reals, but there is no justification for ascribing objecthood to them. In the inference, 'the hill is fire-possessing', it is necessary to admit qualifierness and qualificandumness in the hill and the fire, for this distinction is common to perceptual cognition; simply by admitting this distinction their objecthood is explained.

If qualifierness etc. be not admitted in the inference, then it cannot be explained how it can be blocked by cognition of the absence of the probandum in the locus, and also how it can block a contradictory cognition; it is modeness etc. which is the limitor of such preventer-preventedness. This is only a hint.

Explanation: Gadādhara concludes his treatise by just stating briefly a very important topic. He has propounded the theory that the two pairs of terms, qualifier and qualificandum, and, subject and predicate, cannot be reduced to one pair. Ontologically their properties are all real entities.

But now he raises the further point. Is the distinction between subject and predicate an epistemological distinction? By denying that the *object* of cognition has this distinction, he has given a negative answer to the question. He has argued that it is necessary to introduce the qualifier-qualificandum distinction into what is cognized, for otherwise the preventer-prevented relation among cognitions cannot be explained. But why should a further distinction that between subject and predicate be introduced into what is the *object* of cognition? We hazard the guess here, that this distinction might be merely psychological. This does not mean that the distinction is unreal or subjective. It merely means that the distinction between the subject and the predicate in what is cognized may be *relative to the cognizer,* instead of being *in* what is cognized. The subject is that *about* which one

wants to cognize something, and the predicate is that which is cognized about it. Although Gadādhara has accepted the syntactical-semantical rule that the referent of the last word in a non-compound expression is necessarily the predicate, still this does not mean that the predicate is an element, a constituent, of the object. A different *word order* necessarily changes the subject and the predicate, but this change does not imply that there has been any change in the qualifier-qualificandum distinction. This latter distinction is essential to objecthood, for different types of cognitions are distinguished from each other in terms of them. But no such function is ascribed to the subject-predicate distinction. Hence Gadādhara, in his concluding passage, suggests but does not develop, the point that there is no reason why subjectness and predicateness be ascribed objecthood of cognitions.

But there are difficulties in thus conceiving the subject-predicate distinction as not belonging to the object of cognition. It is true that Sanskrit, being an inflectional language, permits inversions of various types (and this makes it difficult, in many cases impossible, to represent the point that the Navya-Nyāya philosophers are making in this context, as the word-order in Sanskrit cannot always be preserved in English) and the word-order is determined, within the permissible limits, by the intention of the speaker which can even override the syntactic-semantical rule. But this factor is totally absent in perceptual cognition, for there is no speaker-hearer distinction in that type of cognition. So many Navya-Nyāya philosophers deny the subject-predicate distinction in perceptual cognition.

But difficulties arise in the analysis of inferential cognition. For an inference is analysed into three terms, the probandum, the probans and the locus of an inference, in order to exhibit its structure without which no inference can be judged valid or invalid. Now this analysis of the structure of inference is wholly in terms of the subject-predicate distinction. As Gadādhara himself has accepted the Navya-Nyāya theory that the probandum of an inference is the predicate in the conclusion, he could not identify predicatehood with modeness (qualifierness); for the probandum may, or may not, be a mode in the conclusion. Now in an inference for one's own sake no language is used according to Navya-Nyāya philosophers; whether one agrees with them

on this point or not, it is clear that in an inferential situation there is no hearer-speaker distinction. Thus the distinction between subject and predicate in the conclusion of an inference is determined by what the person inferring *wants* to infer. The probandum of an inference is completely independent of the word-order of the sentence in which the inference is expressed; and further, the word-order of the sentence gives *no* indication of what *is* the probandum or the locus of an inference. Thus the distinction between the subject and the predicate in an inference is absolutely necessary for its analysis, even though it is determined by what the person inferring wants to infer. Thus at least in inference, the subject-predicate distinction plays a vital role; and *if* the probandum-locus distinction in the conclusion of an inference is an epistemological distinction, then it follows that the subject-predicate distinction, too, is an epistemological distinction which determines the *objective* structure of the inference.